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1 Purpose and scope 
 
Widely available insurance within a well-
functioning and solvent market has the potential 
to not only assist the recovery from hazard events; 
but also positively influence mitigation behaviour. 
However, the characteristics of current flood 
insurance models and their effectiveness vary 
considerably between countries. How flood 
insurance provision is structured, what losses are 
covered and excluded and how it is purchased all 
impact upon the effectiveness of the scheme for 
recovering from flood losses and ultimately how 
burden sharing is split between the at-risk 
individual and society. 
 
This study reviews international insurance 
provision (and compensation schemes) for adverse 
natural events.  It will focus primarily on flood 
insurance for domestic properties and in particular 
assess insurance cover for all sources of flooding 
(including fluvial, coastal and surface water) and 
other storm related losses.  Each insurance model 
is described and its performance for aiding 
recovery as well as modifying risk behaviour 
examined.  A number of criteria are used to 
evaluate these models including; degree of 
insurance penetration, coverage, insurability, 
equity, incentives for mitigation and impact on 
market solvency.   
 
The review also examines the role of insurance 
within a broader portfolio of flood and storm 
management.  Recognising the balance between a 
focus on proactive management and recovery as 
well as public and private investment is critical to 
understanding the overall role of insurance within 
a country and wider lessons that can be drawn.  
This cultural and flood management context is 
fundamental to assessing the impact that flood 
insurance may have on community resilience.  
Where possible, the review draws on information 
about insurance trends and other data for the 
provision of cover for older people; although the 
availability of data specifically for this group is 
limited. 
 
The review aims to investigate the following 
questions: 
 
 What is the role of insurance for adapting to 
flood risk and how can flood insurance 
arrangements be adopted to spread the burden 
of flooding in such a way that it builds 
community resilience to flooding?  
 
 What are the characteristics of currently 
adopted insurance models and what are the 
benefits and limitations for adoption within 
New Zealand for building community resilience 
to flooding and storms? 
 
 Is it possible to map the key criteria of 
insurance models and products onto the 
resilience characteristics and needs of older 
people?   
 
 What insurance products and assistance are 
best placed to assist older people to secure 
their quality of life, given the risks of hard to 
predict, severe adverse events impacting on 
their community?   
 
 What specific needs do older people in New 
Zealand have with regard to the provision of 
flood insurance?  For instance, issues of 
accommodation security, tenure and the 
problematic insurance status of retirement 
village residents.   Are innovative models of 
insurance required and is the insurance 
industry able to provide these? 
 
 What is the current interest of insurers in 
promoting mitigation and community resilience?  
What activities have they undertaken and how 
interested are they in features such as resilient 
design and the structural integrity of dwellings. 
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2 Building financial resilience to flood losses: Introduction to the general 
principles of insurance, the insurability of floods and the role of compensation 
 
There are many ways in which those who suffer 
the impacts of flooding can financially recover 
from the losses. These mechanisms can be broadly 
characterised by the level to which those who 
receive financial assistance, directly pay for the 
recovery mechanism and the formality and rigidity 
of the device.  It has been stated that;  
 
“In recovery terms there are two issues; efficiency 
which involves the design of loss-sharing 
agreements that provide incentives for mitigation; 
and equity which is how to evaluate the fairness of 
loss-sharing arrangements that reduce the 
vulnerability of different groups.”  
IIASA (1999, p3).  
 
Recovery systems have to therefore balance these 
two objectives.  Priest (2003) provides a 
straightforward typology of flood-recovery options 
with the directness of financial input by the 
individual affected diminishing progressively as you 
read down the table.  
 
It is often the case that following a flood event 
(and in particular one that causes extensive 
damages) a variety of these different mechanisms 
is in place or adopted to recover 
from flood impacts.  It is likely that victims will be 
offered some assistance and will be expected to 
bear the remainder of the losses themselves. The 
most common mixes are those between the levels 
of flood victims bearing the loss individually and 
between compensation and flood insurance.  
Indeed, even those individuals with the most 
comprehensive flood insurance policies usually 
have to bear some of the loss through the 
application of a deductible. 
 
Examination of the recovery mechanisms used 
internationally (Section 6) highlights the various 
blends of these devices, illustrating the situations 
under which they operate.  Each will be critically 
assessed using the two key characteristics 
described by IIASA (1999): efficiency and equity.  
These assessment criteria are discussed in more 
detail in Section 4. To this is added the third 
criteria of robustness; as a recovery mechanism 
will be unable to achieve its goal in the longer term 
if it is not economically viable.  This is particularly 
important in the case of flood insurance provision 
and there are several principles to which insurance 
needs to adhere to be considered equitable, 
efficient and robust. 
  
Table 2.1: Types of recovery from flood losses 
Recovery 
mechanism  
Explanation and characteristics 
Loss bearing The victim carries all of the losses. This might mean drawing on savings or having to 
borrow money in order to re-build and recover from flood damages. In this case the 
victim is generally directly paying for all of the losses; although also within this 
category passing the loss onto the immediate family may also be described.  
Loss sharing This involves spreading the flood losses more widely and there may be many ways in 
which this is achieved; a formalised mechanism is flood insurance. Those recovering 
from losses are directly paying for these damages through the premiums, however 
the losses are spread temporally and spatially and therefore they do not pay the total 
amount.  
Compensation Compensation can be described as a more social device and is a term that is used to 
describe the situation where the national, regional, city, or local government provide 
assistance following flooding. The victim does pay for a percentage of the damages in 
the form of taxes although the payment is very indirect and not directly related to the 
value of their property of the losses that they suffer.  
Charitable/ 
International aid 
Assistance from outside of the community and even from outside of the country. The 
money from these organisations usually comes from donations and therefore the 
victim does not directly pay for the losses.   
Source:  After Priest (2003)  
3 
 
2.1 General principles of insurance and 
insurance for natural hazards 
This section briefly introduces the basic principles 
of insurance (see also the Glossary in Appendix C) 
and the conditions which need to be met in order 
for an insurance scheme to be viable.  It 
concentrates on property and contents insurance; 
personal and health insurance will not be covered. 
Faure and Hartlief (2003) discuss the basic premise 
of insurance as being relatively straightforward – it 
is a mechanism in response to risk aversion.  
Individuals, companies and countries need to have 
an aversion to risk and to the uncertainty about 
that risk before they will seek coverage.  Much has 
been written about the conditions necessary for 
risks to be insurable and for insurance schemes to 
be robust.  Arnell (2000) presents five conditions 
that need to exist to ensure the sustainability and 
long-term robustness of any insurance strategy.  
These are: 
 
1. It must be possible to estimate the likelihood 
and magnitude of possible losses, so that 
premiums can be calculated that reflect this 
loss potential. If this is not possible, the 
premiums become arbitrary and the insurance 
agency (private or governmental) is at risk; 
2. Losses from individual claims must be 
independent, and no single event such as a 
major flood should affect the majority (or even 
a large number) of those insured. If this is not 
the case, then the insurance agency might be 
faced with an overwhelming claims total, and 
fail. 
3. The occurrence of any event leading to claims 
must not be predictable in deterministic terms 
(i.e. the dam will fail tomorrow and my house 
will be lost), or else those purchasing policies 
will only do so when they know that a claim is 
certain / likely. 
4. There must be sufficient demand for insurance 
coverage to make a large enough market 
whereby a single event such as major flood 
does not lead to claims that exhaust the 
insurance agencies’ resources. 
5. The premium charged to the insured must be 
acceptable such that coverage is purchased. 
Source: Arnell (2000; 413). 
 
In a similar manner, Hausmann (1998) and 
Mehlhorn and Hausmann (2012) introduce six 
different “Principles of Insurability” some of which 
map onto the conditions presented by Arnell (2000) 
above and others which complement them.  Table 
2.2 combines these principles and these 
characteristics will be used in Section 2.2 to discuss 
the particular challenges associated with the 
insurability of flood insurance. 
 
Table 2.2:  Principles of Insurability (After Mehlhorn and Hausmann, 20121
                                                     
1
Presented in Hausmann (1998) which gives the original source as Gruss, W. (1977) Versicherungswirtschaft. Verlag Peter Land: Bern, Switzerland. 
The 2012 Principles omits Need, but assumes that the majority of floods will cause damages and create a financial need.  NB – the first five 
principles are those reported by Mehlhorn and Hausmann (2012) and their original principles are quoted in italics 
; Hausmann, 1998 and 
Arnell, 2000) 
Principle Description 
Mutuality 
“A large number of people who are at risk must combine to form a risk community”. This relates 
to Arnell’s principle that there is a sufficient demand for insurance.  
Assessibility 
“The expected loss burden must be assessable.”  This means that it needs to be possible to 
estimate both the likelihood and magnitude of possible losses so that premiums can be calculated 
to reflect this loss potential. 
Randomness 
“The time at which the insured event occurs must not be predictable, and the occurrence itself 
must be independent of the will of the insured.”  This is similar to the independent and 
unpredictable characteristics (Points 2 and 3) described by Arnell (2000). 
Economic 
viability 
“The community organized by the insured people must be able to cover its future, loss-related 
financial needs on a planned basis.” 
Similarity of 
threat 
“The insured community must be exposed to the same threat, and the occurrence of the 
anticipated event must rise to the need for funds in the same way for all concerned.” 
Need “When the anticipated event occurs, it must place the insured in a position of financial need.” 
Affordability 
This final point relates to the need to ensure that insurance is affordable and that the premium is 
acceptable to the majority.  Without this criterion being fulfilled the mutuality element of 
insurance will not be sufficiently fulfilled. 
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Michel-Kerjan (2001) highlights that one of the 
main characteristics of natural perils is the 
movement from a situation of private risk towards 
one of collective (or societal) risk and adverse 
natural events are not always subject to the same 
traditional rules of insurance. He goes on to argue 
that single property risks, when combined through 
a natural catastrophe aggregate, become a public 
problem which is potentially greater than the 
collection of the individual risks.   Therefore, 
effective insurance against these risks is essential 
to the resilience of any natural disaster-prone 
community. 
 
Private and public-based insurance has long played 
a role in the recover from natural hazards.  White 
(2011) suggests that insurance is “a key pillar in 
any comprehensive strategy of adaptation to 
natural hazards” Insurance: 
 
 increases resilience against residual risks 
that cannot be prevented or mitigated 
 can incentivize engagement and investment 
in risk mitigation measures 
 reduces pressure on the fiscal budget from 
natural disasters  
After White (2011). 
 
Hoeppe and Gurenko (2006) argue that in 
developed countries the insurance industry 
absorbs approximately 40% of all economic losses 
caused by adverse natural events. From the 
perspective of private insurers, if the market is 
functioning well, natural risks are assessable and if 
there is a sufficient demand for coverage, 
insurance against natural perils have the 
potentially to be profitable.  Governments are also 
keen to have a functioning insurance system due 
to the potential demands on public resources 
following large natural events.  For instance, 
following a disaster governments are often 
expected to provide to support for reconstruction 
which may also extend to assistance to the 
individual households if insurance is not available 
or widely adopted.  Different types of insurance 
(whether private or public), reinsurance and also 
the creation of ex-ante compensation funds permit 
governments the ability to reduce the pressure on 
fiscal budgets following disasters and spread that 
risk over both time and space. 
 
Insurance therefore is a “potentially valuable tool 
for encouraging loss reduction measures against 
natural hazards and for providing recovery funds 
to disaster victims” (Kunreuther, 1996; 184).  
However, he goes on to argue that the types of 
exposure being covered and the nature of adverse 
natural events means that private insurers are not 
able to take on these risks alone and that they are 
reliant on other mechanisms to assist in risk 
management.  Consequently, there is often the 
need to require the active involvement and 
agreement of other parties such as government 
agencies, building contractors and other financial 
institutions to ensure that other policy tools (e.g. 
construction codes, risk reduction measures) are 
implemented (Kunreuther, 1996). 
 
The following section explores the nature and 
characteristics of flooding and the insurability of 
losses from flood events. 
2.2 Insurance as a mechanism for recover y 
from flood events: Key characteristics of 
the insurability of floods 
Sayers et al. (2012; 187) identify four main roles of 
flood insurance when it is part of a portfolio of 
measures to reduce, manage or recover from flood 
risk: 
  
1. Reimbursing those who suffer damage, and 
thereby restoring them to their pre-flood 
financial situation. 
2. Spreading the costs of flooding across 
communities (and clients), given that floods 
may affect only some communities at a time; 
and for individuals through time by spreading 
the potential costs of flood damage over 
many years in relatively small payments 
rather than having a single large cost if, and  
when, a flood actually occurs.  
3. Reducing the costs to the government of 
post-event recovery since the insured will 
receive insurance funds (note: where a private 
insurance sector exists only) 
4. Promoting a change of behaviour with regard 
to exposure to flood risk, by giving a signal of 
the hazard that people face and providing 
incentives for “good behaviour”  
 
Purchasing insurance ensures that a certain level of 
financial recompense is granted after a flood event 
and it can therefore be described as acting as a 
buffer between the impacts of a hazard and those 
who may be affected.  In essence, flood insurance 
might be considered to be an economically-
structured social device.   Fundamentally, flood 
insurance can be viewed as a risk transfer 
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mechanism through which the adverse impacts of 
flooding are transferred through both time and 
space. An individual takes out insurance to reduce 
the uncertainty of recovery from flood impacts in 
the future. By paying a premium in the short term 
they are ensuring that they will receive 
recompense in the event of future flooding. The 
flood risk is also transferred spatially because, 
through multiple premiums, an insurance company 
can pool the risk over a wider geographic area. This 
means that the total risk of flooding is reduced to a 
manageable level and their insurance portfolio 
remains ‘viable’. In order for flood insurance to be 
offered and the market to remain sustainable 
there are a number of criteria which need to be 
fulfilled. These criteria are collectively known as 
the insurability of the risk. 
 
Therefore, in principle insurance appears to be an 
appropriate and successful way in which 
individuals, communities and governments might 
enable the recovery from flood damages.  
However, Mehlhorn and Hausmann (2012) suggest 
that providing insurance for flood events provides 
a very specific set of challenges which unless 
handled carefully can prevent its commercial 
viability.  Each of the principles identified above in 
Section 2.1 are re-presented in Table 2.3 in relation 
to their significance with the provision of flood 
insurance (after Sandink et al., 2010).  This 
highlights that some of the principles are easier to 
establish than others and also illustrates the clear 
interaction between the principles.  For instance, 
unless the assessibility of the risk is adequate this 
threatens the economic viability of the scheme; 
whereas not ensuring randomness within the risks 
covered threatens the mutuality of the insurance. 
 
 
Table 2.3:  Application of the general principles of insurance to floods: the insurability of flooding 
Principle Description 
Mutuality 
While traditional flood definitions do not lend themselves to mutuality (i.e. those 
occupying floodplains), when a more encompassing definition of flood is used, which 
includes flooding that can occur virtually anywhere, mutuality can be obtained.   
 
Mutuality is then addressed through bundled insurance coverage for flood. 
Assessibility 
Assessibility can be attained through renewed and continued flood mapping efforts.   
However, there needs to be a balance between very accurate assessment and knowing 
too much about the risk.  In many situations accurate assessment is a barrier to accurate 
pricing; although this is improving all the time. 
Randomness 
Sandink et al. (2010) suggests that randomness might be achieved by restricting 
insurance from those at highest risk (e.g., those who occupy the 1 in 100 year floodplain), 
and through insurers keeping track of changes in flood hazards.  However, depending on 
the location in question and the terms of the cover this might threaten the mutuality 
(and thereby the economic viability) of the insurance scheme as it may lead to an 
insufficiently large pooling of the risk. 
Economic 
viability 
A robust and large insurance community can result in economic viability through bundled 
flood insurance coverage. A large insurance community can serve to keep insurance rates 
low, and will provide capacity for pay-outs when flood disasters occur. 
Similarity of 
threat 
Water is the cause of damage in each case regardless of the type of flooding that occurs.  
This is not the same of course if flood insurance is bundled with other types of perils and 
the threat (although in some cases can still be linked) can be dissimilar. 
Need 
There exists a need to cover flood damages – i.e. flooding will cause individuals or 
companies to suffer material damages and be in financial need of recompense.  This is a 
usual situation in relation to flooding. 
Affordability 
This final point relates to the need to ensure that insurance is affordable and that the 
premium is acceptable to the majority.  Without this criterion being fulfilled the 
mutuality element of insurance will not be sufficiently fulfilled. 
Source:  After Mehlhorn and Hausmann (2012), Sandink et al. (2010)
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Of initial interest when discussing flood insurance 
is what is defined as flooding from an insurance 
perspective; as this ultimately determines those 
impacts that are ultimately compensated.  Flood 
definitions of course vary between policies, 
between insurers and between those countries in 
which flood insurance is provided.  What is 
surprising however is although definitions of 
flooding are often considered to be precise they 
are equally often confusing in terms of coverage; 
often resulting in court challenge.  An example of 
this is in Australia, where riverine flood insurance 
has traditionally been limited, yet the poor and 
confusing working of insurance cover from storms 
means that many homeowners still believe that 
they are covered when affected by a flood. A 
similar issue occurred in the US following 
Hurricane Katrina leading to lengthy lawsuits 
costing US$ millions.  In this case insurers argued 
that homes were washed away by storm surge (an 
in effect flooding) and therefore claims were only 
valid for those fewer eligible properties 
participating in the National Flood Insurance 
Program.  Conversely, homeowners argued that 
their properties were taken away by the wind and 
therefore they should receive full indemnification 
for the losses from insurers (Sandink et al., 2010). 
Therefore the definition of insurance is critical and 
not always straightforward.  A similar problem 
exists in New Zealand between damages caused by 
flooding (covered by private insurance) and debris 
flows (covered under the EQC) which highlights the 
importance of how an event is defined (discussed 
in more detail in Section 5). 
 
Much confusion also exists in New Zealand in 
relation to the terms of insurance and if or how 
their policy covers flooding.  In many cases the 
extent of coverage is ambiguous with insurers in 
particular not being clear about if the insured 
amounts include or exclude Goods and Services 
Tax (GST) leaving the insurant unclear about how 
much they will receive from the claims process.   
 
Mehlhorn and Hausmann (2012) present the three 
major obstacles to the provision of flood insurance.  
These barriers are: 
 
 The assessibility of the losses 
 The problem of anti-selection; 
 Ensuring economic viability of the insurance 
system 
 
It is possible to overcome these barriers through a 
well-functioning system and these barriers and 
their potential solutions will now be discussed. 
2.2.1 Assessibility of losses 
This first barrier identified by Mehlhorn and 
Hausmann (2012) is that the risk is assessable. In 
order to ensure that an insurance company 
remains in business it is essential that they have a 
good strategy to manage their risk exposure.  
Indeed, this exposure management is seen as 
critical to good insurance practice and is becoming 
increasingly regulated by such instruments as the 
EU Directive Solvency II (European Parliament and 
of the Council, 2009 – see Appendix A1.1). To 
enable the exposure to be effectively managed the 
flood hazard and risk needs to be translated into 
damages and monetary values in order that 
adequate premiums are established. This thus 
introduces reliance upon adequate identification 
of the hazards and requires the availability of 
either past historical records, floodplain mapping 
or inundation modelling.  If this data is not 
available or easily accessible then this may lead to 
the inability to provide effective cover for this risk.   
 
However, the reliance on data and flood modelling 
may vary depending upon how flood insurance is 
provided and how the cover is structured.  The 
more directly the premiums need to relate to the 
risk (i.e. through a single insurance policy for 
flooding) the more important the assessibility of 
that risk is.  The importance of flood data 
diminishes when dealing with a composite package 
and it is the balance between the different types of 
risks that emerges as being of greater significance.  
Insurers would argue however that the more 
information that they have about flood risks the 
better: even if they choose not to use all of this 
information for pricing purposes.  
 
It is not only the accessibility of the risk which 
impacts on the premiums charged; in many 
instances the market also intervenes.  This is 
noticeable in the United Kingdom, for instance, 
where for many years the general insurance 
market has been very competitive and therefore it 
has not be economically viable to price flood 
insurance in direct relation to the risk.   
 
Although there have been moves towards better 
assessibility of flood risks it is still important to 
retain some element of uncertainty; if a loss is 
expected to occur then a pay-out is likely. Insuring 
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a risk that is considered to be ‘certain in timing’ 
goes against the general principles of insurance as 
it removes the ability of the insurer and reinsurer 
to accrue profit.   This starts to become an issue in 
areas of very high flood risk and those that suffer 
repeated events where although the exact timing 
of a flood is still uncertain; the high probability of 
an event may lead to conditions of uninsurability 
unless other mitigation measures are implemented. 
 
Connected to the issue of risk assessment is moral 
hazard (Winter, 1992). This is related to the 
potential increase in the “probability and/or size of 
loss caused by the behaviour of the policyholder” 
(Kunreuther, 2002). It has been acknowledged that 
the presence of insurance provision may have a 
detrimental effect upon the actions of property 
owners in reducing the impacts of flooding. 
Insurance companies need to be able to estimate 
the impact of this behaviour; otherwise it is likely 
that insurance premiums will be too low. 
2.2.2 The problem of anti-selection 
“A fundamental principle of insurance is that it 
groups individual risks into ‘pools’ of similar risks. 
This helps to ensure that everyone pays a fair price 
for the risk that they bring into the pool” (Sampson, 
2001). Therefore, there must be sufficient demand 
for coverage of flood insurance in order to 
establish a large enough pool of policyholders. This 
ensures that any one insurer has enough income 
spread over a wide region so that not all 
policyholders will claim if a major event were to 
occur and therefore the risk is transferred spatially. 
 
However, many adverse natural events are 
considered to be a correlated risk where many 
properties in the same area suffer losses as part of 
a single event (Kunreuther, 2007).  This is the 
situation with flooding, the characteristics of this 
hazard means that often large geographical areas 
are inundated at the same time, thereby exposing 
insurers to large losses. Similarly, it is often the 
same areas that are repeatedly affected. In this 
respect, the hazard of flooding hinders insurers 
from following the fundamental principle of 
insurance in spreading the losses over both time 
and space. Theoretically, if flood insurance was to 
be presented as a single risk, and a separate 
premium offered, there is the likelihood that only 
those who believed that they might be flooded 
would purchase it. The problem with this is two-
fold. Firstly, if only those liable to flooding bought 
cover, then the risk is not sufficiently spread 
spatially and the insurance companies are unlikely 
to be able to generate a sufficient pool from which 
to draw in the event of widespread flooding. “The 
mutuality requirement of flooding is not met when 
frequently affected risks are the only ones insured,” 
(Hausmann, 1998, p7) and therefore the economic 
viability of the insurance system is threatened.  
This is a situation present with the US National 
Flood Insurance Program leading to the need to 
reform as occurred in 2012 (Anderson, 2000; Burby, 
2001). Secondly, if the pool is not large enough to 
spread the risks, the costs of insurance for those 
purchasing it is too high (Paklina, 2003). 
 
This situation where only those affected by a peril 
wish to purchase insurance is known as adverse-
risk selection or ‘anti-selection’.  Generally, anti-
selection only occurs in those situations where 
flood insurance is optional (Crichton, 2008; 
Sandink et al., 2010).  If insurers were to offer 
cover purely for flood insurance, they may find 
that they are liable to pay out very high numbers 
of claims, without having the premium base to 
cover it.  A first approach to overcoming this 
problem is to charge technically-priced premiums 
which directly reflect the level of the risk faced.  
Many policyholders would deem these to be 
unacceptably high and unaffordable; thereby one 
of conditions suggested by Arnell (2000) that the 
size of the premium is acceptable to the insured is 
not fulfilled. To be able to secure a wide coverage 
and a sufficient number of policyholders, it is 
essential that the premiums are set appropriately 
and are considered to be acceptable to the insured. 
This raises implications concerning the image of 
insurance companies and concerns by insurers 
over the adverse publicity associated with 
increases in premiums.  
 
The main mechanism that many private insurer’s 
use to tackle the problem of anti-selection and the 
problem of not being able to charge full-actuarial 
premiums, is to pool the risks further and charge 
premiums that are not commensurable solely with 
the flood risk.  Composite insurance involves the 
bundling’ of flood insurance with other perils and 
these often include other natural perils (such as 
earthquakes, windstorms) and fire or theft policies.  
In these cases those not liable to flooding, but still 
susceptible to the other bundled perils, such as fire 
and theft, would essentially be cross-subsidising 
those flooded during a major event. 
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A related issue is whether an insurance policy is 
voluntary or compulsory in nature.  The type of the 
insurance therefore impacts upon the number of 
policyholders purchasing flood insurance and 
ultimately the size of the pool.  If insurance is 
voluntary then this also leads to issues about 
awareness of the hazard and ultimately whether 
they would purchase flood insurance to assist 
recovery following a flood event.   
2.2.3 Ensuring economic viability of the 
insurance system 
The final obstacle of Mehlhorn and Hausmann 
(2012) relates to the insurance company (or state 
entity in the case of governmental-backed 
insurance) maintaining its economic viability.  
Sandink et al. (2010; 41) affirms that economic 
viability is threatened “when extremely large loss 
events affect an area with a large concentration of 
policy holders”.  Botzen and van den Bergh (2008) 
argue that this may occur when risks are highly 
correlated which may be the case with natural 
events (e.g. storms and flooding).  Therefore, the 
losses actually incurred by the insurance company 
need to be relatively low compared to the total 
number of premiums sold. This is to ensure that 
the insurers have enough in their ‘pool’ to cover 
their loss. There needs to be a balance struck by 
those managing the risk. The level of premium 
needs to ensure that the price is acceptable to 
those being insured, so that enough people take 
out cover to spread sufficiently the risk 
geographically.  Furthermore, a sufficiently high 
premium needs to be charged so that a private 
insurance company both covers its losses in the 
event of a pay-out, and has sufficient funds to 
invest to make a profit. It is this aspect that may be 
challenging the insurance industry’s willingness to 
continue providing cover, as the profitability of 
general household insurance is threatened.  
Flooding may affect the economic viability of 
insurance in two specific ways: as flooding may 
occur in a small geographical area if insurers have 
too much exposure in that location and secondly if 
flooding affects widespread areas of a country (e.g. 
Elbe 2002, summer 2007 in UK and Queensland 
2010/2011). 
 
In the strictest sense those offering insurance via a 
commercial market are in business to make a 
profit, a fact that needs to be remembered 
whenever the private insurance industry is being 
considered. This is a relatively complex notion. 
Profits will be generated if the income gathered 
through premiums exceeds the amount paid out as 
claims and the money spent on administrative 
overheads. This is not the whole situation, as even 
if insurance companies are unable to make a profit 
directly from a particular insurance product such 
as flood insurance (i.e. claims exceed premium 
income), their business might still be profitable. 
This profit could be generated solely through the 
investment of the premiums that have been 
collected (D. Whitaker; Guy Carpenter, pers. 
comm.) or through an insurers’ diversification of 
insurance products. 
 
As well as making a profit it is equally essential for 
the insurance company to remain solvent, as it is 
not just the company who would suffer if they 
were unable to make payments after an event. The 
collapse of an insurer, similar to that of 
Independent in June 2001 (BBC news website, 
2001) threatens policyholders’ compensation and 
it may also mean that the obligations of the insurer 
to provide recovery would fall on another party, 
either the rest of the industry or the Government 
(Dlugolecki, 1999). It is essential that insurers have 
a good idea of the risks involved when offering 
cover and have a proficient risk management 
strategy aimed at calculating and understanding 
their aggregate exposure.  
 
Although there are a number of issues related to 
the insurability of the flood peril there are various 
ways in which flood insurance and reinsurance can 
be delivered and maintain these principles 
(Mehlhorn and Hausmann, 2012).  These are 
explored further in Section 6 and Appendix A. 
 
As discussed above, bundling risks is the main way 
that insurers use to increase the pool of insured 
and spread the risks geographically.  Sandink et al. 
(2010) also stress the importance of reinsurance in 
reducing the risks to insurers and guaranteeing the 
limiting of their financial exposure. 
 
2.3 The context of insurance within disaster-
risk financing 
It is important to briefly put catastrophe risk 
insurance for properties into a broader context of 
disaster-risk financing. Many provide 
categorisations of different types of disaster 
9 
 
Table 2.4: Pillars of disaster risk financing and insurance 
Type Description Primary beneficiaries 
Sovereign 
Disaster Risk 
Financing 
Financial strategies to increase the financial response 
capacity of governments in the aftermath of natural 
disasters, while protecting their long-term fiscal balances 
National and local 
governments 
Property 
Catastrophe Risk 
Insurance 
Develop competitive and sustainable catastrophe 
insurance markets and increase property catastrophe 
insurance penetration 
Households, small-and 
medium-enterprises; 
national governments 
Agricultural 
Insurance 
Develop cost-effective, sustainable and affordable 
agricultural insurance programs for farmers, herders, and 
agricultural financing institutions 
Farmers, herders, rural 
finance institutions, 
cooperatives 
Disaster Micro-
Insurance 
Facilitate access to disaster insurance products to protect 
the livelihood of the poor against natural disasters and 
promote disaster risk reduction in conjunction with social 
programs 
Low-income 
populations 
Source: After GFDRR (2011a) 
 
financing and insurance (e.g. GFDRR, 2011a; 
Schrader, 2012).  GFDRR (2011a) identifies four 
different categories which are presented and 
explained in Table 2.4.  The comparison in this 
report focuses almost exclusively on the first two 
of these categories: Sovereign disaster risk 
financing and property catastrophe risk insurance.  
Although this report primarily provides a 
comparison of insurance and compensation 
schemes for individual citizen’s property, other 
types of financing from disasters are used and 
some are becoming more important in certain 
situations.     
One of the most desirable situations is to transfer 
the financial losses and risks to the market as this 
is often seen to be the most effective and efficient 
mechanism for dealing with them.  The UN/World 
Bank (2010) has identified three different ways in 
which financial risks can be transferred to the 
market and the instruments that are used to make 
the transfer.  They also identify two ways in which 
the financial risk is retained (Figure 2.1). 
2.3.1 Insurance versus compensation 
The mechanisms that communities and individuals 
use to recover from flood loss vary greatly 
between countries. In some, particularly in the 
developing world, there is little formal assistance 
following flood events and the majority of the loss 
falls upon individuals and communities (risk-
bearing). International and charitable aid is offered 
for the more catastrophic events, however for the 
smaller more frequent events the community has 
to bear most of the losses (Blaikie et al., 1994; May 
et al., 1997). On a global scale IIASA (1999, p3) 
believe that “victims and their governments bear 
the major losses from natural disasters worldwide 
and that there is only moderate risk transfer with 
insurance and even less global loss sharing through 
international aid.” There is much that can be 
learned from studying the situation in these 
countries and the ways in which these 
communities cope with the impacts of flooding is 
important.  
 
It is important to realise that when discussing 
mechanisms for recovery from flood loss in 
developed countries (i.e. those nations where 
international aid is not required following a 
disaster), society ultimately bears the loss. It is the 
mechanism and route by which the finances are 
distributed that differs. In the case of 
compensation and government assistance 
following flooding, society contributes through 
taxes. If a commercial market provides insurance 
then members of society provide these payments 
through premiums. Society is fundamentally 
investing in the recovery of productive capacity 
following a flooding event.  
 
The role of society in ultimately paying for these 
losses is often masked by the mechanisms used to 
hold and distribute funds following a flood event. 
This relationship needs to be remembered and 
made more explicit, in order to highlight and 
educate the public about the role that they are 
playing in paying for flooding events and therefore 
the steps that are possible for society to take to 
reduce these costs. 
 
What is of primary concern is the balance between 
different levels of individual loss bearing and more 
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structured mechanisms designed to provide 
economic recompense. It is also important to 
examine the insurance penetration of each of the 
different schemes and judge whether perception 
of the level of compensation on offer, directly or 
indirectly, affects the purchasing of flood insurance.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Managing and transferring financial risks to the market 
 
Source: UN/World Bank (2010, p149). 
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3 Trends in flood losses: the importance of flood insurance 
 
Much has been written about the growing 
trends in losses due to natural hazards; both in 
terms of fatalities and economic damages 
(Barredo, 2009; Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 
2012; Bevere et al., 2012; Bevere et al., 2013; 
Kundzewicz et al., 2013).  This section will 
provide a brief discussion about the nature of 
flood losses in comparison to other natural 
hazard events and the significance of insured 
losses. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Number of events between 1970 and 2012 
 
Source: (Bevere et al., 2013) 
 
Figure 3.2: Graph illustrating the number of 
disasters by type between 1970 and 2010 
 
Source:  GFDRR (2011a) 
 
 
Figure 3.1 highlights the upward trend in the 
number of events considered to be disasters 
(both natural and man-made) between 1970 
and 2012.  Figure 3.2 disaggregates this 
trend based upon the type of natural event. 
Of interest for this study is the upward trend 
in the number of flood events which in 2010 
numbered over eight times as many as in the 
early 1970s. The IBRD (2010) represents 
similar data but highlights the significance of 
different types of natural hazards within 
different regions (Figure 3.3).  Floods 
dominate in all but North America and 
Oceania where storms are the most 
frequent disaster; with floods ranking as 
second. Of course with better reporting, 
wider access to data and an increasing 
interest in natural disasters, it is difficult to 
discuss the numbers absolutely; despite this 
however there is some evidence to suggest 
that both floods and storms are becoming 
more frequent. 
Figure 3.3:  Frequency of different types of disasters between regions 
Source: International 
Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (2010; 
28). 
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The GFDRR (2011a) also present another graph 
(Figure 3.4) which highlights the upward trend in 
damages from disasters over the same period.  
However, although the absolute values of disasters 
do appear to be increasing, there is a question 
about whether losses are actually increasing 
through the higher numbers of events or if 
increasing losses are more linked to changes in 
socio-economics (e.g. through inflation, population 
changes and increasing wealth per capita).  
Barredo (2009) undertook a study on a small 
sample of disastrous floods (defined as those with 
losses greater than US$1000 million at 2006 values; 
NZ$1236 million) and normalised the damages to 
2006.  The results of this study (Figure 3.5) 
highlight that this upward trend in damages is no 
longer visible in the loss data and that a more 
periodic nature of damage loss is observed. 
 
Figure 3.4: The upward trend in disaster losses 
between 1970 and 2010 
 
Source:  GFDRR (2011a). 
Figure 3.5: The effect of normalising damages on major flood events in Europe (1970 to 2005) 
 
 
 
 
Annual flood losses in Europe (for the ‘major’ flood events) 
 
Annual flood losses in Europe with normalised damage values to 2006 
Source: Barredo (2009; 101) 
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Bevere et al. (2013) highlights that floods were the 
most significant natural peril in terms of the 
frequency of events in 2012, however when the 
value of insured losses are considered, it comes 
very low down the list of hazards.  This may be for 
one of two reasons; either few losses are insured 
for floods or other types of natural events cause 
more damage. The latter of these is more likely as 
when the twenty most costly events for insurance 
loss in the list are examined, only two flood events 
appear (the UK floods in June and November 2012) 
ranking only 13th and 14th on the list.   There is 
some ambiguity in the data as topping the list of 
the most costly event (at US$ 35 billion in insured 
losses more than three times the next most costly 
event) is Hurricane Sandy which has been 
categorised as a storm event; however many of the 
losses were in effect caused by flood-related 
damages.  Hurricane Sandy was considered to be 
an extreme event hitting areas with high loss 
potential, therefore it is important to question 
whether the insured losses in 2012 are indicative 
of the normal pattern in other years, or if there is 
indeed a recognisable pattern. Table 3.1 highlights 
not only the variability of insured flood losses from 
year to year but also the percentage contribution 
of flood losses to total insured losses.  This ranges 
from a low of 0.8% in 2004 to a high of 24% in 
2007.   
 
 
Table 3.1:  Major annual losses by loss category2 (2004 to 2012) 
Year  
Categories of natural disasters 
Total – all 
natural 
disasters** Floods* Storms 
Earthquakes 
tsunamis 
Droughts, 
bush fires, 
heat waves 
Cold, 
frost 
Hail 
Other natural 
catastrophes 
2004 
Frequency 
 
37 48 13 1 11 5 1 116 (34.9%) 
Insured losses (in 
US$ million) 
361 
(0.8%) 
38 175 5 657 2 1 030 551 - 45 737 (94.1%) 
2005 
Frequency 
 
61 48 12 10 12 3 3 149 (37.5%) 
Insured losses (in 
US$ million) 
3 464 
(4.4%) 
73 512 234 20 623 477 - 78 330 (93.9%) 
2006 
Frequency 
 
58 47 9 5 12 5 - 136 (39.0%) 
Insured losses (in 
US$ million) 
984 
(8.3%) 
8 265 81 120 1 360 1 028 - 11 838 (74.5% 
2007 
Frequency 
 
53 57 10 7 10 3 2 142 (42.4%) 
Insured losses (in 
US$ million) 
5 798 
(24.7%) 
6729 788 745 487 7 76 23 269 (84.4%) 
2008 
Frequency 
 
44 62 12 2 7 7 3 137 (44.1%) 
Insured losses (in 
US$ million) 
2 059 
(4.6%) 
39 288 422 500 1 575 763 85 44 692 (85.15) 
2009 
Frequency 
 
46 51 13 8 6 8 1 133 (46.2%) 
Insured losses (in 
US$ million) 
1 667 
(7.5%) 
13 548 609 1 748 586 4 197 - 22 355 (85.1%) 
2010 
Frequency 
 
69 63 13 9 10 1 2 167 (54.9%) 
Insured losses (in 
US$ million) 
6 393 
(16.0%) 
20 126 12 943 10 397 - - 39 869 (91.7%) 
2011 
Frequency 
 
65 76 15 9 8 2 - 175 (53.8%) 
Insured losses (in 
US$ million) 
16 282 
(14.8%) 
41 152 49 194 2 431 250 630 - 110 021 (95.0%) 
2012 
Frequency 
 
63 61 15 8 13 5 3 168 (52.8%) 
Insured losses (in 
US$ million) 
2 712 
(3.8%) 
54 065 1 787 11 524 250 900 - 71 278 (92.3%) 
Source (Data from Zanetti et al., 2004; Zanetti et al., 2005; Zanetti et al., 2006; Zanetti et al., 2007; Enz et al., 2008; Enz et al., 2009; 
Rogers et al., 2010; Bevere et al., 2011; Bevere et al., 2012; Bevere et al., 2013) 
                                                     
2NB * The percentage value given here in the floods is the total insured flood losses as a percentage of total natural hazard losses 
for that year. ** insured losses are provided for a range of different categories (e.g. man-made disasters, aviation disasters, mining 
disasters, terrorism etc.) therefore the percentages presented in this column are the values out of the total number of disasters. 
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Paklina (2003) in her study following the 2002 
European floods highlighted the considerable 
flood-related losses that some insurers suffered. 
Table 3.2 provides the scale of these losses for 
some of the larger insurers and it is important to 
realise that the data provided here are not the 
total claims but the losses suffered by the 
companies (i.e. total claims minus flood-related 
premiums).  Although the total flood-related 
losses in 2002 were considerable across the 
board they were not considered to have 
threatened the viability of the insurance industry: 
however following the floods the cost of 
insurance was considered to be increasing 
(Paklina, 2003). 
 
Table 3.2: Estimated losses of (re)insurance 
companies from the 2002 floods 
Company Estimated gross 
losses in million 
Euro 
Munich Re 217 to 500 
Swiss Re 170 to 250 
Partner Re 100 to 120 
Hannover Re 64 to 150 
General & Cologne Re 50 
Allianz 770 
Assicurazioni Generali SpA 79 
Pojistovna Ceske Sporitelny 
(CZ) 
69 to 260 
Converium 36 to 50 
Gema 150 
Axa 75 
AGF 58 
Source: (after Paklina, 2003; 4). 
 
Melhorn and Hausmann (2012) contend that 
insured losses are only small in comparison to all 
flood losses.  Bernhardt (2011) highlights this gap 
between the insured losses from catastrophic 
events and total economic losses (Figure 3.6)  
 
3.1 Flood losses in New Zealand 
The Insurance Council in New Zealand publish 
data about the costs of natural disasters in New 
Zealand primarily focussing on the significant 
events3
                                                     
3 see http://www.icnz.org.nz/statistics-data/cost-of-disaster-events-
in-new-zealand/ 
.  No-one can question the significance of 
the 2010/2011 Canterbury earthquake series in 
terms of their impact on the insurance industry 
with insured losses of over NZ$10 billion being  
Figure 3.6: Massive gap between the economic 
and insured catastrophic losses 
 
Source: Bernhardt (2011; slide 7) 
 
 
paid in claims by the end of 2013 with this total 
still likely to increase (ICNZ Press Release, 2014) 
with an additional NZ$12 billion in claims 
expected by the EQC.  However, losses from 
other events and other perils are not insignificant. 
Figure 3.7 combines the data provided between 
1996 and June 2014 (excluding those losses from 
the 2010/2011 Canterbury earthquakes series) 
and also displays the numbers of events featuring 
on the ICNZ list of costly natural disaster events.  
Both of these highlight the significance of both 
storm and flood (and combined events) within 
this insured loss profile.  Indeed, if only those 
events in the 18 months between January 2013 
and June 2014 are considered only 10% have 
come from non-storm or flood related sources (in 
this case the Cook Strait earthquakes). Therefore, 
although the huge losses and claims from 
earthquake events have dominated attention in 
recent years, consideration should also be given 
to the more frequent, albeit smaller event losses, 
accumulating from floods and storms. 
 
Figure 3.7: Disaggregation of the costs of 
natural disasters in New Zealand 
1996-2014 (NZ$ million)4 
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4 International comparison of flood insurance and compensation 
Undertaking an international comparison of flood 
insurance illustrates the variation in the devices 
and mechanisms used to share and bear the risk 
from flooding.  These contexts are important 
because they will affect those instruments that can 
be implemented and ultimately have connotations 
for the transformation of any of these strategies 
for use elsewhere: including in New Zealand. It is 
clear that there are various factors that influence 
the recovery mechanisms present within a country 
and the options available to victims. These include 
socio-economic status, political ideology and 
economic climate.  All of these are factors would 
impact upon the presence and type of flood 
recovery mechanisms and the balance between 
public and private options.  
 
The key criteria for assessment of these 
international examples are efficiency, equity and 
robustness.  
 
4.1 Efficiency 
As described above (Section 2) by IIASA (1999) 
efficiency is the degree to which the loss-sharing 
arrangement is able to promote mitigation 
measures; whether that is at an individual level 
through property-level flood protection, at a 
community level (i.e. through the prevention of 
inappropriate development) or through national 
strategies (e.g. through the implementation of 
national construction standards).Therefore, any 
strategies which encourage mitigation at any level 
will be analysed. 
 
4.2 Equity and fairness 
A more challenging concept is that of equity and 
social justice within flood insurance and recovery.  
Huber (no date) has identified the different 
behavioural dimensions and responsibilities 
between different approaches to recovery from 
flooding.  He identified the following for five 
countries to show the range of different 
approaches between the balances of responsibility. 
 
 UK – individual responsibility 
 US – collective, regional and individual 
responsibility 
 France – collective responsibility of house-
owners 
 Germany – tax payers competing with private 
responsibility 
 The Netherlands – exclusively collective 
responsibility. 
 
This will be extended to the other countries 
explored in this study.  However, notions of 
fairness can be considered to be very complex.  
From the UK perspective there are a number of 
studies which have examined the distributional 
consequences of flood management including their 
impact on insurance provision (HR Wallingford, 
2008; Penning-Rowsell and Pardoe, 2012a; 2012b).    
 
Additionally, O’Neill and O’Neill (2012) have 
examined concepts of social justice related to flood 
insurance in the UK.  They identify three different 
approaches to fairness in the provision of flood 
insurance:  
 
 “‘pure actuarial fairness’ – insurance costs to 
individuals should directly reflect their risk level; 
 ‘choice-sensitive fairness’ – insurance costs to 
individuals should reflect only those risks that 
result from each individual’s choices; 
 ‘fairness as social justice’ – insurance in the 
provision of goods that are basic requirements 
of social justice should be provided 
independently of individuals’ risks and choices.” 
Source: O’Neill and O’Neill (2012: 8-9). 
 
They also identify two models of insurance 
provision for the UK, “individualist, risk-sensitive 
insurance”, provided through a market in which 
individuals’ payments are proportional to their 
level of risk; and “solidaristic, risk-insensitive 
insurance”, in which those at lower risk contribute 
to the support of those at higher risk” (O’Neill and 
O’Neill, 2012; 6-7).  These can be used and 
adapted to describe which type of approach is 
present in each international example.  These 
concepts are however, quite difficult from the 
viewpoint of the general principles of insurability 
and may be interpreted in different ways.  For 
instance, a ‘solidaristic’ insurance system may be 
considered one all of those ‘at risk’ from flooding 
share the risks and therefore premiums are 
lowered as those at lower risk ‘subsidise’ those at 
higher risk.  This may also include being at risk 
from different types of flooding; with households 
potentially being at a higher risk from one type of 
flooding than another and other households being 
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more susceptible to the effects of a different type 
of flooding.  However, most composite household 
insurance policies will spread the risks further than 
just flooding, with polices often including other 
natural perils or even wider with other ‘perils’ such 
as fire and theft being included.  Therefore, the 
pool (and consequently the community across 
which the risks are spread) will vary between 
different types of policies. 
 
There is also the need to consider the notion of 
solidarity in relation to other systems of recovery; 
such as state compensation schemes.  In the most 
part these will be considered to be ‘solidaristic’ in 
nature as in general the losses of the few (i.e. 
those affected by flooding) will be borne by the 
many (the general population).  This may be 
through different mechanisms but in the most part 
they rely on government intervention (at various 
levels) and are funded through taxation. 
 
Similarly, the concept of risk-sensitivity may be 
interpreted in different ways.  In the broadest 
sense this can be judged by whether the policy 
premium is linked to the risk.  Arguably an 
insurance scheme which had fully-risk sensitive 
pricing would be one whereby a full-actuarial 
premium would be charged which would reflect 
the true cost of the insurance. In reality, this would 
make insurance too expensive for the majority.  An 
individual flood insurance policy where premiums 
are altered according to the flood risk zone where 
a property is situated can be considered to be risk-
sensitive.  Conversely, a policy whereby a risk is 
bundled with many other perils with no premium 
adjustment for risk can be considered to be risk-
insensitive.   
 
However, comparable to the concept of solidarity, 
one might consider these not to only be absolute 
concepts.  Consider for instance an insurance 
policy which provides cover for flooding and 
earthquake which is sold as an endorsement to a 
fire policy with an additional premium. If a flat-rate 
premium exists (i.e. the same premium for all 
those purchasing the policy) then it is more 
towards the risk-insensitive end of the spectrum as 
there is little differentiation according to risk.  
However, the existence of an additional premium 
might suggest that it is not completely risk 
insensitive either but this depends on the size of 
the premium, the terms of the policy and who is 
purchasing the insurance (i.e. if it is only available 
to those at risk).  Equally, if a more risk-
differentiated premium is provided in this example, 
due to the fact that insurance cover is available for 
both floods and earthquakes a premium may be 
adjusted based on an assessment of the flood risk, 
the earthquake risk or a combination of both.  
Depending upon how this is calculated will 
determine the degree of risk-sensitivity of the 
policy.  The assessment in this report will consider 
the degree to which an insurance scheme is “flood-
risk sensitive”; so even if there is some 
differentiation according to other risks, these 
systems will be considered to be risk-insensitive if 
premiums have no pricing related to flooding.   
 
Fairness in flood management can be explored via 
different perspectives; for instance is a system 
which spreads the losses from flooding across 
many individuals fairer than one which spreads it 
across fewer people? This is of course what is 
happening in those situations where flood risks are 
compulsorily bundled with other perils and not 
differentiated by risk.  However, is it fair that those 
who are not at flood risk effectively subsidise the 
insurance (and public flood management 
investment via general taxes) for those who are at 
high risk?  There are some very complex 
arguments about social justice which vary 
depending on your view of justice and the justice 
principles or models that you use to assess it (e.g. 
Equality, Maximum utility, Rawls’ Maxim in rule; 
see Johnson et al., 2008).  Therefore, in order to 
adopt a simple approach the social equity 
characteristics of each of the strategies will be 
discussed, rather than an absolute judgement 
about whether a system is fair.  
4.3 Robustness 
The concept of robustness will be investigated in 
this report by examining the degree to which each 
insurance or compensation scheme effectively 
satisfies the general principles of insurance.  
Therefore, as well as identifying some basic 
descriptive characteristics (e.g. the types of 
flooding insured, the risk that flooding poses to a 
country etc.) one aim is to identify a number of key 
characteristics for each scheme. These include: 
 
 Levels of insurance penetration (i.e. what 
percentage of the population, or at-risk 
population has insurance) 
 How the insurance/compensation scheme is 
structured  
 Whether insurance is an individual policy or 
bundled? 
17 
 
 The degree of risk-pricing for insurance 
premiums (i.e. is there an actuarial premium) 
 Is cover is compulsory or optional? 
 How insurance is purchased by individuals 
 How the insurance scheme or compensation 
spreads and transfers the risk? 
 
Although it is possible for an insurance system to 
be completely robust, in principle it will have a 
range of characteristics some of which make it 
more robust and economically viable and others 
which threaten robustness.   For instance, there 
may be an individual flood risk insurance policy 
available at risk-reflective premiums which is a 
positive indicator of robustness; however 
insurance penetration maybe low which threatens 
the robustness and economic viability of the 
scheme.  Therefore, it is necessary to combine all 
of the characteristics of schemes in order to 
undertake a full assessment of any insurance or 
compensation strategy.   Robustness will therefore 
be presented on an indicative scale of High, 
Medium and Low to provide a comparison 
between systems. 
4.4 International comparative review 
This primarily desk-based review has been 
completed by initially looking at general reviews of 
insurance and flood insurance mechanisms4
                                                     
4
It is important also to clarify that many of the countries included 
within the comparison also have social security systems which are 
likely to provide assistance for flood victims which suffer significant 
hardship as a result of flood damage (i.e. are left unemployed or their 
health is affected).  Additionally, as part of many legal systems it may 
be possible for individuals and business owners in some circumstances 
to seek recompense under Tort Law if they are considered to have 
suffered losses due to negligence or other disadvantaging actions.  
However, the social systems and legal-sought recompense are not 
discussed as part of this report; the focus is solely on insurance 
mechanisms or funds which are specifically developed to provide 
compensation or financial assistance following natural events. 
 
.  A 
number of published reports were available as a 
starting point for analysis (Gaschen et al., 1998; 
Fiselier and Oosterberg, 2004; CEA, 2005; CCS, 
2008) however these vary in their completeness 
and the recency of the information.  Therefore, 
where possible (in terms of both availability and 
language requirements) these have been 
supplemented by verifying and reviewing the 
relevant legislation and other scheme 
documentation.  In some instances schemes have 
been widely documented and critiqued whereas in 
others little information and data about the 
approach was accessible; therefore the 
descriptions of recovery systems provided here for 
each country is variable.  Furthermore, to 
supplement the written information, the author 
has had many conversations with flood researchers 
in other countries (mainly European) to gain their 
advice and assistance in understanding recent or 
planned (and therefore relatively unpublished) 
changes to insurance systems.  
 
Section 5 discusses the approach to flood 
insurance in New Zealand including both a 
consideration of the government backed EQCover 
as well as household insurance available via the 
private market.  This analysis has been undertaken 
through examination of current and past 
legislation, official reports, press releases and grey 
literature. This information has been 
supplemented by a number of interviews 
undertaken with experts in the provision of 
insurance in New Zealand as well as those involved 
in retirement villages.  These have been invaluable 
in providing insight about how the systems 
function in practice, the drivers of recent changes 
in approach as well as the lessons from the 
Canterbury earthquakes. 
 
Information on each international approach is 
reported geographically in Appendix A.  Section 6 
provides a comparative assessment where 
countries are grouped and discussed according to 
the type and characteristics of the flood insurance 
or compensation mechanisms.   The insurance 
situation(s) in New Zealand will be placed within 
these models and the similarities and differences 
with alternative approaches highlighted. 
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5 Natural hazards insurance in New 
Zealand 
Insurance for natural events in New Zealand 
appears to have traditionally stemmed from 
concerns about, and the need to recover from, 
earthquakes; which has traditionally been the 
most costly natural peril in New Zealand (BRANZ, 
2013).  However, insurance cover is also available 
for other natural perils including volcanic hazards, 
tsunamis, landslides, storm risks, hydrothermal 
activity and floods. Cover for natural perils is 
provided in two main ways both of which have a 
role to play in assisting recovery from flooding: 
through the government organised Earthquake 
Commission EQCover and secondly through private 
insurance provided as part of a standard 
household domestic policy.  When considering the 
potential of flood insurance to provide resilience to 
older people in New Zealand the main groups to 
consider are those older residents who reside in 
their own properties, those who are in rented 
properties and those who reside in retirement 
villages.  This section introduces the different types 
of flood insurance available for these different 
groups and how insurance functions in New 
Zealand.   
5.1 Earthquake insurance cover provided by 
the government 
Natural disaster insurance originated in New 
Zealand in 1944 following damaging earthquake 
events in Wairarapa (1942) and was initiated by 
the passing of the Earthquake and War Damage 
Act5
                                                     
5Earthquake and War Damage Act 1944, 8 GEO VI 1944 No 15 
 1944.  This Act mandated that cover against 
earthquake and war damages should be 
compulsorily included as part of all fire policies 
(CCS, 2008).  The scheme was organised and 
regulated by a specially created government 
agency, the Earthquake and War Damage 
Commission.  The scheme was supported by the 
Earthquake and War Damage Fund which was 
financed by a surcharge placed on all household 
policies.  However, the scheme also had a State 
guarantee to assist in any shortfalls in the damage 
fund (CCS, 2008). 
 
The original 1944 Act only covered damages from 
war and earthquakes; however it was soon 
extended and revised by additional legislation to 
include (and later remove) the damages from 
other perils (CCS, 2008): 
 
 1950 Act extended to cover extraordinary 
flood and storm risks. 
 1954 These additional perils were 
combined with volcanic eruption and 
landslide.  Landslide was only 
incorporated automatically and 
without an additional premium from 
1970. 
 1967 Authorised to insure against 
geothermal activity, but on a 
voluntary basis. 
 1984 The Act was again revised to 
generally exclude the risks of storm 
and flooding from residential 
damages; however limited insurance 
was introduced to provide ‘land 
cover’ (CCS, 2008).   
 
This highlights that cover for flooding and storms 
were originally included in the scheme in the same 
way as other perils.  The revision to this approach 
was considered to be due to the desire to refocus 
the risk on catastrophic risks (i.e. low probability, 
high magnitude and large damages) rather than 
the more frequent and smaller scale events.  
Evidence about why the damages to land from 
flooding remained within the scheme is lacking and 
therefore it is difficult to be certain of the reasons. 
One proposition is that retaining this coverage 
would enable communities to remain cohesive 
following large scale events.  
 
Other changes have occurred over this period 
which has altered the status of the Commission.  In 
1988 it was made a Statutory Corporation which 
gave it autonomous powers and although it 
continued to be publicly owned the new status 
permits it to act as a commercial entity (CCS, 2008).  
However, the major changes to the Commission 
and the system of natural hazards insurance came 
with major reforms in 1993 and this remains the 
basis of the current scheme. 
5.2 Earthquake Commissions Act 1993 and 
the provision of EQCover in New Zealand 
The Earthquake Commissions Act 1993 6
                                                     
6Earthquake Commission Act 1993, Public Act 1993 No 84, 10th August 
1993, Reprint as at July 2013. 
 was 
passed following concerns about the high risk 
potential of the existing approach and the 
presence of the state guarantee would mean that 
the New Zealand would have to meet high losses.  
CCS (2008; 116) argues that the 1993 Act “has the 
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fundamental aims of reducing the government’s 
exposure to losses and allowing commercial 
interests to make their own decisions about 
insurance protection”.   Many of the reforms the 
Act proposed were not introduced immediately 
and there were transition arrangements to 
introduce changes slowly and allow those covered 
to take appropriate other action. 
 
The first reform was to remove the provision for 
damages owing to war.  This not only removed the 
peril but also required the renaming of the 
Commission (to the New Zealand Earthquake 
Commission) and the associated fund (Natural 
Disaster Fund).  A second key reform was to 
exclude non-residential properties for cover; 
thereby no longer making it mandatory for fire 
policies to include natural perils for non-residential 
properties. Commercial properties and activities 
were excluded in recognition of the huge liabilities 
associated with the complete cover. As discussed 
above this cover was gradually removed and was 
achieved over two years by progressive reducing 
the level of cover provided from 100% to 75% in 
year 1, 50% in year 2 and finally 25% in year 3 and 
after 1996 no cover for non-residential properties 
was provided7
 An earthquake, natural landslip, volcanic 
eruption, hydrothermal activity or tsunami; or 
. 
 
The Act came into force on 1st January 1994 and 
covers losses from the following natural perils. 
 
 A natural disaster fire (where a natural disaster 
fire is caused as a consequence of an 
earthquake, natural landslip, volcanic eruption, 
hydrothermal activity, tsunami or (in the case of 
residential land) a storm or flood; or  
 A storm of flood (only in the case of damages to 
residential land not residential property) 
 
The first key point relates to the fact that insurance 
cover for the recovery of flood losses is extremely 
limited and only concerns damages to residential 
land rather than residential property. 
 
The specific details of the current system are set 
out in the Earthquake Commission Regulations 
1993 8
                                                     
7 Ibid, Section 41 
 which also came into force on the 1st 
8Earthquake Commission Regulations 1993, SR 1993/345, 20th October 
1993, Reprint as at 1st December 2011. As amended by the 
Earthquake Commission Regulations 2010, 2010/348, 4th October 
January 1994.  Coverage for natural perils is 
compulsory on all fire insurance policies and is 
purchased via the private insurance market.  Fire 
insurance is not itself compulsory (and those who 
do not have coverage are also uninsured for 
natural perils) and therefore the penetration of 
natural hazards insurance is reliant upon the 
penetration of household fire policies.   
5.2.1 Terms of coverage, settlement and 
excesses 
Cover by the Earthquake Commission (or EQCover) 
insures home, personal possession and land (EQC, 
no date).  This includes following: 
 
 Separate homes in the same building. 
 Separate buildings which are part of the home 
(e.g. sheds, garages) 
 Services which are owned by the policyholder 
(e.g. water pipes and cabling) which are up to 
60 metres from any of the buildings 
 The contents of properties (but with some key 
exclusions including anything excluded as part 
of the base fire insurance policy) 
 Land – the land under the property, land within 
8 metres of the property and the land of the 
main access way (within 60 metres of the 
property) but not the driveway or any artificial 
surfaces that cover the access way    
(EQC, no date; 6).   
 
Residential dwellings are insured by the EQCover 
up to a maximum amount of NZ$ 100,000 (plus 
GST) and personal contents up to a maximum of 
NZ$ 20,000 (plus GST) (Earthquake Commission 
website 9
5.3.1
, 2013a).  Above these amounts the 
private insurer will pay any remaining losses 
according to the terms of the household (fire) 
policy taken out (i.e. this might be replacement of 
indemnity cover) (Consumer NZ website, 2011).  
Therefore, the scheme for these geophysical perils 
might be considered to be a first loss cover and 
thereby essentially acts as a large deductible for 
the private system. The principle of the approach is 
that the cap should be set at a level so that the 
majority of the claims are covered entirely within 
the EQC scheme. Indeed, even with an event on 
the scale of the Canterbury earthquakes the 
majority of claims are within the EQC cap; however 
this does not mean that private insurers have not 
been heavily exposed (see Section ). 
                                                                                    
2010 and Earthquake Commission Regulations 2011, 2011/379, 31st 
October 2011. 
9www.eqc.govnt.nz – the date refers to the last page update. 
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The EQC (no date) describes the level of cover that 
is provided by EQCover.  A dwelling was insured 
against its replacement value; although until 
recently there was no specification that it needed 
to be reinstated to exactly the previous condition 
or the sum to be provided for reinstatement.  
Claims for damage to contents will be settled 
according to the terms of the base fire policy; that 
is either as new (replacement value) or taking into 
account the age of the property and wear and tear 
(indemnity value) (EQC, no date).  
 
Cover for land is handled differently to dwellings. 
Damages to land are often of two types: mud and 
damage to the land from the movement of 
materials from higher up the slope or that is 
associated with the instability of the land, caused 
by landslips or debris flows.  In relation to flooding 
this might include repair of the scouring of a 
riverbank (within a certain distance from the house) 
which may affect the stability of a dwelling or 
clearing land of debris or boulders left by flood 
waters (Earthquake Commission website10
5.2.2 Implications of treating floods 
differently to other perils within the EQC 
, 2013b). 
 
There is a capped liability for land which is 
calculated on the basis of the average size of the 
property in the area and is undertaken via a 
professional valuation of the land when a claim is 
made (EQC, no date).  The calculation includes the 
value that is assigned to the land as well as a 
judgement about whether the land can be 
remediated in a cost effective way; this means that 
within the total liability there will potentially be 
some sort of mitigation which is undertaken.  
Therefore, when land is damaged, the EQCover 
specifies that the value of the land or the repair 
cost will be paid whichever is the lesser amount 
(EQC, no date).  
Treating flooding differently from other perils may 
have implications for the definition of events: for 
instance the difference between damage to 
properties from debris flows or from flood waters.  
This is important because under one scenario the 
EQC would be liable for the first NZ$100 000 of 
damage to properties and under the second it 
would be the sole responsibility of a private insurer.  
Although examples of these types of definitional 
conflict are rare (although court cases have 
occurred) challenges may increase if liabilities rise 
                                                     
10www.eqc.govnt.nz – the date refers to the last page update. 
and the system becomes stretched.  A further issue 
relates to the tendency for damages to be 
conservatively estimated so that they do total 
above the capped amount. Although from an 
administrative point of view this is desirable as all 
the damages are claimed through the scheme, this 
puts a householder at risk of reimbursement at a 
level below that needed to cover all of the 
damages or repairs. 
 
Although the Earthquake Commission Act 1993 
sets out a standard level of indemnification it does 
provide for some discretion about how those 
insured will be able to recover.  The Act11
5.2.3 Premium surcharges 
 provides 
the Commission with the ability to settle claims by 
payment, replacement or reinstatement. Following 
a claim for natural hazard damages deductibles are 
also applied.  This is specified in the Earthquake 
Commission Regulations and is calculated either at 
NZ$ 200 (per the number of dwellings in the 
building) or at 1% of the amount payable 
whichever is the greater amount and flat-rate 
deductible of NZ$ 200 is applied to residential 
property.   For residential land there is also a 
relevant deductible which is NZ$ 500 for each 
residential dwelling that is situated on the land or 
10% of the amount payable whichever is greater; 
up to a total amount of NZ$ 5,000.   
The scheme is funded via an additional premium 
(surcharge) which is added to all household fire 
insurance policies. The net result is to socialise the 
risk and make the level of insurance much more 
affordable and the level of entitlement much 
higher than it otherwise might have been. These 
additional premiums are collected by private 
insurers and passed on to the Earthquake 
Commission.  The premiums are not differentiated 
according to risk; rather they are calculated as a 
percentage on the insured value.  The current 
surcharge payable is 15 cents (plus GST) for every 
NZ$ 100 insured as part of the fire policy up to a 
maximum surcharge of $180 (plus GST); NZ$150 
for the building and NZ$30 for the contents.  This is 
a threefold increase in premium since the 
Earthquake Commission Regulations 1993 which 
suggested that the surcharge on each premium 
should be 5 cents.  It has been suggested that this 
rise is a direct consequence of the losses sustained 
due to the Canterbury earthquakes.  The 1993 
                                                     
11Earthquake Commission Act 1993, Section 29. 
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Regulations12
5.2.4 The Natural Disaster Fund (NDF) and 
government backing 
 also state that there is no additional 
premium associated with the coverage of land 
damages.  Although premiums related to cover 
have increased it not clear how policyholders are 
reacting to these increases, nor indeed whether 
they are aware how much the surcharge has 
increased.  The EQCover premium increases have 
occurred at the same time as other insurance 
premium increases as well as an increase in GST 
and therefore policyholders may not realise which 
proportion of the increase is due to the EQCover or 
the private insurance cover. 
 
Following the payment of a claim, the Commission 
is also able to add an additional premium 
surcharge to reinstate and thus continue to 
provide insurance cover for natural hazards.  This 
amount is calculated using a number of factors; 
the total payment received in relation to the total 
value of the property insured, the original 
premium paid and the number of days left to run 
on the annual policy. This additional payment 
recognises the need for the claimant to re-
contribute to the funding of the scheme.  
The system was initiated with the backing of a 
state guarantee; this situation remains and thereby 
the New Zealand Government is ultimately the 
reinsurer of last resort.  The Earthquake 
Commissions Act 1993 sets out the current terms 
of the Natural Disaster Fund, although this had 
existed in various guises as part of previous 
legislation (previously named Earthquake and War 
Damage Fund and the Disaster and Landslip Funds).  
The primary purpose of the fund is to be able to 
pay claims and thereby the premium surcharge 
(less the administrative fee paid to insurers for 
collecting the monies) is paid in to the NDF.  The 
fund is the principal mechanism for settling claims 
and creating resilience to these hazards however 
the New Zealand government under the terms of 
the 1993 Act13
                                                     
12Earthquake Commission Regulations 1993, Section 3(3). 
13Earthquake Commission Act 1993, Section 16. 
 are required to meet any shortfall 
and “provide to the commission out of public 
money such sums by way or grant or advance as 
may be necessary to meet the deficiency”.  
Therefore, essentially taxpayers are responsible for 
backing the scheme although the wording of the 
Act suggests that the Minister is sanctioned to 
specify the terms and conditions by which financial 
resources are provided. Consequently, the NDF 
may be required to reimburse some or all of these 
funds back to government once the fund has been 
restored to healthy levels.  
 
In order to make best use of the resources, the 
NDF is invested and since 2001 there has been a 
move to invest more of it on the international 
equities market than previously when the majority 
was invested in New Zealand securities (EQC 
website, 2012).  Two reasons led to this shift: to 
obtain a better return on investment and to spread 
the assets more widely; thereby ensuring that the 
funds were not all affected by the same disaster.  
As of 2008 it was suggested that 30% of the NDF 
was invested overseas on the international 
equities market and 70% remained invested in 
New Zealand securities (EQC, 2008). 
 
However, the fund does not only rely on 
government backing, the EQC scheme also invests 
in reinsurance provided by the global reinsurance 
market.  Machetti (2009) suggested that the 
Earthquake Commission takes out against losses 
which exceed NZ$ 1.5 billion following a severe 
disaster.  The reinsurance cover provides 
additional funding of up to NZ$ 4 billion. The 
reinsurance cover is negotiated over a three-year 
cycle which if another disaster over NZ$ 3.5 billion 
occurs then further reinsurance cover is activated 
with a NZ$ 1 billion attachment point (Machetti, 
2009).   
 
Although the NDF was called on to pay for small 
numbers of claims, in general prior to the 2010 and 
2011 earthquakes the premiums exceeded claims 
and the fund was able to grow and it was reported 
that in 2008 it totalled NZ $5.6 billion). More detail 
about some of these issues and how the fund 
functioned in relation to the Canterbury 
Earthquakes is discussed in Section 5.2.6.Following 
the Canterbury Earthquakes the system is under 
NZ Treasury review, the potential implications of 
which will be discussed in more detail in Sections 
5.2.7 and 7.3.7. 
5.2.5 EQCover and mitigation 
There does appear to be some provision for 
incentivising mitigation within the EQCover system 
of insurance in New Zealand and this may be 
through three main ways: a refusal of insurance, 
via the relocation of properties/land following a 
claim or via limiting its liability.  The first of these is 
specified in the Earthquake Commissions Act 
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199314
A second power that the 1993 Act provides is that 
the Commission may relocate properties instead of 
reinstating them.  This may be because the site 
becomes unusable, but it may also be related to 
damage which it is “likely to suffer
which details the circumstances in which 
insurance can be cancelled.   
 
It states that cancellation is permitted and will 
remain by written notice where: 
 
“(a) the Commission settles a claim in respect of any 
property by payment of the full amount to which that 
property is insured under this Act; and 
(b) the property in respect of which the claim is settled is 
neither replaced nor reinstated to the satisfaction of the 
Commission” 
Earthquake Commission Act 1993 S. 3; part 4. 
 
A cancellation order remains on the property, 
regardless of whether a new policy is purchased or 
if a property has new owners.  A homeowner 
would be required to apply in writing for the 
reinstatement of insurance and the Commission 
would need to consider and agree why a 
cancellation would no longer need to apply.  This 
provision in the legislation may enable the 
Commission to place some requirements about 
reinstatement and potentially to make a reduction 
in the risk whilst doing so; however it is unclear 
how often these clauses are enacted or if they are 
monitored. 
 
15
                                                     
14 Ibid, Schedule 3 
15 Ibid, Schedule 3; part 10 
”. This 
provides options for the Commission to reduce the 
highest risks: however it is unclear how often this 
power is utilised to reduce the Commission’s 
exposure and reduce repeated claims. 
 
The third incentive for mitigation may be through 
the limiting of liability of the Commission for those 
properties which it considered to be a high risk.  
The 1993 Act states that the Commission may limit 
its liability by declining future claims via written 
notice where it “considers that any property is in 
imminent danger of suffering natural disaster 
damage” (New Zealand Government, 1993; 
Schedule 3; part 5).  This is mainly to prevent 
repeated claims as it primarily affects those 
properties which have already been affected and 
where: 
 
 
“the Commission considers that -  
(i) the property or any part of the property is likely to 
suffer the same, or substantially the same, loss or 
damage again; and 
(ii) the likelihood of such loss or damage could 
reasonably be or have been avoided” 
Earthquake Commission Act 1993 S. 3; part 5 
 
Property-owners would have to demonstrate that 
they have reduced their risk in these situations in 
order to have their insurance cover reinstated. In 
addition, the Commission has the ability to refuse 
a claim if a property owner has failed to adhere to 
any law or bylaws and that failure has caused or 
exacerbated any damages or that the property was 
not constructed in accordance to the appropriate 
standards16
As discussed in Section 
.  Both of these may be incentives for 
those insured to make certain that their properties 
are well built; however the effectiveness of this 
condition may be hampered by low risk awareness.  
Many policyholders may not realise that they are 
at risk until they are directly affected and they are 
required to submit a claim. 
 
5.2.1 above, when claims 
are made as part of the EQC for damages to land 
attention is paid to the remediation of the risks.  
When mitigation is undertaken for land, it is often 
done collectively.  Often more than one property is 
affected by landslips and so it is more (cost) 
effective and so there will be a small area wide 
mitigation that is undertaken, reconstruction of a 
retaining wall or deeper geotechnical works. This is 
a fairly common occurrence as landslides 
associated with flooding are quite frequent. 
However, where the costs of the remedial works 
exceed the costs of total liability the homeowner 
will receive a cash settlement which is 
compensation against the loss.  There is however, 
no specification within the Act that these monies 
are required to be spent on remediating the 
damages or mitigating against any future damages.  
This is an important omission as the consequences 
of not taking action to reduce future risks impacts 
not only on the individual householder who has 
taken the decision but also their neighbours. 
 
It is unclear how effective these measures are in 
leading to mitigation and a reduction in future risks.  
It has been suggested that there is not a following 
up of all individual cases, but that in most 
instances remedial work is undertaken and that 
there is an ongoing relationship with the 
                                                     
16 Ibid, Schedule 3; part 3. 
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homeowner through that process.  There is also 
the requirement that if a property has received a 
pay-out from the EQC it will be recorded on the 
Land Information Memorandum (LIM) which is 
held by the local authority.  This means that a 
potential buyer is able to see what was claimed 
and assess if any mitigation has been undertaken.  
 
5.2.5.1 Increased Flood Vulnerability (IFV) 
land damages 
The EQC have also proposed some future 
mitigation efforts to reduce the vulnerability to 
land from flooding caused by earth movement.  
Although it is possible to report the current status 
of this work and its potential implications; however 
it is too soon to state the conclusions of these 
efforts as various approaches to the issue and 
policies are still being debated. 
 
Areas which are put at increased risk of flooding 
following land movement are entitled to claim for 
land damages as part of the EQC. Increased 
Flooding Vulnerability (IFV) 17
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that residents 
will use their settlements to mitigate their 
increased flood risk, although as described above 
has occurred in a 
number of areas around Christchurch (an already 
low lying area) as land heights fell following the 
earthquakes. The EQC are still undertaking 
modelling and lidar surveying to try to identify 
properties which may now be at higher risk due to 
the results of the earthquakes and then work to 
settle these claims.  This is a very complex area and 
there is high potential for confusion and 
dissatisfaction around this process. The EQC need 
to try to separate those increases related to 
earthquake impacts from increased flood risk 
caused by other factors (such as climate or land 
use changes); it is likely that there will be some 
people who may attempt to attribute their flood 
damages and changes in risk to earthquake 
damage even if these are not linked. Additionally, 
there may be some people who have already been 
flooded due to their increased risk.  Under this 
scenario the EQC will still settle on the land 
damages but any property damages are the 
responsibility of the private insurer: however this 
situation is complicated if the flooding occurred 
mid-way through the reconstruction or repairs to a 
dwelling damaged during an earthquake.    
 
                                                     
17 What this type of land damage is called. 
the EQC scheme definitely advocates a mitigation 
approach where possible. Indeed, with rising 
private insurance premiums in flood risk areas 
policyholders in the future will be incentivised to 
use these pay-outs to take action to reduce their 
susceptibility to flooding. 
 
Indeed, there are also some potential fairness 
issues to consider.  Some residents may question 
why residents whose flood risk has been increased 
by earthquakes are entitled to land damage 
payments; whereas residents whose risks are being 
increased by other factors (such as sea level risk or 
climate change) are not being treated in the same 
way by the government.  At a basic level both 
events (earthquakes and climate change) are not 
the fault of the resident and if they have insurance 
policies, both will have taken measures to secure 
their financial recovery and pay into the EQC under 
the same terms; yet their potential outcomes will 
be significantly different. 
 
When claims are made, mitigation is possible, 
however the Act precludes the subsidisation of 
these measures and therefore financial assistance 
is only available within the value of a settlement.  
Additionally, because the premium surcharge 
remains low (even with the increase it is only a 
maximum of NZ$207) there is no capacity to 
incentivise people through premium reductions to 
take mitigation actions.  Thereby, in a proactive 
sense the EQC involvement in mitigation is 
primarily through research and education and the 
funding of programmes to increase understanding 
of hazards and communicate this to homeowners 
as well as professionals involved in risk 
management (e.g. land use planners, engineers, 
designers, architects). 
5.2.6 Implications of the Canterbury 
Earthquakes on Earthquake 
Commission Coverage 
This section will discuss how the EQC functioned 
following the Canterbury earthquakes and the 
impacts that this has had on the scheme and may 
have in the future. The NZ Treasury has estimated 
that the total cost of the Canterbury earthquakes is 
around NZ$30 billion.  The scale of this is most 
appreciated when considering that this value is 
around 15% of New Zealand’s GDP (EQC, 2011).  It 
is clear that the earthquakes have really tested the 
scheme and were unprecedented in the history of 
the scheme. EQC (2011) highlight that the last 
highest single event was an earthquake in 
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Inangahua in 1968 whereby a total of 10, 500 
claims were made and average claims were in the 
order of 5, 000.  The EQC ‘Scorecard’18as of end 
March 2014 highlights that there have been close 
to 631, 000 claims19.  However, it is also useful to 
break this down into the type of claims.  There 
have been over 750, 000 exposures20
From a response perspective, although the EQC 
considered their ability to deploy personnel into 
the field; however they acknowledge the inherent 
difficulties in scaling responses from small and 
medium events to these two huge events and that 
 received by 
the EQC of which 56% are for buildings, 25% for 
contents and 19% for land. The majority (97%) of 
contents claims have been settled, but there is still 
many land and building claims still to be completed 
some three years on from the 2011 earthquakes 
with only 57% and 50% of claims completed 
respectively.  The total amount paid out in 
settlements by the EQC as of the end March 2014 
is just under NZ$7 billion (including GST) although 
the EQC estimate the total settlement will finally 
be in the order of NZ$12 billion. 
 
It is also important to recognise that during this 
period, the EQC has not only been responding to 
the Canterbury earthquakes.  January 2011 saw 
damages from Cyclone Wilma and a large landslip 
event, a tsunami occurred in March 2011 and 
Hawkes Bay landslips in April 2011 (EQC, 2011) as 
well as other events, such as the 2013 Cook Strait 
earthquakes, over the following three years.  
Although the EQC had undertaken modelling in 
2009 about what they thought would be a large 
exposure event (an earthquake in Wellington), in 
fact the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes sequence 
event led to claims around 4 to 5 times this scale 
(EQC, 2011).  Furthermore, the modelling was 
undertaken on the basis that there would be one 
event with associated claims whereas in fact 14 
different ‘claim events’ occurred within the 
earthquake sequence which has led to added 
complexity (and workload): as claims have to be 
verified and caused issues of duplication and a new 
system developed to attribute damages to the 
relevant and correct events. 
 
                                                     
18  Data as of 28th March 2014, www.eqc.govt.nz/canterbury-
earthquakes/progress-updates/scorecard 
19 The Act specifies that each event has to be treated as a separate 
claim and therefore these 631, 000 claims may not each equate to a 
separate claimant as some may have made separate claims for the 
2010 and 2011 sequences of earthquakes.  
20 Building, land and contents can be included as part of one ‘claim’ 
however separately they are termed exposures. 
it has had a detrimental impact upon the personal 
experiences of customers.  To try to respond more 
quickly to claims a new system was implemented 
whereby claims under NZ$10,000 were fast-
tracked and paid a cash settlement. Although this 
may ease some of the issues for the EQC and also 
made the process more rapid for many (potentially 
frustrated) policyholders, this may have created 
additional problems and concerns for older people 
as it meant that they have to manage their own 
repair processes.  The potential issues with this are 
described further in Section 7.3.5. 
 
The Canterbury earthquakes have highlighted 
some of the idiosyncrasies of having this dual 
system of coverage in which some perils are 
treated differently than others and for risks where 
the land and properties may be affected differently.  
There may be instances where there may be no 
damage to a dwelling but damage to the land 
makes the house dangerous to live in (e.g. at the 
top of a cliff that has become unstable).  In this 
scenario if a resident has property insurance they 
will get a pay-out in accordance with the Act for 
the damages to the land; however a local authority 
may deem the property unsafe and permanently 
prohibit inhabitation.  In this scenario they will not 
get any recompense from their insurer as there is 
no damage to the house.  Equally the EQC is not 
able to offer any more compensation beyond what 
is stipulated in the Act and so will not be able to 
give any additional monies for the undamaged 
house. There were some occurrences of this 
following the Canterbury earthquakes and the re-
designation of the land in the red zone: an 
example of which in relation to retirement villages 
is provided in Section 5.4.2. 
 
In summary, despite the unprecedented and 
unexpected scale of the earthquake sequence, the 
EQC scheme (and the insurance industry more 
broadly) has functioned well and with the 
assistance of the government the scheme has been 
able to meet (and continues to meet) its 
obligations.  The pooling nature of the scheme has 
worked and the risks to those affected by the 
earthquakes spread more broadly.  However, there 
is still much more work to do and those who are 
still out of their homes or who are still awaiting 
their settlements may be frustrated by the process. 
Additionally, the NDF has been depleted by these 
events and thereby the future viability and stability 
of the scheme needs to be examined going 
forward.  The threefold increase in premiums is a 
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move in the right direction as it begins the process 
of recovering the resources paid out by the 
scheme; although it is unclear how the scheme 
may function if highly damages earthquakes occur 
before funding levels significantly increase.  It is 
likely that significant government intervention 
would be required and a review of the system has 
resulted to consider these issues and the role of 
the scheme going forward.  
5.2.7 New Zealand Treasury review of 
Earthquake Commission Coverage 
The terms of reference for the New Zealand 
Treasury review of the EQCover provide details of 
the review which has primarily been initiated by 
the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquakes (NZ 
Treasury, 2012). However, discussions of the 
reviews of the scheme predate these events. For 
instance, EQC (2008) argue that Act had not been 
reviewed or revised since its introduction in 1993 
and provides arguments for revising a number of 
issues including raising the cap on the insurance 
cover, considering the relevance of the coverage 
for land, considering issues of how to encourage 
homeowners to increase the safety of their 
properties and how to manage the disaster fund to 
encourage sustainability.  
 
The Treasury Review aims to learn the lessons 
from the Canterbury earthquakes and to ensure 
that the earthquake scheme remains viable into 
the future.  In particular the review suggests it will 
focus on: 
 
 What the EQC insures, the structure and extent 
of the EQCover (including the layers of loss, the 
types of disasters and property covered, 
whether the scheme should continue to be 
mandatory and whether the caps and excesses 
should be reformed.) 
 How the EQC prices its insurance (including 
issues such as whether it should be risk based 
or whether there should be reform to the 
collection mechanism). 
 Institutional design (including what roles and 
expectations should the crown have and the 
structure of the form) 
 Financial management of the Crown’s risk 
exposure (including the financing of the risk, 
the size and composition of the NDF and 
alternative instruments)  
 
Following the earthquakes the EQC made some 
recommendations to the incoming Minister in 
2011 about those changes they thought would 
enable the scheme to function better and these 
are likely to be considered and debated as part of 
the review (EQC, 2011). Of particular relevance to 
this study is the potential removal of the land 
cover for flooding and storms, this may be because 
it is considered to be outside of the core remit of 
the scheme which is to assist in the provision of 
the catastrophic risks and protect against market 
failure.  If removed from the EQC, it is unlikely that 
land would subsequently be covered by the private 
market as the coverage of land damage is 
something that has traditionally not been 
considered.   
 
Furthermore, a number of other recommendations 
of the EQC (2011) have wider implications for the 
private household insurance market (and thereby 
the provision of flood insurance) firstly through 
increases to the premiums. The current premium 
surcharge has already been increased threefold 
and further recommendations include introducing 
differential premiums (potential based on flood 
sizes or construction type) which would also 
increase the premiums further.  For the EQC, this 
would have the impact of increasing the monies 
coming into the NDF and reducing moral hazard; 
however these increases may impact upon the 
affordability of household insurance for some.  
Additionally, potential changes to the EQC cap will 
also change the balance between the EQC and 
private insurers.  The current caps (of NZ$100,000 
and NZ$20,000) are generally considered to be too 
low.  Although the cap was considered to be 
sufficient to cover the majority of claims from 
Canterbury, the caps have not been changed since 
1993 which is leading to a number of different 
factors: 
 
 It is limiting the premium income of the EQC  
 The cap means that the owners of more 
expensive properties are being subsidised at 
the expense of the owners of less valuable 
homes – this would not be the case if there was 
a higher cap as the more expensive property 
owners would have to contribute more. 
 Due to the inflation, when there is a total loss 
of a property the exposure of the private 
insurer is quite high as the cap is set at 
$NZ100,000 whereas the average rebuild cost is 
around NZ$500,000. 
 
A number of proposed changes to the cap have 
been suggested.  These include raising the cap, 
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removing the cap entirely and the EQC taking all 
the premium income for these perils and 
consequently covering all of the loss or to pro-rate 
the EQC contribution in relation to the liability of 
the private insurer and thereby having a variable 
contribution rather than a fixed cap and a move 
away from a first loss insurance system (EQC, 
2011).   
5.2.8 Summary characteristics of the current 
Earthquake Commission Coverage 
Table 5.1 provides a summary of the EQCover 
highlighting both the key characteristics of the 
approach as well as how it can be categorised 
according to the three assessment criteria of 
efficiency, equity and robustness.  Generally, the 
scheme provides an effective way of spreading the 
risk from natural perils (even though its 
contribution to recovery from flooding is limited) 
in a very wide-reaching way between all 
policyholders across the country, rather than in a 
private system whereby risks would only be spread 
between those policyholders within coverage from 
a single insurance company. Additionally, the 
government-backed system has enabled the 
provision of widespread cover by guaranteeing the 
Natural Disaster Fund or the reserve.  Without this 
state intervention it is unclear whether the private 
insurance market would offer full coverage as the 
loss exposure from earthquakes is particularly so 
high. The potential exposures were exposed by the 
Canterbury earthquakes. These events have 
highlighted the difficulties in providing a universal 
scheme backed by the government and have 
highlighted the potential for losses well in 
accidence of the pool that require government 
intervention.  However, the earthquakes at the 
same time have reinforced the need for some kind 
of coverage which provides recovery from these 
types of natural perils and in particular mandatory 
earthquake cover: a situation which is not 
replicated in some other situations whereby 
participation in a scheme is optional (i.e. California, 
Japan etc.).Recovery from the impacts of the 
Canterbury earthquakes would have been more 
difficult without the presence of the scheme, the 
framework for assisting victims and funds 
accumulated the NDF and it is likely that the New 
Zealand Government would have had to shoulder 
increased responsibilities.   
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Table 5.1: Summary table for cover for natural perils as part of the EQCover policies. 
Insurance scheme: State-organised and back insurance administered via private insurance. 
Types of perils and 
flooding covered by 
insurance: 
Dwellings and land are covered for the following perils: earthquake, natural 
landslips, volcanic eruption, hydrothermal activity or tsunami; or a natural 
disaster fire.  Flood damages to residential land only are covered as part of 
the scheme. 
Optional/ 
compulsory cover: 
Compulsory if a homeowner has a household policy as cover is included as 
part of fire cover.  
Insurance premium 
mechanism: 
A formalised cross-subsidy surcharge at a flat-rate per sum $100 sum insured 
for all policies. 
Risk transfer mechanism: Bundled across all household policyholders and between the perils covered. 
Penetration/ 
coverage of flood cover: 
Penetration should be the same as for insurance as a standard peril (see 
below) and thereby be quite high as if a homeowner as a mortgage it is 
compulsory to have household insurance – however may be threatened by 
the general rise in insurance premiums and a reduction in homeownership.  
Presence of state aid or 
compensation: 
No. 
Summary: Recovery to land damage caused by flooding is covered as part of the EQC 
scheme. 
Key principles of the recovery system 
Efficiency:  There are some elements of mitigation tied to the scheme although the 
monitoring and enforcement of these components might need to be 
strengthened to be truly effective. 
Equity principle: Solidaristic, risk-insensitive insurance – as all policyholders are included and 
there is no pricing difference between risk areas 
 
Robustness of recovery 
system: 
Medium to high– in principle this system should be quite robust as it permits 
the collection of a reserve pool to meet claims and thereby spreading the risk 
widely between policyholders.  However, large events may threaten the 
viability of the Disaster Fund which may require additional government 
resources in the future.   The system is sufficiently flexible to increase the 
surcharge and thereby balance premium income and likely claims.  
5.3 Flood insurance coverage as a standard 
household peril 
Flood insurance for dwellings is available as part of 
a standard household policy in New Zealand. 
Henderson (2012) suggests that an ‘all risks’ policy 
to complement the cover of the EQC has been 
available since the 1960s although other 
household insurance had been available prior to 
this and fire policies in particular had a much 
longer tradition.   
 
Insurance cover is provided by the private 
insurance market as part of a composite policy and 
is bundled with other perils including theft and fire 
and separate policies are available for both 
contents and buildings insurance. Premiums are 
offered on a sum-insured basis and there is no 
such thing as a ‘standard’ household policy and 
insurers will compete on conditions terms as well 
as price:  however generally, policies are settled on 
a full replacement (new for old) basis. Private 
household insurance policies not only provide 
coverage for risks that are not included within the 
EQCover scheme but also if damages reach the 
level of the cap then the difference will be covered 
by the private insurers. 
 
Household insurance penetration rates are 
generally very high: in the order of 90% to 95%.  
The reasons for such a high coverage are a little 
opaque and are likely to be due to a combination 
of factors.  High structural insurance will be tied to 
the compulsory requirement for mortgage holders 
to have coverage. This is also coupled with very 
high rates of homeownership at present in New 
Zealand21
                                                     
21 Although this is changing – see Section 
. Penetration of contents is anecdotally 
7.3.1 for the potential 
impacts of demographic changes on insurance cover in the future. 
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lower but still higher than a lot of other countries 
and it is usual for people to have coverage. 
 
Generally, New Zealand is served by a small group 
(in global terms) of private insurers dominated by 
Australian firms: only around six companies offer 
residential insurance.  Despite this, the market 
works well and is competitive, although the impact 
of the Canterbury earthquakes will latterly be 
discussed. One might consider the insurance 
market in New Zealand to be quite specialised as 
the natural risks are quite complex.  The market is 
reinsured via the global reinsurance market.  
5.3.1 Recent changes to insurance provision, 
drivers of change and the implications 
of the Canterbury Earthquakes on (flood) 
insurance provision 
The principle of the EQC approach is that the cap 
should be set at a level so that the majority of the 
claims are covered entirely within the EQC scheme. 
Indeed, even with an event on the scale of the 
Canterbury earthquakes the majority of claims 
were within the EQC cap; however this does not 
mean that private insurers have not been exposed 
to these risks.  The EQC (2011) estimate that 15% 
of buildings insurance claims will be passed on to 
private insurers and 5% of contents claim. 
Difficulties emerge when properties suffer from 
extensive damages (or even total loss) as there is a 
potentially large difference between the 
NZ$ 100,000 cap and the full rebuild or repair costs. 
By the end of 2013, private insurers had paid out 
over NZ$10 billion in claims from the Canterbury 
earthquakes (ICNZ Press Release, 2014).  Of this 
total amount NZ$6.7 billion are for commercial 
settlements and NZ$3.5 billion in ‘over cap 22
The majority of insurers had a difficult time 
following the Canterbury earthquakes.  Indeed, 
one mutual (AMI) required government assistance 
to save it from insolvency (see Section 
’ 
residential claims. 
 
5.3.1.3).  
Despite, these short-term difficulties the market 
has rallied and following a number of difficult years 
the household insurance has returned to a 
situation of profitability; although the experience 
of Canterbury has led to some significant changes 
within the industry.  In addition, other factors such 
as the increase in technology and mapping and 
concerns over climate change and new 
                                                     
22 These are the amounts payable by private insurers over the first 
NZ$100,000 losses paid out by the EQC. 
development are also driving changes to the 
industry. 
5.3.1.1 Premium increases 
One of the most noticeable changes to 
policyholders has been an increase in premiums in 
the two to three years following the Canterbury 
earthquakes.  But premium increases have also 
been due to the large number of weather events 
over this period (in particular in 2013). The average 
premium is now in the order of NZ$800 to $1000 
which for most has been an increase of 30%: with 
the premiums for some households rising by as 
much as 50%.  This has been occurring at the same 
time as the premium surcharge increases to the 
EQC and then increase in GST so most households 
are now paying significantly more for their policies 
than in the past.  This may be creating issues of 
affordability both now and in the future, the 
implications of which are discussed further in 
Section 7.3.1. 
5.3.1.2 The move to a sum-insured value 
Another fundamental change following the 
Canterbury earthquakes has been a change to the 
basis of premium calculation.  Prior to the 
earthquakes the market used quite an unusual 
system of offering total replacement cover on the 
basis of the square footage of the property.  This 
was considered to be an inflation-proof system 
which did not rely upon an estimation of the value 
of the property. Policyholders would insure on the 
basis of the size of a property and if this property 
was destroyed it would be reconstructed to that 
same size, whatever the cost of that replacement. 
Although this system worked for many years over 
the last 20 years or so there has been quite a 
competitive market for insurance and thereby 
premiums were kept low at the same time as 
entitlements were going up and there was pretty 
much open cover for full loss, which proved to be 
catastrophic for a couple of companies as their 
exposure was too high. 
 
However, this approach has now been replaced by 
a more common system of insurance-based on the 
‘sum insured’ which reduces many of the 
uncertainties present with the old system and 
allows insurers to manage their risk better.  So as 
policyholders’ renewals have come round, they are 
being moved to the new system which raises 
questions about whether people understand the 
new system and whether they are insuring 
correctly and for appropriate sums.  Both under-
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insurance and over-insurance emerge as issues.  
Over-insurance means that policyholders will be 
fully covered in case of a loss; however it means 
that their premiums will be higher than they need 
to be and may unnecessarily lead to affordability 
issues.   
 
Underinsurance creates problems for both insurers 
and policyholders. If a policyholder is underinsured 
at the time of the loss it means that they will not 
be fully compensated which may threaten their 
financial recovery from flooding events.  From a 
positive perspective, the ‘condition of average’23is 
prohibited in New Zealand on dwellings under the 
Insurance Law Reform Act 1985 24  and on 
commercial properties it is required that the clause 
be fully disclosed 25
                                                     
23 A potential condition on an insurance policy which takes account of 
the difference between the sum insured and the actual current value 
of a property (i.e. the degree of underinsurance).  In situations 
whereby this clause exists when partial loss occurs the pay-out 
received on the insurance will be calculated (pro-rata) to the same 
proportion as the value of the underinsurance. For instance, if the 
current value of a property is NZ$500,000, but it is only insured for 
$350,000, in the event of a loss of $250,000 the policyholder will only 
receive $175,000. The total sum insured is only paid out in the event 
of a total loss and in the scenario above this will be NZ$150,000 less 
than the true value of the property, 
24 Insurance Law Reform Act 1985, Section 15. 
25 Ibid, Section 16. 
 although in reality in New 
Zealand few commercial insurance contracts are 
subject to the condition of average.  This means 
that for domestic dwellings the policyholder will 
receive the full value of the claim (up to value of 
the sum insured) even if there is partial loss and 
thereby the implications of underinsurance are 
reduced. Nevertheless the impact of 
underinsurance is likely to be significant; 
particularly in the early periods following the 
change when policyholders are trying to 
understand the new systems.  This is supported by 
evidence by the ICNZ which has suggested that 60 
to 70% of homeowners have opted to cover their 
property for a ‘default’ value: i.e. an estimated 
average cost to rebuild a ‘standard home’ rather 
than estimating a more appropriate sum of 
coverage.  It is feared that for many properties this 
amount would be insufficient to completely 
rebuild their home if it was destroyed and is 
reducing the resilience of many citizens to 
recovery from all perils.  This choice may be in 
some cases due to convenience or not wanting to 
engage with the changes to the system, in many 
will be related to a desire to pay the increased 
premiums (insurance is estimated to increase by 
NZ$40 per additional NZ$ 100,000 covered) and 
lastly may be related to a lack of understanding 
about how to estimate the value of the property. 
Companies providing valuation assistance have 
emerged in New Zealand following the change to 
the sum insured which may in some cases limit the 
potential for underinsurance.  However, the use of 
these services may currently be limited. 
 
However, the prohibition of the ‘condition of 
average’ may cause problems for private insurers 
as they will need to deal with partial losses which 
approach the total value of the sum insured; whilst 
only receiving the premium for the under-insured 
value.  Thereby, this situation has to be built into 
insurers pricing models to cover potential claims 
and as a result a price margin may be added to all 
premiums: thereby again increasing the costs for 
all.  
5.3.1.3 The changing relationship between 
government and private insurers: 
Increasing regulation and changes to 
the provisions of reinsurance 
Traditionally, the insurance industry in New 
Zealand has been self-regulatory and there has 
been very little intervention into the private 
market by the government (other than of course 
the first loss cover provided by the EQC).   The 
scale of the Canterbury earthquakes has increased 
the awareness of the NZ Government about the 
potential for losses and in particular their need to 
step in and support a failing insurer following the 
Canterbury earthquakes has exacerbated their 
concerns.  AMI (a domicile mutual company and 
predominantly South Island company) had been 
operating in New Zealand for a long period of time, 
had a large market share (c. 35%) and was the 
country’s second largest residential insurer 
(Steeman and van den Bergh, 2011).  Therefore, 
when there was the potential for them to become 
insolvent following the earthquakes, they were 
considered too large to fail (as the numbers of 
people impacted would be high) and the 
government (i.e. the general taxpayer) bailed them 
out. 
 
The Government agreed to put in NZ$500 million 
of resources to fund the companies earthquake 
liabilities although admitted that more (and up to 
NZ$1 billion) may be needed (NBR, 2011). As a 
result of this situation the government has 
imposed greater regulation on the industry. In 
order to operate, insurers are now required to 
have a license and the regulator, the Reserve Bank, 
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has imposed stricter conditions of reinsurance as 
insufficient cover was considered to be one of the 
reasons why AMI ran into difficulties.  Insurers are 
being (gradually) required to increase their 
reinsurance cover and by 2016 will have to 
purchase cover for a1 in 1000 year event: a very 
high amount by global standards.  Insurers will 
need to pay more for this cover which will 
inevitably be passed on to consumers; thereby 
again raising premiums for the homeowner.  
However, this increased coverage and regulation 
means that it will be less likely that insurers 
become overexposed in the future and that if one 
does it may be due to failings of the regulators to 
enforce the rules. 
5.3.1.4 Improvements in technology and 
mapping and its impacts on 
understanding flood risks  
Risk-reflective pricing in New Zealand is in its 
infancy and many of the insurers are only just 
starting to use the new geographical tools which 
have become available to work out what the risks 
really are.   A move towards the use of these tools 
has been prompted by a number of factors: losses 
sustained by the earthquakes and a desire to 
better understand their exposure to all hazards; 
technological and data improvements which has 
meant that these tools are now available; and 
finally the Australian floods.  The latter of these 
factors should not be underestimated as many of 
the insurers are Australian-owned companies and 
suffered heavy losses in the Queensland flooding. 
 
New geotechnical maps are being incorporated 
more routinely into the systems of insurers and are 
starting to get a more holistic view of their risks 
and exposure.  Prior to these tools insurers were 
reliant on data about historical events and claims: 
but now they are able to provide an estimate 
(although with a degree of uncertainty) for a 
particular property and determine a likely flood 
probability for that location.  This ability is starting 
to reshape how insurers are underwriting flood 
risk and they may choose to underwrite different 
hazards (including flooding) separately to create 
the policy premium.  It is difficult to say precisely 
what the impact of this will be on the insurance 
market although there are a number of 
foreseeable possibilities: 
 
 There will be a greater differentiation of 
premiums based on flood risk; i.e. those at 
higher flood risk will pay more than those at 
lower risk 
 Premiums for high risk properties will rise – 
although the degree of this increase is unknown 
and will depend upon other factors such as the 
competitiveness of the market 
 Deductibles for flood may be increased in areas 
at high risk of flooding or the entitlements may 
be limited in certain situations. 
 Cover for high risk areas may be withdrawn. 
 
Although many of the above will prove to be 
problematic for some policyholders (i.e. those 
located in areas of high risk), insurers’ ability to 
price their risk more effectively is positive for the 
resilience of the industry.  Additionally, some 
might argue that if considered solely from the 
viewpoint of flood risk, it creates a fairer system 
whereby those at very low risk are not paying the 
same amount as those at high risk – although 
without some element of cross-subsidisation the 
principles of insurance are not fulfilled.  The 
transition period from non-risk reflective pricing to 
one whereby there is some degree of flood risk-
reflective pricing is likely to be the most difficult. 
5.3.2 Private insurance and the mitigation of 
flooding 
Mitigation against flooding in New Zealand 
currently has a focus on minimum flood heights. 
Local councils in areas of high flood risk have the 
ability to set minimum heights and to put these 
requirements into the building costs for new builds.  
If a house was considered to be a total loss and 
had to be completely rebuilt then an insurer would 
be required to build according to these standards 
otherwise they would not be able to gain building 
consent.  However, in the majority of situations 
related to flooding this is not the case and in most 
cases the policy is worded in such a way that it is 
only the damaged parts of the property that need 
to be tackled and that it is not the responsibility of 
the insurers to bring the undamaged parts of the 
properties up to the standards.  However, raising 
properties is very expensive and thereby the cost is 
generally prohibitive for insurers to consider as 
they will not undertake any betterment activities.  
When a property is damaged it will be repaired like 
for like and it is unlikely that floor heights will be 
raised.  
 
Other types of mitigation to flooding such as flood-
proofing, the use of flood gates or other resilience 
measures are quite rare in New Zealand; partly  
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related to the typical type of construction.  It is 
hard to fit resistance measures to timber 
properties because they are not waterproof and 
this limits the opportunities for the use of these 
types of resistance oriented property-level 
measures and thereby if water reaches the floor 
level then it leaks through the structure of the 
property.  This highlights a potential conflict 
between mitigation for earthquakes (whereby 
ductile materials such as timber are favoured as 
they are less likely to fail in the same way as brick 
or concrete) and mitigation from flooding which 
often requires stronger and more waterproof 
materials. The structural resilience of buildings to 
flooding (and other natural hazards) has been 
undertaken by BRANZ also as part of the 
Community Resilience and Good Ageing research26
However, there are options for mitigation at a 
more community scale.  An example of this was in 
the case of a repeatedly flooded housing 
development in the North of New Zealand around 
18 years ago.  Insurers threatened to remove 
coverage following the third consecutive flood in 
three years.  This prompted the local council to 
take mitigation action.  The housing development 
had been built on marginal land that had been 
swamp and so the council was able to install a 
. 
 
                                                     
26http://resilience.goodhomes.co.nz/publications/ 
series of pumps which are used in times of heavy 
rain and the development has been free from 
flooding. 
5.3.3 Reducing future risks 
Mitigation may become more important in the 
future in order to manage future flood risk.  The 
flood risks in New Zealand are considered to be 
increasing due to climate change.  In particular 
rainfall is expected to be more intense, sea levels 
are set to rise as well as increasing storminess all 
of which have the potential to impact upon the 
frequency and severity of flood events (NZ Ministry 
for the Environment, 2010).  
 
Pressure on land in some areas of New Zealand is 
increasing and as a result, there is concern by 
insurers that exposure to flood risks are increasing 
as developers build in inappropriate areas which 
are at high flood risk.  In many cases this may be 
because local councils do not have sufficient 
resources to fight developers or even when it is 
taken to an environmental court the council’s 
objections are rejected on the grounds of 
economic considerations. Flood risk areas are 
potentially being targeted for development 
because often the land is less expensive and even 
when developers adhere to the requirements for 
drainage set by local councils this is not always 
sufficient to prevent flooding. 
 
Insurers would like councils and environmental 
courts to further consider the implications of 
development in these areas, particularly under 
future climate change scenarios and new 
development constructed in known areas of flood 
risk may be some of the first locations insurers 
decide to exclude from cover in the future. 
5.3.4 Summary characteristics of flood 
insurance coverage for domestic 
dwellings 
Table 5.2 provides a summary of the private cover 
highlighting both the key characteristics of the 
approach as well as how it can be categorised 
according to the three assessment criteria or 
efficiency, equity and robustness.  The high 
penetration of cover is one of the key 
characteristics of the approach as it means a wide 
group of policyholders through which to spread 
the risk; although the actual degree of risk 
spreading is that within a company.  The bundled 
nature of the policies also means that flood risks 
are pooled and cross-subsidised and transferred 
The example of Queenstown flood mitigation 
 
Heavy rain causes flooding problems related to 
rising lake levels by up to 2 meters and causing 
water ingress to hotels on the lake shore front. 
Claims were into the multi-millions and the 
insurers were still providing flood cover but 
they imposed fairly large deductibles on those 
risks that were flooded.  The building owners 
when rebuilding and refurbishing these 
properties undertook repairs that made ground 
flood areas were more resilient and easier to 
reinstate in the future.  Additionally, as the lake 
does not rise immediately and there is 
considerable warning (a rare situation in New 
Zealand), it allows businesses to remove all of 
the soft and hard fixtures on the lower floors.  
This minimises damages and thereby once the 
water recedes the properties can be hosed out 
and they have been very successful in 
recovering quickly from flooding and this is a 
good example of positive adaptation action. 
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between different types of risk.  Flood insurance at 
the moment is considered to be risk-insensitive, 
that is premiums are generally not altered and 
priced on the basis of flood risk.   
 
Table 5.2: Summary table for the provision of flood insurance within standard household policies 
Insurance scheme: Bundled insurance via the private market. 
Types of perils and 
flooding covered by 
insurance: 
All types of flooding for dwellings are generally included within standard 
policies. 
Optional/ 
compulsory cover: 
 Buildings insurance is compulsory with a mortgage loan. 
 Contents cover is optional. 
Insurance premium 
mechanism: 
Premiums are cross-subsided by its composite nature. 
 
Also has reinsurance. 
Risk transfer mechanism: Risk is transferred via spreading across all risks in the bundled system. 
Penetration/ 
coverage of flood cover: 
Quite high – Considered to be around 80 to 90%. 
Presence of state aid or 
compensation: 
None – only the state guaranteed first loss cover for earthquakes as described 
in the sections above. 
Summary: Recovery from flooding to dwellings is entirely based upon the purchase of 
insurance from the private insurance market. 
Key principles of the recovery system 
Efficiency:  The insurance industry exerts pressure on the government to better manage 
flood risk. However, currently the industry is not very involved in flood 
mitigation and the low premiums mean that is difficult to incentivise 
mitigation.   
Equity principle: Solidaristic, risk-insensitive insurance but there is a move towards greater 
consideration of the risk and for higher premiums to be introduced and 
therefore a move towards individualist, risk-sensitive insurance. 
Robustness of recovery 
system: 
Medium –also a higher awareness by insurers of the loss potential due to 
flooding.  There is also the added complication of the dynamism of the risk 
due to the potential for earth movements to raise or lower land and thereby 
make them more or less vulnerable to flooding 
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5.4 The special case of flood 
insurance provision for 
residents in retirement villages 
Currently, only a small percentage of New 
Zealand’s older citizens reside in 
retirement villages; although this 
continues to be a growing sector.  In mid-
2013 the Retirement Villages Association 
(RVA) reports that there were 26,700 
older people living in approximately 
23,600 units in around 350 registered 
retirement villages.  A number of these 
villages were badly impacted by the 
Canterbury earthquakes and there are a 
number of lessons that can be learnt 
moving forward about these groups, their 
needs and their specific insurance 
requirements.   
 
Although some regulatory protection exits, 
there is some concern that some aspects 
are not being properly and fully enforced 
and that they could be much more 
vigilance. The role of Statutory Supervisor 
(SS) is usually performed by a specialist 
company who are licensed to act in that 
capacity by the Financial Markets 
Authority. The role of the Statutory 
Supervisor is important to the resilience 
of villages on a number of grounds.  They 
can step in and take action if they are 
concerned about the financial stability of 
a village.  The role of Statutory 
Supervisors in the insurance of retirement 
villages is discussed below in Section 5.4.1.  
Furthermore, if a Supervisor works 
proactively then they have an increased 
potential to increase the resilience of 
older people living in retirement villages 
(see Section 7.3.8). 
 
Since 2007, the Retirement Villages Act 
2003 27
 
 (as amended) it has been a 
requirement for all residents entering 
retirement villages to receive 
independent legal advice before signing 
the occupation right agreement and that 
a lawyer must explain to the potential 
resident the terms of the agreement and 
its implications and that the explanation  
                                                     
27  Retirement Villages Act 2003 as amended by the 
Retirement Villages Act 2007. 
Key features of retirement villages in New Zealand 
 
 The majority of the villages (c. 80%) operate on the 
status of owner purchasing a “License to Occupy” a 
retirement dwelling.  This means that the resident 
does not own the property but enters into a contract 
with the village operator to reside in a property. On 
leaving the property (e.g. moving to another property, 
in with relatives, into a nursing home or passing away) 
the resident (or their estate) will only get back a 
proportion (usually 70% or 80%) of the purchase price.   
The other 20-30% is called the Deferred Management 
Fee and is retained by the village operator to refurbish 
the property to a standard ready for resale. 
 
 Additionally, the business model generally means that 
the operator also gains any increase in the market 
value or conversely also bears any depreciation. 
 
 Residents are only responsible for the contents of 
their dwelling; insurance for the dwellings is the 
responsibility of the retirement village operator. 
 
 The other 20% of villages are operated on the basis of 
a ‘unit title’ or other form of tenure (e.g. rental) 
whereby the resident owns the property and are 
thereby responsible for the maintenance and upkeep.  
Under this regime, the operator owns the land and is 
responsible for the community facilities and well as 
the roads, drainage and services. 
 
 Retirement villages are part of a regulated industry: 
with a whole suite of legislation.  Most importantly the 
Retirement Village Act 2003 and the Retirement 
Villages Amendment Act 2007.  Regulations are in 
place to protect the interests of residents including 
their right to live in a village. There is also a disputes 
process which exists to assist residents. 
 
 Under the Act the villages are required to be 
registered and all registered villages are required to be 
signed up to the Retirement Villages Code of Practice 
(COP) (NZ Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment, 2008)  
 
 Each village is also required to be overseen by an 
Independent Statutory Supervisor which looks to 
protect the interests of the residents. 
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“be given in a manner and in language that is 
appropriate to the age and understanding of the 
intending resident28
5.4.1 Insurance in retirement villages 
”.   
 
This legal disclosure, although does not guarantee 
that the resident will heed their advice, does 
provide a mechanism in place to ensure that 
residents who entered the village post-2007 have 
had the agreements explained and should be 
aware of the occupancy details, a part of which is 
likely to include what insurance issues are their 
responsibility and which are the responsibility of 
the village operator.  Awareness of these issues 
may diminish the longer a resident lives in a village 
as there is no requirement for these terms and 
conditions to be revisited and of course 
understanding may be lower for those who 
entered a village before 2007.  Indeed, there is 
some evidence to suggest that following the 
Canterbury earthquakes some residents thought 
they were covered as part of their contract when 
in fact they were not.   
When residents reside in a village under the terms 
of a unit title, a resident will be responsible for the 
insurance of both the property and the contents: 
in the same way that they would be responsible if 
they owned their own property that was not 
located within a retirement village.  The rest of this 
section will therefore primarily focus on insurance 
issues to those living in villages with a ‘license to 
occupy’ model. 
 
In these villages, the village operators are 
responsible for insuring the physical assets of the 
villages (including the individual residents’ units) 
under a commercial model of insurance. The 
Retirement Villages Code of Practice (COP) since 
2013 specifies the details of the coverage and that 
they are to have comprehensive insurance 
coverage for full-replacement cover.  Additionally, 
village owners may take out temporary 
accommodation insurance and business disruption 
insurance. The COP also makes the requirement 
that this coverage must be to the satisfaction of 
the SS who check a range of different features of 
retirement villages. The SS is required to report to 
the Registrar of Retirement Villages that they are 
satisfied with the running of the village.    
 
                                                     
28 Ibid, Section 27(6) 
Obtaining an appropriate level of insurance may be 
a complicated process now that insurance is for a 
nominated sum, but in general the process will 
require proper evaluation.  Valuations are required 
to be undertaken; these must be current and 
should include everything above and below the 
ground (e.g. sewerage pipework, communication 
and power lines etc.).  However, some SS are not 
yet fully qualified to be able to suggest the 
insurance coverage is adequate although this is 
improving with additional training being offered to 
supervisors, although they should continue to rely 
heavily upon the knowledge of specialised 
professions such as insurance brokers and valuers. 
It is expected that in the future SS will be more 
able to adequately judge the appropriateness of 
retirement village insurance and will be able to 
intervene if not satisfied; thereby increasing the 
resilience of these villages to natural events. 
However, the SS is employed by the village 
operator and although many are reputable there is 
no guarantee of their impartiality and few 
guidelines about their powers and responsibilities 
in relation to many of the issues around adverse 
natural events. 
 
Contents insurance in this scenario is solely 
between the individual resident and their insurer.  
There is no obligation for a resident to have 
contents insurance and some have chosen not to 
insure.  This could of course be for a number of 
reasons which may include the price of the cover 
and whether they consider the value of their 
possessions is worth insuring. Many residents 
however will just transfer the type of insurance 
that they have always had.  However, there are a 
number of specialist products available to 
residents in retirement villages which offer an 
appropriate level of cover and may also include 
temporary accommodation cover if for whatever 
reason they are unable to reside in their property 
(i.e. the village is closed due to fire or a natural 
event).   
5.4.2 Lessons for retirement villages and 
retirement village insurance from the 
Canterbury Earthquakes 
A number of villages were badly impacted by the 
Canterbury earthquakes and many of the 
difficulties that were experienced have led to some 
potential lessons for the provision of flood 
insurance and the resilience of residents in 
retirement villages.  The extent of the damages to 
villages was unprecedented and whereas
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operators were used to dealing with one 
or two units being affected by fire, in this 
situation hundreds of units were impacted 
at the same time.  Generally, the 
Canterbury earthquakes created a lot of 
difficulties, stress and frustrations for both 
residents and their families and operators.  
Not least because there were conflicting 
priorities: the operator having to make the 
decisions about the village as an entity 
(and whether rebuilding was a possibility) 
and that grated with individual residents 
who expected decisions to be made on an 
individual basis.  It was a process that no-
one has been through before and it was a 
process that exceeded the wildest 
expectations of anyone in terms of 
magnitude and severity.  It highlighted the 
importance of effective communication 
between insurers, operators and residents. 
Changes were made to the Retirement 
Villages Code of Practice to remove the 
uncertainty about the terms villages would 
receive in the future following the total 
and permanent destruction of a village (i.e. 
that they would not be rebuilt). Prior to 
the changes residents were in the 
situation whereby they only received the 
original purchase price minus the Deferred 
Management Fee, and in many cases this 
caused hardship when securing a new 
‘license to occupy’ agreement. Although 
other retirement villages offered 
preferential rates to many of these 
residents and it was believed that the 
majority have been satisfactorily relocated 
in alternative villages; this whole process 
was very stressful for residents and their 
families and it was considered to be very 
unfair that residents were left out of 
pocket through no fault of their own.   
 
The code has therefore been changed to 
clarify the situation for residents and 
therefore if in the future a village is 
destroyed and not rebuilt the resident will 
receive at least a sum equivalent to their 
original purchase price. 29
                                                     
29 See Section 47 (2d &e) of Retirement Villages Code of Practice 2008 
(Variations included October 2013) 
If however, the 
village is rebuilt then residents will be able 
to move into a reconstructed unit and 
their original terms and conditions 
Experiences and lessons for retirement villages from the 
Canterbury earthquakes  
 Four villages were very badly damaged; two were 
rebuilt and two have not been. 
 One village was not able to be rebuilt because it was 
located in an area re-designated as a red zone, whereas 
one operator decided not to rebuild. 
 80% of villages in the affected areas had some level of 
damage – but in most cases residents were able to 
continue to live in the damaged properties (sometimes 
with temporary repair) until they were able to be fully 
restored. 
 Practical issues involved finding temporary 
accommodation very quickly for large numbers of 
residents when many others also looking for alternative 
accommodation. 
 Many owners did not have adequate temporary 
accommodation insurance, as some people required 
accommodation for up to two years: new insurance 
products have now emerged to fill this gap. 
Financial issues 
 Difficulties experienced by one of the destroyed 
villages, whereby the land was badly damaged and 
subsequently red zoned, but the properties were largely 
undamaged.  Therefore, the insurer originally refused to 
pay out as there was essentially no damage to repair; 
yet the operator could not continue to run the village.  
Eventually, a settlement was reached between the 
insurer and the operator. 
 Uncertainties about the residents’ level of pay-out when 
a village was destroyed and not rebuilt. 
 Under the contracts residents were only entitled to the 
original purchase price of the property minus the 
Deferred Management Fee, even though it was not 
their choice to leave the village – this meant that some 
found it difficult to relocate. 
 Insurance claims took a long time to settle due to the 
large amounts involved (in the order of NZ$50million in 
some cases and therefore the insurers had to fully 
investigate claims. This meant that both village 
operators and residents had to wait a considerable 
period for their pay-outs. 
Industry response 
 Positive and coordinated response of the industry who 
worked together to find temporary accommodation and 
new permanent units for displaced residents. 
 Retirement village owners also in some circumstances 
gave affected residents extended terms of credit and 
special terms in order to assist them in relocating to 
alternative villages. 
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transferred to a new contract.  If the resident 
chooses not to relocate then they will only receive 
the original purchase price minus the Deferred 
Management Fee and not the full 100% value. 
 
These circumstances would be the same if in an 
unlikely situation a village was to be completely 
destroyed by a flood and not reconstructed; 
however it is likely to bemire relevant for other 
geophysical hazards when land is rezoned and 
residential habitation is subsequently prohibited. 
Interviewees suggested that the changes to the 
Code have in general been warmly received by the 
operators as it provides a framework which was 
missing before.  They are also aware that it might 
have gone further as some residents were 
demanding that they be entitled to recoup the full 
market value.  However, it was unlikely that this 
would be implemented as it would be impossible 
for an operator to insure for this. Implications for 
making residents in retirement villages more 
resilient to hazards via insurance will be discussed 
in Section 7.3.8.  Despite these changes to the 
Code of Practice anxiety remains amongst some 
residents who are concerned about the levels of 
insurance coverage and whether their home (and 
investments) is secure if impacted by adverse 
natural events. 
 
Both of these scenarios are now discussed and 
compared and contrasted to other international 
examples.  For shorthand purposes the flood 
insurance cover provided for land as part of the 
EQC will be referred to as New Zealand (EQCover) 
or NZ EQC and offered by the private market for 
flood-affected dwellings will be referred to as New 
Zealand (dwellings) or NZ dwellings. 
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6 Models of flood recovery, insurance and compensation 
How flood insurance provision is structured, what 
losses are covered or excluded and how it is 
purchased all impact upon the effectiveness of the 
scheme for recovering from flood losses and 
ultimately how burden sharing is split between the 
at-risk individual and society.  As described in 
Section 4 each of international systems of recovery 
from flood losses have been assessed according to 
the three main principles: 
 
 Efficiency - The impact that the system has 
upon incentivising mitigation  
 Equity - The principles of social justice and 
fairness are upheld by the system 
 Robustness - The degree to which the 
insurance system (and more broadly the 
recovery system) adheres to the principles 
of insurance and is therefore has economic 
viability over the long term. 
 
In addition, each of the scheme’s key 
characteristics have also been identified and 
presented at the end of each country’s sub-section 
(Appendix A).  This section draws together the 
information about the different recovery systems, 
and aims to provide a synthesis of the different 
potential options for recovery and how they reflect 
each of the three analysis principles above.  Sub-
sections introduce and compare the different types 
of flood insurance systems adopted internationally; 
the balance between the use of insurance and 
compensation; equity and fairness; robustness and 
assessments of the efficiency of different types of 
flood recovery systems.  
6.1 Comparing international models of flood 
recovery 
A number of studies have aimed to model and 
categorise flood recovery, insurance and 
compensation mechanisms (notably Hausmann 
(1998), Arnell (2000), Porrini and Schwarze (2014) 
and Mehlhorn and Hausmann (2012)).   Each of 
these different  approaches have focussed on 
different elements and are discussed below; the 
analysis initially focusing on different approaches 
to providing flood insurance cover, before  
broadening the discussion to encompass the role 
of compensation in the recovery from flood events 
and the involvement of governments. 
6.1.1 Approaches to the provision of flood 
insurance cover 
Hausmann (1998) presents a comparison based on 
different flood insurance solutions in relation to 
the following three elements; the risk of anti-
selection, the loss potential and the costs of risk 
assessment (Table 6.1).  All of these three 
elements focus clearly on the market viability of 
the insurance system.  This is a good simple way in 
which to describe different approaches, however it 
lacks clarity and distinction about who bears the 
high loss potential (although this can be inferred).    
 
Table 6.1: Hausmann’s (1998) classification of different insurance solutions 
 
Source: Hausmann (1998; 35).
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Figure 6.1: Mehlhorn and Hausmann (2012)’s depiction of flood insurance systems 
 
Source:  Mehlhorn and Hausmann (2012; 17). 
 
The classification also only includes flood insurance 
instruments and does not account for the presence 
or impact of compensation mechanisms.  It does 
however provide a first categorisation of insurance 
options. This has been simplified even further by 
Mehlhorn and Hausmann (2012) who indicate that 
flood insurance can be categorised into four 
different approaches; 
 
 Public and optional (e.g., United States); 
 Public and bundled (e.g., France; NZ (EQC));  
 Private and optional (e.g., Germany); and  
 Private and bundled (e.g., UK; NZ dwellings). 
 
They go on to present these along a spectrum with 
two axes; whether they are public or private and 
whether they are optional or bundled/compulsory 
(Table 6.1).   
 
This approach does illustrate a number of the key 
elements of flood insurance that are available; but 
again excludes other mechanisms of recovery such 
as compensation.  Additionally, although its 
simplification is necessary from a categorisation 
perspective, the approach is not able to depict the 
inherent complexity.  For instance, it highlights in 
the top left of the diagram a free-market and risk-
adjusted situation; however often in reality a free 
market will also bring competition.  Despite it 
being true that there is the freedom for flood 
insurance to be provided on an actuarial basis, and 
via risk-adjusted premiums, in reality competition 
within that market may often prevent this from 
occurring. 
6.1.1.1 Bundled versus single risk insurance 
A common descriptor used by a number of studies 
is the contrast between policies for single perils (i.e. 
insurance just for flooding) and those where 
insurance is offered as part of a bundled policy 
(Paklina, 2003; Sandink et al., 2010). To be 
economically viable single policy flood insurance 
will need to be provided on an actuarially sound 
basis; i.e. where the premiums are reflective of the 
risks being insured.  Although this will mean that 
policyholders will become more aware of the risks 
that they face and therefore mitigation may be 
incentivised, there are often a number of problems 
associated with insurance policies which are 
implemented on these terms.  These include: 
 
 Risk assessment – insurers need to be able to 
effective assess and understand the risks and 
this was considered to be a problem in many of 
the international examples. 
 Availability - insurers may choose not to 
provide insurance for those locations where the 
risk is too high – thereby arguably those who 
have the greatest need for insurance are not 
able to purchase it.  
 Affordability – those at high risk may have 
insurance premiums which are too expensive 
and therefore they are unable to purchased 
insurance.  
 Adverse-selection – if the risks are well-known 
there is a high possibility that only those at risk 
will choose to purchase flood insurance.  
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Bundled policies (as described in Section 2.2.2) 
eliminate many of these issues by enabling the 
flood risk to be spread more widely.  These types 
of composite policies (such as NZ dwellings) were 
widespread in the international examples explored; 
with 17 systems whereby flood is offered via the 
private market having some element of bundling 
and with a further five pool or state-run systems 
also having bundling. The type of bundling did 
however differ with some flood insurance being 
solely bundled with other natural perils and others 
bundling flood insurance into a standard 
household policy along with non-natural events 
such as fire and theft. 
 
There are arguments for and against both of these 
different types of policies and the advantages and 
limitations are well known. Paklina (2003) argues 
that the benefits of a bundled policy outweigh 
those of single-risks and that flood insurance 
should be provided in this way.  The main benefit is 
that in those countries where flood insurance is 
provided as part of a composite policy insurance 
penetration is much higher than those where a 
single risk policy is offered.  Crichton (2008) 
highlight that bundled policies permit the risks to 
be spread in three ways: over different risk areas, 
over time and between risks.  These different 
elements permit a more economically viable 
system to be created.  Sandink et al. (2010) also 
argues that the changing nature of definitions of 
flooding in insurance policies (i.e. the increased 
focus on extreme rainfall and surface water events 
particularly in urban areas) means that the number 
of properties considered to be at risk of flooding is 
growing; albeit with potentially lower losses than 
those at high risk from fluvial or tidal flooding.  
Therefore, although those at low flood risks are 
cross-subsidising those at higher risk, with extreme 
rainfall events covered, most homeowners “who 
purchases flood insurance (now) have the 
potential to benefit from flood coverage” (Sandink 
et al., 2010; 42). 
6.1.1.2 The importance of the compulsory 
nature of insurance 
The compulsory or optional nature of flood 
insurance is another of the key characteristics of a 
policy and is also obviously highly correlated to 
market penetration and the uptake of insurance.  
When defining and categorising approaches to 
flood insurance as well as a distinction between 
whether a policy is for a single risk or bundled 
perils the type of approach is also complicated by 
the optional or compulsory nature of the insurance 
provided.  This phenomenon is also highlighted in 
Figure 6.1whereby one axes runs between option 
and bundled/compulsory. 
 
The mandatory nature of insurance schemes may 
however encompass three different elements:  
 
1. There is a requirement on property-owners to 
have insurance cover for flooding (and usually 
other natural perils) 
2. Whether there is a compulsion enshrined in 
law for insurers to include flood insurance as a 
mandatory peril within any household policy; 
3. Whether flood insurance cover has 
traditionally been included as a standard peril 
included within any household insurance 
policy.   
 
The international examples reviewed are mapped 
onto these two different elements of compulsion 
in Table 6.2.  This indicates that there is a relatively 
even spread in the ways in which approaches have 
included a mandatory element into their coverage; 
from trying to enforce compliance from all 
property-owners (and in the case of France also for 
tenants) to only making it a compulsory peril 
within standard household policies. 
 
Porrini and Schwarze (2014) suggest that all of 
these situations should be considered to be 
compulsory as in all of them a consumer is not able 
to negotiate freely about those risks which are able 
to be insured.  However, they argue that in all but 
the first condition, ultimately the sovereignty of 
the consumer is maintained as policyholders may 
choose not to enter into an insurance contract.  
This autonomy for buildings insurance may be 
removed however when a property owner has a 
mortgage (see below).  Lamond and Penning-
Rowsell (2011) affirm that coverage is strongest in 
those markets where flood is bundled into 
standard property insurance and weakest when a 
stand-alone policy is offered on an optional basis. 
Increased penetration coverage is not only an 
indicator of the potential robustness of a scheme 
but also as the CEBR (2012) contend that the 
overall costs to the taxpayer are substantially 
reduced when insurance penetration is highest. 
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Table 6.2:  Elements of compulsion within the provision of flood insurance 
Type of compulsion  International examples 
There is a requirement on property-owners to 
have coverage for flooding (and usually other 
natural perils) 
France, Iceland, Romania, Spain 
There is a compulsion enshrined in law for 
insurers to include flood insurance as a 
mandatory peril within any household policy 
Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland (Cantonal) 
Flood insurance cover is a standard peril 
included within any household policy 
United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Switzerland 
(GUSTAVO), New Zealand (dwellings) 
 
 
Kunreuther (1996) highlights a number of key 
factors which influence whether a policyholder 
selects to purchase or maintain insurance (such as 
the importance of the perceived risk, the 
cancellation of policies if a claim is not made and 
awareness of the product).  These are added to by 
Seifert et al. (2013) who suggest that the 
characteristics of the flood risk, the availability of 
other types of financial assistance and previous 
experiences of flood risk all connect and influence 
insurance demand and the likelihood of a 
policyholder to purchase insurance in situations 
where it is not compulsory.  Indeed, Hung (2009) 
also suggests that homeowners often lack the 
cognitive ability to assess both the potential loss 
and the probability of a catastrophe and therefore 
it is difficult for many people to judge whether or 
not it is in their interests to insure. All of these 
difficulties are overcome if there is some element 
of compulsion in the nature of the insurance 
provision.  
 
There is of course a third element of a compulsory 
nature that needs to be considered that there may 
be other conditions whereby having household 
insurance may be compulsory.  The most common 
of these is when there is a loan secured on a 
property and the mortgage lender requires that 
their investment is protected.  This is true of many 
countries (including New Zealand) that have been 
included in this review.  However, in general this 
requirement only concerns a householder having a 
standard household policy and therefore if flood 
insurance is included within a standard policy then 
the compulsory requirement extends to include 
this (and often other natural perils).  Secondly, 
there is often only the requirement to insure the 
building or structure under these requirements, 
the decision about whether to insure the contents 
remains the choice of the property owner.  
In some circumstances (e.g. NFIP in the US) there is 
a requirement to have additional coverage for 
flood insurance.  For instance, in the case of the 
NFIP if a property is located in a Special Flood 
Hazard Areas and have Federal mortgages then 
they also are required to participate in the 
Program.  Although this compulsion will have a 
positive impact upon penetration and makes it 
more likely that policyholders will have insurance, 
it does not guarantee that all those who have a 
mortgage loan will also have purchased insurance.  
This will often depend upon how stringent 
mortgage lenders are in regulating and checking 
that insurance has been purchased and the terms 
of that coverage.  Dixon et al. (2006) investigated 
the market penetration of the NFIP and as part of 
this the numbers of policyholders complying with 
mandatory purchase requirements.  It has been 
estimated that 50% to 60% of properties in SFHAs 
are subject to the mandatory requirement; 
however they estimate that compliance with these 
requirements appears to be only 75% to 80% and 
therefore there are quite a few households who do 
not have flood insurance than should have (Dixon 
et al., 2006).  However despite this, penetration 
rates are still much higher for those who have 
mortgages than do not have the requirement and 
it is suggested that market penetration is a low as 
20% for those where flood insurance is not 
mandatorily required. 
6.1.1.3 Different premium mechanisms 
One of the other key elements is how premiums 
are collected and used to distribute and transfer 
the risk.  The different types of premiums are of 
course related to the type of insurance provided.  
The main distinction is between flood insurance 
cover which is priced according to the risk and 
whether a full actuarial premium is charged, or 
whether a below risk-priced premium is charged; 
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whether this is subsidised or purely market driven.  
Although in theory a full-actuarial premium might 
on the face of it appear to be the ideal situation in 
reality; in practice there are very many barriers to 
the adoption of this approach; not least 
affordability and availability issues.  Therefore, 
examples of full risk-related premiums amongst 
the international examples are limited and in 
particular the New Zealand dwellings insurance 
premiums are not differentiated by flood risk.  
 
A single-risk policy is of course (at least in part) 
actuarially calculated and therefore reflective of 
the flood risk of the property being insured.  
Machetti (2009) suggests that there are three 
other types of price forms which are independent 
of the actuarial level of the premiums and the 
degree to which they are risk differentiated.   All of 
these were present in systems investigated in this 
study; these are: 
 
 A fixed amount – this might also be known as a 
flat-rate premium which is applied  (such as 
that applied in Denmark, Taiwan) 
 As a percentage amount of the base policy  (e.g. 
France) 
 As a percentage of the insured capital (e.g. 
Norway, New Zealand EQCover, Japan, Spain, 
Iceland, Portugal, Netherlands, Switzerland 
(GUSTAVO)) 
 
All of these premium mechanisms might be used 
for the provision of flood insurance and are 
employed within private-bundled or pooled 
policies and they might be considered to be 
additional premium enforcements or a levy.  
Although in essence to a policyholder who is 
bearing the cost these might be considered to be 
similar and generate additional funds from which 
to pay claims, the way in which they are held and 
transferred (e.g. to an insurance company, in an 
insurance or state-run pool or reinsurance reserve 
fund) may vary considerably.  The nature of the 
instrument (additional premium or levy) may also 
vary in terms of how they are treated and handled 
in law (i.e. are they considered to be a tax, as 
public or private funds). 
 
In addition to these actuarial or non-actuarially 
based mechanisms there may also be other 
situations whereby although there is the potential 
to implement pricing on an actuarial basis, the 
competitiveness of the market is inhibiting this 
process.  This is the circumstances are present in 
the Netherlands with rainfall-based flood 
insurance and in the UK for flood insurance.  In 
these situations, the flood risk component of the 
risk ends up being under-priced.  In addition, the 
composite nature of the policy means that the 
policyholder has no way of knowing how much 
each of the different elements combines to make 
up their overall premium.  Although this in itself is 
not necessarily problematic incentivising 
mitigation action to reduce risk may be challenging 
under these conditions (see Section 6.4). 
 
As well as different ways in which premiums are 
priced there were different approaches to the 
setting of deductibles. The majority of the 
international examples studies employed 
deductibles which is the amount a policyholder is 
required to pay and is therefore the proportion of 
the financial losses that they have to bear.  Some 
deductibles were set at a fixed value for all of 
those affected, some were graduated according 
the risk and others were employed as a percentage 
of the total loss.  Whatever approach was adopted 
there was usually a minimum deductible to be 
applied.  Increasing deductibles may be seen by 
insurers as an alternative (as well as a complement) 
to raising premiums; the attractiveness being that 
it will have the effective of reducing the overall 
exposure of an insurer (as the proportion of the 
total risk they will bear is lowered) whilst still 
maintain the affordability of premiums, at least in 
the short term.  Machetti (2009) also argues that 
where risks are very high the employment of 
deductibles is required and fundamental to 
maintaining the insurability of cover; and should 
be employed in conjunction with risk-reflective 
pricing.   Therefore, gaining an effective balance 
between the overall pricing of the risk via 
premiums and via deductibles can be an effective 
way in which to manage the economic viability of 
an insurance product.  In New Zealand fixed 
deductibles are employed by the EQCover; 
whereas for private cover the presence (and 
amount) of a deductible for flooding can vary 
depending upon the specific terms of the policy. 
6.1.1.4 The robustness of different flood 
insurance approaches 
Table 6.3 provides a simplified approach to 
presenting the different models of flood insurance 
provision.  As discussed above there are many 
different ways in which the approaches can be 
categorised.  The approach adopted here focuses 
on the robustness of the approach and its 
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economic viability and builds on some of those 
discussed above as well as others (Hausmann, 
1998, Arnell, 2000, Priest, 2003; Porrini and 
Schwarze, 2014; see Table 6.6 below).  In particular, 
the categorisation incorporates Hausmann’s (1998) 
three threats to the insurability of flooding; the 
risks of anti-selection, the loss potential to insurers 
and the costs of assessment. 
 
Each of the different international models of 
insurance has been placed in the table along with 
the different threats to insurability as indicated by 
Hausmann (1998).  Where more than one system 
of insurance is present within any one country 
these countries appear more than once in the 
table.   
 
Table 6.3 provides an initial review of the 
robustness of an insurance system based on the 
three threats to insurability.  The least viable 
approach appears to be one whereby cover is 
optional and sold as a single policy as this had a 
high score for all three of the ‘threats’.  This type 
of system is generally evidenced by low 
penetration (e.g. Germany, Italy, Indonesia and 
Taiwan) as premiums are relatively expensive and 
therefore discourage or prohibit uptake.  In the US 
where this approach is also adopted high 
premiums are off-set by government subsidies 
making participation in the program more 
affordable.  Can this approach be considered 
economically viable when in 2008 it was reported 
to be in debt to the US Treasury in the order of 
US$ 17 billion? 
 
From this analysis, the most viable and robust 
option appears to be the final one in the table 
where insurance coverage is compulsory and 
provided with graduated premiums.  It scores low 
or medium on all of the threat criteria and in 
particular for the two greatest threats to 
insurability; the risk of anti-selection and the loss 
potential to insurers.  This of course makes sense 
from a viability perspective as not only will a 
compulsory scheme have a sufficiently large pool 
of policyholders from which to draw equally the 
presence of graduated premiums makes it more 
likely that insurers able to obtain sufficient funds 
to cover claims. However, despite this approach 
being the most robust there are no current 
international examples of where it has been 
adopted. 
 
There could be many reasons why an approach of 
this nature has not been utilised and the reasons 
may vary between countries; however the 
compulsory nature of this approach may be at 
least part of the answer.  This element of the 
scheme is likely to require legislation (and 
therefore government involvement) in order to 
mandate policyholders to adopt insurance.  This 
coupled with graduated (and therefore potentially 
risk-reflective premiums) means that some 
homeowners will be compelled to take out 
insurance which for some may be quite expensive 
and to some unaffordable.  Irrespective of the cost, 
many policyholders will have an increased expense 
and also lose the autonomy to make decisions 
about insurance purchase. A government is likely 
to find that any move towards encouraging a 
system of the nature is likely to be both publically 
and politically unpopular and therefore may be 
reluctant to advocate its introduction; without 
government regulation however a system is 
unlikely to be feasible.  The closest international 
examples to this approach are those adopted in 
France, Iceland, Romania and Spain whereby cover 
is compulsory; however the premiums in these 
cases are not graduated.  
 
The proposed UK model (for adoption post-2015) 
is however moving towards an approach where 
flood cover will remain a standard part of a 
household policy; thereby fulfilling the compulsory 
element.  Additionally, premiums are set to 
become more graduated and risk reflective, 
particularly in the moderate and high flood risk 
areas.  The issues of affordability in this case are 
overcome by the establishment of an insurance 
pool and the capping of premiums for the very 
highest-risk properties.  Additionally, Defra (2013a) 
indicate that this proposal is only an interim 
transitional measure established for the next 20 to 
25 years; after this period they expect premiums to 
be fully-risk related with no subsidisation and 
therefore a system based on compulsory cover 
with a graduated premium is expected to be 
adopted. 
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Table 6.3:  Models of flood insurance provision 
Description International examples Threats to insurability 
Risks of anti-
selection 
Loss 
potential to 
insurers 
Cost of 
assessment 
Flood cover included as a 
standard part of a 
domestic household policy 
Netherlands (rainfall and 
SWF) 
Switzerland (GUSTAVO) 
United Kingdom (pre-
2015) 
Belgium 
New Zealand (dwelling) 
Low High Low 
Flood cover available as 
an optional extra to a fire 
policy – bundled with 
other perils 
Portugal 
Sweden 
Brazil 
Ecuador 
China 
Israel 
Japan 
Philippines 
Germany 
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Mexico 
High High Low 
Flood cover provided by a 
compulsory levy on 
insurance premiums 
(a) Levy goes to a pool of 
private-sector 
companies 
 
Norway 
Romania 
United Kingdom (post-
2015) 
Low High Low 
(b) Levy goes to a    
      government- 
      supported agency   
      (often state- 
       guaranteed) 
France 
Denmark (sea flooding) 
Iceland 
Spain 
Switzerland (Cantonal) 
New Zealand (EQC) 
Low High Low 
Optional flood cover sold 
as a separate single risk 
policy 
Germany 
Italy 
Australia 
Indonesia 
Taiwan 
United States30
High 
 
High High 
Compulsory cover with a 
graduated premium  
This is currently not a 
utilised model 
Low Medium Medium 
Flood cover not available 
(or minimum availability) 
Netherlands (sea and 
river) 
Canada (most flooding) 
n/a n/a n/a 
After (Arnell, 2000; 419; Hausmann, 1998; 35 and Priest, 2003; 223).
                                                     
30Although a separate policy is provided - the terms of the US insurance system are very different from the others in this category which are all 
provided as part of the private market.  As well as the US approach offering a state-funded solution, premiums are subsidised which makes the 
insurance affordable and uptake more widespread. 
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From an economic viability perspective there 
appears, in principle at least, to be little 
difference between many of the other 
approaches; in particular when they also have an 
associated degree of compulsion.  Both a pool-
based approaches and those where flooding is 
included as part of a standard household policy 
encourage economic robustness via the grouping 
of the risks and spreading the potential losses as 
widely as possible.  Further discussion about the 
techniques that different approaches to flood 
recovery use to spread and transfer risk thereby 
increasing economic viability are is presented in 
Section 6.2.  However, the full robustness of each 
of these schemes is only apparent when 
specifically comparing the premiums that are 
charged, the numbers of people participating in 
the approach and a full assessment of the flood 
risk. 
 
The categorisation adopted above in Table 6.3 is 
a good way of presenting each of the insurance 
approaches and permits a good initial analysis of 
the robustness and viability each schemes; but it 
is lacking in the degree to which the approach is 
provided by the private market or has state 
intervention.  Botzen and van den Bergh (2008) 
highlight the distinction between public and 
private coverage in arrangements to recover 
from flood damages.  
 
Table 6.4:  Characteristics of arrangements against flood damage 
 
Botzen and van den Bergh (2008; 423) 
 
However, as Botzen and van den Bergh (2008) it is 
impossible to investigate the role of state 
intervention without including the presence or 
absence of public compensation.  The following 
section will therefore focus on the balance 
between compensation and insurance in the 
recovery from flooding. 
6.1.2 The balance between insurance and 
compensation in flood recovery 
The private market is often seen as the most 
effective and most efficient way in which to 
provide insurance and recovery from flooding and 
other natural perils (Botzen and van den Bergh, 
2008). However, many of the countries examined 
as part of this study had compensation funds in 
place to assist in the financial recovery of 
individuals from flooding.    Michel-Kerjan (2001) 
argues that there are two primary strengths of 
government intervention and compensation funds 
in post-disaster recovery: 
 
 Governments are able to spread the costs over 
time (i.e. this may even include risk-spreading 
over a number of generations) 
 Obtain compensation from a very large number 
of people (i.e. the whole taxpaying population) 
 
Table 6.5 presents the international examples 
investigated in relation to the insurance system 
they have adopted as well as whether they have a 
compensation scheme in place. The flood 
insurance strategies adopted in this table differ 
slightly to the categorisation adopted above in 
Table 6.3.  This was necessary to distinguish 
between those strategies which utilise the private 
market or public-based solutions.  
 
From examination of the international strategies 
for recovery, there does appear to be some 
relationship between flood insurance availability 
and penetration and the compensation available. 
Those governments of countries with little or no 
flood insurance in general appear to have made 
greater preparations for the payment of 
compensation.  However, many countries have a 
system whereby both insurance and compensation 
are available.  In some countries (e.g. The 
Netherlands) this may be because some types of 
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flooding are covered by insurance and others are 
not.  However, in many situations the availability 
of State financial aid and compensation is 
obstructing the development of a functioning 
private market of flood insurance and contributing 
to low flood insurance penetration. Faure (2004; 5) 
argues that approaches to the compensation for 
disasters in Europe are diverging.  Four different 
perspectives of compensation funds are presented 
in Table 6.5: 
 
 Systems with no state compensation 
provided 
 Systems where compensation is provided on 
an ad-hoc basis (often when legislation is 
implemented ex-post when there is hardship)  
 Systems where compensation is enshrined in 
legislation or policy and provided and 
financed by ex-post funds 
 System where compensation is enshrined in 
legislation or policy and provided and 
financed by ex-ante funds 
 
It is important to stress the difference between the 
more formal state compensation schemes (e.g. 
Austria, Mexico) which have defined those natural 
perils which are included, have clear procedures in 
place and have a formalised mechanism for 
claiming assistance; and those where emergency 
legislation ex post is introduced on a case-by-case 
basis following a disaster (e.g. Germany, Australia, 
Italy).  Although in many cases individuals may be 
compensated in similar ways, expectations of the 
State may differ considerable and there will be less 
certainty about whether victims will receive any 
financial assistance.  Depending on the general 
culture of State intervention in the country of 
interest, this uncertainty may be more acceptable 
to some property-owners than other.  For instance, 
those with a strong tradition of State assistance 
(e.g. Italy) will come to expect such assistance and 
is unlikely to have a strong impact.  However, in 
other nations this uncertainty may have the 
positive impact of encouraging households to take 
out cover.  However, it does raises questions of 
social justice and the fairness of the approach.  
 
There is also a difference between those recovery 
systems which are financed in advance of flooding 
(or other natural events) (e.g. Austria) and those 
where funds are collected ex-post.  GFDRR (2011b) 
argues that the former allows a greater degree of 
planning and financial preparation than those 
which are required to raise funds after flooding. 
The arguments between structural versus ad hoc 
solutions is complex. Faure (2004) contends that 
on the one side there is the argument that a 
structured approach whereby victims are confident 
that they will get some compensation following 
flooding sends the wrong signal and is potentially 
detrimental to the uptake of household financial 
solutions (i.e. insurance, self-insurance) or 
preventive measures.  However, on the other hand 
there is an argument that ad hoc compensation 
creates “legal uncertainty” (Faure, 2004; 21) with 
the potential for different terms and conditions 
and amounts of compensation to be provided after 
different events.  It also prevents governments 
from developing adequate reserves between years 
in order to be able to spread the risks most widely.  
Schrader (2012: 4) summarises both the problems 
of ex-post financing and the advantages of ex-ante 
financing:  
 
Problems of ex-post financing 
 Limited borrowing capacity 
 Narrowing tax-base for internal resource 
mobilisation 
 Slow pace of external support 
 
Important advantages of ex-ante financing 
 Tailored combination of risk retention and transfer 
 Positive spill over on disaster management 
 Better economic management, more reliable (and 
targeted) government intervention 
Contribution to financial sector development 
 
At the highest level a State-funded compensation 
scheme is an example of a national solidarity 
approach; whereby all citizens will ultimately 
contribute to the scheme.  However, an issue of 
fairness is raised when some citizens are choosing 
to take precautions from flooding and paying a 
premium for flooding for which they will receive 
recompense and others who do not receiving a 
similar level of financial assistance.  There is much 
to be said of the French State-backed insurance 
system of which one of the founding principles is 
that all victims should be treated equally. 
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Table 6.5:  The presence of compensation and insurance within international flood recovery systems 
  APPROACHES TO COMPENSATION 
  
 
 
 
No state 
compensation 
provided31 
Ad hoc 
compensation 
(i.e. only 
implemented in 
legislation or 
provided at the 
time of event) 
Ex-post 
compensation 
(i.e. schemes are 
enshrined in 
legislation/policy 
but no fund 
established prior 
to event) 
Ex-ante 
compensation  
(i.e. schemes 
enshrined in 
legislation and fund 
established prior to 
event permitting a 
reserve) 
A
PP
RO
A
CH
ES
 T
O
 IN
SU
RA
N
CE
 
No (little) flood insurance 
available 
  Netherlands (sea 
and river)32
 
 
Canada (most 
flooding) 
In
su
ra
nc
e 
pr
ov
id
ed
 v
ia
 t
he
 p
ri
va
te
 m
ar
ke
t 
Optional33
Indonesia*34 
Taiwan 
 
individual 
flood cover 
(risk-
reflective) 
Germany 
Italy 
Australia 
Poland 
  
Optional 
composite 
cover 
(bundled with 
other perils)   
Portugal* 
Sweden 
Brazil 
Ecuador 
China*34
Germany 
Argentina 
Australia 
 
Israel 
Japan* 
Philippines* 
 
Austria 
Mexico35 
Compulsory 
inclusion of 
cover in a 
package 
Netherlands 
(rainfall and SWF) 
Switzerland 
(GUSTAVO) 
United Kingdom 
(pre-2015) 
New Zealand 
(dwellings) 
   
Pooled flood insurance36
 
Norway 
Romania* 
United Kingdom 
(post 2015) 
 
(with no state guarantee) 
   
Pooled flood16 insurance 
(has a state guarantee) 
France 
Denmark (sea 
flooding) 
Iceland37
 
 
 Belgium38 
State-run16 (and 
subsidised) flood 
insurance scheme 
Spain39
United States 
 
Switzerland 
(Cantonal) 
  
                                                     
31 Where it is unknown whether a country has state compensation  - these have been categorised in this category but signified by * 
32 There is one policy available for flooding but premiums are high and uptake is limited. 
33 Whether optional or compulsory relates to whether there is a choice whether cover for flooding can be purchased or excluded from a household 
policy 
34 Some insurance is provided by state insurers but it appears that it is not subsidised. 
35 But compensation to private households is limited to low income housing. 
36These strategies may also have some private market involvement, however insurance is not solely provided on this basis. 
37 Other flood insurance is available via the private market, however terms vary. 
38 Although there are ex ante schemes established in reality the financing is provided both ex ante and ex post (i.e. the fund is topped up if funds 
prove to be inadequate). 
39 Although there is some insurance underwritten by the private market so that it could be considered to be a pooled-type system with a state 
guarantee. 
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Porrini and Schwarze (2014) have an interesting 
view of compensation schemes and argue that 
they are an example of “enforced solidarity”.  They 
suggest that taxpayers are obligated to contribute 
and that when payments are received following 
flood losses the monies accepted are not a service 
in return but are a “relief measure provided upon 
‘request’ of the claimant” Porrini and Schwarze 
(2014; 12).  As a result of examining how insurance 
can be used as a system for managing climate 
change they  present five stylised models of 
insurance (and other recovery including 
compensation) for managing the risks of climate 
change in Europe.   These models are described in 
Table 6.6 and adapted to try to develop the models 
solely for flood insurance.  Examples of 
international flood insurance schemes have also 
been added.   Porrini and Schwarze (2014) go on to 
analyse each of the models according to the four 
criteria which each can provide some indication of 
the robustness of the recovery approach.  These 
criteria are: 
 
1. Avoiding adverse selection – avoiding the 
situation whereby those only at high risk 
purchase insurance and narrow the pool. 
“Adverse selection means that poor quality 
risks squeeze good quality risks out of the pool.” 
2. Avoiding moral hazard – when knowing that 
they will receive money to compensate them 
reduces a victim’s incentive to reduce damages.  
3. Avoiding charity hazard – the presence of 
government and/or private assistance after 
losses reduces any incentives to take action. 
4. Avoiding transaction costs – high transaction 
costs involved with insurance (costs of the 
completion and settling claims) can threaten 
the economic viability of a product. 
After Porrini and Schwarze (2014)  
 
In Table 6.6, Porrini and Schwarze (2014) highlight 
that the schemes which are most likely to avoid 
the key problems related to recovery are M1, 
Public monopoly insurers of flooding and M2 
where recovery systems operate on the basis of 
compulsory insurance for all.  They argue that 
when all things are considered (as well as the 
potential to encourage adaptation or mitigation 
and the ability to manage financial risk) on balance 
M1 performs the highest across the board.  
However, M2 performs better in terms of the 
ability to manage risk and economic viability.  
Comprehensively, Porrini and Schwarze (2014) 
argue that model M5 (Taxpayer financed 
governmental relief funds) performs the worst in 
the majority of the categories. 
 
This raises an important issue in relation to flood 
insurance and whether the actions of the state are 
dis-incentivising insurance uptake (Coate, 1995). 
This is referred to by some as ‘Charity hazard’ 
(Porrini and Schwarze, 2014). Achieving an 
appropriate balance between the actions of the 
state and the insurance industry is critical to the 
success of any flood insurance scheme.  The 
presence and role of disaster assistance has often 
considered to be a key variable in the failure of 
individuals to purchase insurance; however a 
number of studies have refuted this finding and 
contend that there is little empirical evidence to 
support this notion (Kunreuther, 1978; Kunreuther, 
1996; Thieken et al., 2006). 
 
There are many discussions about whether 
disaster funds are preferable to insurance (Doherty, 
1997, Richer and Nell, 2003).  Schwarze and 
Wagner (2004) argue that disaster funds have 
more disadvantages than insurance-based 
solutions as they are less able to absorb risks than 
their more market-based counterparts.  They also 
argue that with compensation schemes the risk is 
generally held within a country and that it is more 
difficult to spread those risks externally. When 
reinsurance is purchased as part of an insurance 
system this is automatically undertaken as the 
majority of this type of cover is international.  In 
general, Faure (2004) argues that if insurance 
coverage for natural perils is available (along with 
adequate reinsurance) and is competitive, this 
spreads the risk better than compensation funds 
and that it better enables risk differentiation.  
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Table 6.6:  Five stylised models of flood insurance adapted from Porrini and Schwarze (2014) 
Model and description 
International 
examples 
A
vo
id
s 
ad
ve
rs
e 
se
le
ct
io
n 
A
vo
id
s 
m
or
al
 
ha
za
rd
 
A
vo
id
s 
ch
ar
it
y 
ha
za
rd
 
A
vo
id
s 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n 
t
 
M1 (Regional) public monopoly insurer of flooding 
These regulate the mandatory nature of insurance and in the 
most part are regional.  Their public nature permits them also to 
have involvement in other areas of policy (e.g. risk reduction 
measures or land use measures).  Monopolies in the EU are 
limited by competition legislation although may be permitted 
under the virtue that they provide a public benefit. 
Switzerland 
(Cantonal) 
United States 
Yes 
Yes/ 
No 
Yes 
Yes/
No 
M2 Compulsory insurance for flooding 
Insurance is mandatory by law and includes a compulsory 
obligation for all those potentially affected by natural hazards to 
purchase a policy to provide cover.   It is usually combined with an 
obligation on insurers to prove insurance for the risks.  Although 
there is a regulatory framework the way in which flood cover may 
be offered may vary due to the potential supplier competition. 
France 
Iceland 
Denmark 
(sea flooding) 
Spain 
New Zealand 
(EQC) 
Yes No Yes No 
M3 Compulsory inclusion of flood insurance into general house 
ownership insurance (coupling of contracts) 
This is usually bundled insurance coverage and involves the 
compulsory inclusion of natural hazards within buildings and 
contents insurance (e.g. usually fire).  In one sense it is ultimately 
also a form of compulsory insurance as policyholders are not able 
to negotiate freely regarding which perils for which to purchase 
insurance.  However, ultimately a policyholder may decide 
whether to insure at all (although there may be a compulsory 
element related to the conditions on mortgage loans). 
Netherlands 
(rainfall and 
SWF) 
Switzerland 
United 
Kingdom 
(pre-2015) 
Belgium 
Norway 
Sweden 
New 
Zealand40
Yes/No 
 
(dwellings) 
No Yes/No No 
M4 Free market flood insurance with ad-hoc governmental relief 
programmes 
A free-market solution.  Porrini and Schwarze (2014) argue that 
free market solutions only co-exist with ad hoc government relief 
programmes.  Without the government relief to fill in the gaps in 
coverage that are created (due to affordability and availability) 
within a purely commercial operated system.  
 
Austria 
Germany 
Australia 
Argentina 
Portugal 
Sweden 
Brazil 
Ecuador 
Italy 
China 
Israel 
Japan  
Philippines 
No No Yes No 
M5 Taxpayer financed governmental relief funds 
These are ultimately financial arrangements funded by taxes and 
used to compensate for damages, usually up to a fixed amount.  
Payments are generally made in those cases where the claimant is 
not privately insured.  Porrini and Schwarze (2014) argue that this 
is in fact ‘enforced solidarity’ and that the disaster fund is 
enforced through the obligation to pay taxes into the fund.  In 
many of these cases supplementary comprehensive natural 
hazards cover is often available through voluntary private 
insurance; usually offered as an add-on to buildings insurance. 
Austria 
Mexico 
Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
(river and 
sea) 
Yes No No No 
After Porrini and Schwarze (2014, 8, 11-14).
                                                     
40 As described in the table, it is not compulsory for homeowners to have flood insurance for dwellings in New Zealand (unless they have a mortgage) 
however if insurance is purchased flooding is a compulsory peril and a homeowner is not free to select not to purchase cover for flooding.  
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Lamond and Penning-Rowsell (2011) suggest that 
market insurance is often more expensive than 
state-run approaches for a number of reasons 
including: marketing costs, lower portfolio diversity, 
increased handling costs (due to the lower 
economies of scale) and the need to make profit 
margins.  They argue that a national approach will 
have a higher economy of scale and reduce the 
need to have other costs such as marketing.  
However, this might only be considered to be true 
in the situation when flood insurance is provided 
separately, if it is added to an existing composite 
household policy then these costs are not 
additional and would exist regardless if the cover 
includes flood risks or other perils (Lamond and 
Penning-Rowsell, 2011).  
 
Table 6.3 and Table 6.6 provide some indication of 
the types of approaches to flood recovery that are 
more economically viable than others.  Faure 
(2004) indicates that from an economic 
perspective other solutions are preferable to 
compensation funds; however if funds are to be 
used there are four economic prerequisites to be 
ensured: 
 
1. A subsidiary characteristic – victims should be 
forced to use other solutions (e.g. insurance) 
where these are available.  This means that 
property-owners need to investigate other 
solutions first.  This is a situation with many of 
the existing funds explored in this study.  
However Faure (2004) goes on to argue that the 
mere presence of a fund disincentives 
insurance. Therefore, funds should only be used 
for those risks which are considered 
uninsurable. 
 
2. The use of subrogation - where possible any 
compensation should be subrogated against 
potentially liable third parties.  Although a 
victim may receive compensation from a fund 
without having to go through the liability 
system first, these losses should subsequently 
be recovered (where possible) from any third 
parties at fault. 
 
3. Those contributing to the risk should finance 
the compensation fund.  This is most difficult 
with natural events as there may often be no 
clear contributor to the risk.  Faure (2004) 
argues that there is a distributional perspective 
to consider here and a political decision needs 
to be taken about whether those potential 
victims (i.e. only those at risk) contribute to the 
fund or a more national-solidaristic approach 
where all taxpayers contribute. The answer is 
likely to be mainly a political one, however also 
may depend upon the nature of the fund, as 
one whereby all natural risks are included may 
be more difficult to distribute to only those at 
risk. 
 
4. Compensation funds should not provide full 
coverage.  This condition will mean that victims 
are still partially exposed to the risks and are 
therefore more likely to take action to reduce 
losses.  This may be achieved through having an 
upper limit on compensation or through the use 
of a deductible.  
 
Although the models presented by Porrini and 
Schwartz (2014) are informative; the grouping of 
different types of insurance and handling 
compensation separately means that countries can 
appear more than once in the models and the 
categorisation is potentially too aggregated when 
looking at only one type of natural peril.  Therefore, 
the results of the international comparison 
presented in Table 6.5 highlighted that the 
majority of countries have little compensation 
provided by the state.  From analysing the 
relationships that are present between insurance 
and compensation eleven different types of system 
are identifiable.  However, four of these might be 
considered to be those most commonly employed 
with two of those really dominating: 
 
 Optional composite insurance (usually an add-
on to fire policies and bundled with other 
natural perils) available from the private market 
where no compensation is provided 
 Compulsory inclusion of flood insurance within 
standard household insurance policies where 
no compensation is provided (e.g. New Zealand 
dwellings). 
 
Table 6.7 presents these different types of 
schemes and with the most dominant mechanisms 
for household-level recovery from flooding 
highlighted in bold. 
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Table 6.7:  The eleven different types of approaches identified from the international comparative 
review 
Insurance component Compensation Dominant recovery mechanism 
Little flood insurance available National compensation funds National compensation 
Optional flood cover from the 
private market with graduated 
premiums 
No compensation 
Insurance where taken up – but 
often penetration is low 
Optional flood cover from the 
private market with graduated 
premiums 
Ad hoc compensation 
Penetration rates are generally 
low (excluding Australia) and 
therefore compensation is 
generally dominant 
Optional composite insurance 
from the private market 
No compensation 
Insurance the only option – and 
level of recovery depends on 
penetration rates which vary 
Optional composite insurance 
from the private market  
Either ex-ante or ex-post 
compensation 
Penetration rates are generally 
low (excluding Australia) and 
therefore compensation is 
generally dominant 
Compulsory inclusion of flood 
insurance within standard 
household policies  
No compensation 
Recovery is entirely from 
insurance 
Compulsory inclusion of flood 
insurance within standard 
household policies 
Ex-post compensation 
Insured risks are excluded from 
the compensation and therefore 
insurance dominates 
Pooled flood insurance operated 
by the market 
No compensation 
Recovery is entirely from 
insurance 
Pooled insurance with a state 
guarantee 
No compensation 
Recovery is entirely from 
insurance 
State-run and subsidised 
insurance 
No compensation 
Recovery is entirely from 
insurance 
State-run and subsidised 
insurance 
Ad hoc compensation 
Recovery is mostly from 
insurance 
 
 
Michel-Kerjan (2001) argues that the increase in 
costs for governments in terms of providing 
compensation and aid to recovery from losses are 
causing some to examine more closely their 
indemnification, risk reduction and the availability 
of insurance.  This may be leading to a questioning 
of the specific role of governments in recovery 
strategies.   
 
6.1.3 The role of governments in providing 
recovery from flooding 
The level of intervention of government is one of 
the defining elements of whether an insurance-
based scheme or compensation-oriented flood 
recovery approach is adopted.  As described above 
the role of the state varies from very little 
intervention (e.g. UK) to a fully state-implemented 
insurance scheme (e.g. USA) to recovery mainly 
implemented by compensation (e.g. Netherlands).  
However, it is important to stress that the options 
are not mutually exclusive.  A system based on a 
foundation where there is an effective public-
private partnership with clearly defined roles and 
responsibilities is likely to be one which is working 
well.  
 
This role of the State is a key element discussed by 
Mehlhorn and Hausmann (2012) who have 
categorised Government involvement into four key 
ways (Table 6.8).  They stress that in developed 
countries with an established and active insurance 
market there should be no need for a government 
to absorb the risks from natural events; whereas 
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when an active insurance market is absent 
governments should adopt the role of enabler. 
 
In New Zealand councils as well as central 
government fulfil the first three of these roles as 
they set guidelines and rules about such aspects as 
the mitigation of flooding and spatial planning in 
flood risk areas as well as undertake and support 
flood risk research and modelling activities.  Their 
main role is of course thorough their involvement 
in the provision of the EQCover and the state 
guarantee that they provide to that system. 
Often one of the important characteristics of 
insurance schemes for natural hazards is the 
degree of public and private partnerships 
involvement in risk transfer.  The most common 
element in this area in the provision of insurance 
for flood (and often also other natural hazards) is 
the presence of some type of pool or national 
insurance fund.  Although insurance and 
reinsurance pools may differ in their approach and 
functioning. 
 
 
Table 6.8:  The role of governments in flood insurance 
Potential role of 
government 
Explanation 
Governments as rule 
setters 
The public sector has the political and legal power to set rules and regulations 
that enable the insurance market to absorb large losses. These include setting 
capital and licensing requirements for insurers, providing access to 
international markets, defining the terms of liability, supporting preventive 
measures, etc. In some situations, governments can help expand the 
availability of risk transfer solutions to individuals and corporations by 
introducing compulsory insurance schemes to create a sufficiently large “risk 
community”. In many cases, the public sector and the insurance industry are 
implicit partners. Insurers will only insure against floods if the government 
implements flood prevention measures or against fire if fire brigades exist. 
Governments as 
sponsors and facilitators 
of an insurance market: 
Where an insurance market does not yet exist – as is often the case in 
developing and emerging markets (e.g. China) – governments and non-
governmental organisations can play an important role in facilitating the 
development of risk transfer solutions. This may involve collecting exposure 
data and supporting risk research and modelling to enable new insurance 
solutions. In addition, governments can encourage the development of an 
insurance market by initially subsidising insurance premiums. 
Governments as 
re/insurers: 
In many countries, governments also act as insurers or reinsurers for certain 
risks in order to supplement private insurance schemes. Government 
backstop programmes can effectively facilitate a limited private-sector 
insurance solution wherever risk assessment is a particular challenge and 
where the magnitude of a potential loss exceeds the capacities of the private 
sector, such as in scenarios involving terrorism or extreme natural catastrophe 
tail risks. For most weather-related and other natural catastrophe risks, 
however, the private sector has the capacity and expertise to provide 
sufficient coverage. Here, the public sector should limit its direct involvement 
and focus its intervention on expanding the availability of insurance schemes 
– with the ultimate aim of establishing an efficient private-sector market. 
Governments as 
re/insurance buyers: 
As the private sector has the expertise and capacity to insure disaster risks, 
governments can also buy private insurance coverage themselves. This 
enables the public sector to fund disaster expenses before a catastrophe 
occurs. 
Source: After Mehlhorn and Hausmann (2012; 22)
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Boudreau (2011) highlights some common goals: 
 Create an insurance mechanism that makes 
liquidity available to the insured affected by 
a natural disaster; 
 Reduce the government’s fiscal exposure 
and the risk to the national economy arising 
from major natural disasters; 
 Ensure the financial solvency of the pool 
after all but the most catastrophic events; 
 Reduce the government’s financial 
dependence on donors’ financial assistance 
in the aftermath of a major natural disaster. 
She also presents an indicative diagram of the 
public and private partnership structure of a pool 
solution (Figure 6.2).Machetti (2009) also 
highlights the type and degree of risk transfer 
between those catastrophic risk insurance 
systems where there is public intervention; many 
of which include coverage for flooding.  Primarily, 
Machetti (2009) highlights the heterogeneity that 
exists between systems and levels (Figure 6.3). 
 
 
Figure 6.2: The role of public and private partnerships in risk insurance pools 
 
 
Figure 6.3:  Heterogeneity of different levels of risk transfer mechanisms for natural catastrophe 
schemes with public intervention (Machetti, 2009) 
First level of risk transfer 
Systems based on direct 
insurance 
 Denmark 
 New Zealand 
 Norway 
 Spain 
 Switzerland 
 Taiwan 
 The Caribbean (CCRIF) 
 USA (NFIP) 
Systems based on reinsurance 
 France  
 Japan 
Second level of risk transfer 
No risk transfer 
 France  
 Spain 
 USA (NFIP) 
Reinsurance or retrocession 
 Germany 
 Iceland 
 Japan 
 New Zealand 
 Norway 
 Switzerland 
Systems with cession to capital 
markets 
 Taiwan 
 The Caribbean (CCRIF) 
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The challenge of a public-private partnership is 
ensuring that a strategy is able to incorporate the 
best elements of both systems.  One of the most 
important elements of government involvement is 
in the area risk reduction and implementing policy 
to regulate development in risky areas.  This is 
discussed in more detail in Section 6.4. 
 
The notion of ‘Charity hazard’ is discussed above 
and the role of governments as insurers of last 
resort has frequently been criticised (Gron and 
Sykes, 2002).  However, Faure (2004) argues that 
from a legal perspective the role of the 
government as a guarantor of reinsurance is not as 
bad as some critiques suggest; particularly if there 
is still freedom for insurers to use alternatives and 
is not at the detriment of competition within 
insurance markets.  He argues that a government 
has a role where there is a lack of development in 
the private market and the provision of state 
reinsurance may ensure that the risks from 
catastrophes remain insurable.  Faure (2004) goes 
on to suggest that this situation is better than one 
whereby more collective solutions are 
implemented (i.e. compensation funds paid for by 
public resources) as it has the advantage of taking 
a premium from those at risk.  This situation is 
particularly effective if an actuarial or risk adjusted 
premium is chargeable. 
 
The majority of commentators about catastrophe 
recovery systems argue that although there is a 
place for governments in management of 
catastrophe risk, in general where possible the 
‘market’ is the best option for the provision of 
catastrophe insurance.  Government intervention 
(whether long term or short term) should be solely 
involved in facilitating market involvement in the 
provision of flood insurance.   
 
6.2 The robustness and economic viability of 
flood recovery strategies 
Section 6.1.1.4 provides specific details about the 
robustness of the different insurance-based 
approaches to flood recovery.  This section will 
examine the overall robustness of different flood 
recovery strategies and examine the mechanisms 
which make some more economically viable that 
others. 
 
The discussion above) has highlighted that there 
are a variety of ways in which insurance is provided 
for flood (and other natural perils).  The different 
potential roles of the government and the market 
have been described and debated.  The diversity of 
systems highlights a range of ways which are 
utilised to ensure the robustness and therefore the 
economic viability of a system.  Different 
mechanisms are used to spread the risk the most 
common of which are bundling and via solidaristic 
mechanisms within a nation state.  The role of 
bundling in risk transfer and as a solution to anti-
selection is described in Section 2.2.2.  There was 
also diversity reported in the solidaristic 
mechanisms discussed above; some are insurance 
based and involve the backing from the state (e.g. 
France) whilst other recovery is established via 
compensation funding.  The differences in 
approach and the advantages and limitations of ex-
post and ex-ante approaches in terms of 
robustness of the funding schemes are discussed in 
Section 6.1.2. 
 
Insurance or compensation schemes whereby 
there is government involvement also have a 
mechanism for limiting losses.  Often a royal 
degree or declaration is needed in order to invoke 
either compensation or insurance to be paid.  This 
does permit a limiting of losses and exposure for 
the smaller events, but of course may not solve the 
issue of flood recovery for less damaging and 
potentially more frequent events and also may 
raises issues of equity and fair treatment between 
events. 
 
All of the approaches described above aim to 
spread their risks as widely as possible; this might 
be through purchasing reinsurance or other bonds 
or ultimately to the State and as a result of this and 
other risk transfer mechanisms the schemes are 
financially stable as a result. Lamond and Penning-
Rowsell (2011) argue that viability may be 
threatened where the probable maximum loss is 
very high relative to the potential for premium 
income.  This may be the case in areas of very high 
flood risk and may potentially threaten the 
economic viability of the approach.  Arguably this 
situation is similar to that described with the 
current system in the UK which has led to 
imminent changes to flood insurance provision.  In 
New Zealand for the geotechnical perils covered 
this has been resolved through the first loss cover 
provided by the EQC.  This essentially acts as a 
large deductible and thereby removed the first 
NZ$120,000 of loss from the private sector.  In the 
new UK model this deficiency is dealt with by the 
pooling of resources across insurers and a formal 
54 
 
cross-subsidisation of premiums of the highest risk 
properties to ensure that premium income is high 
enough (and therefore ensure economic viability 
of the insurers) yet affordable to property owners. 
 
An alternative scenario which may be present is 
when flood insurance is purchased as an 
endorsement to a household policy and the 
additional premium is such that it is not linked to 
the risk of the peril.  Where flat-rate premiums are 
charged viability may be threatened if insufficient 
knowledge about the overall risk and exposure 
means that premiums are not high enough to 
cover losses or penetration is so low as to mean 
that total premium income proves inadequate. 
 
Another strategy that a number of schemes use to 
manage the economic viability of the recovery 
approach is to provide an upper limit on the losses 
that are covered and/or to add a degree of co-
insurance into the system.  The mechanism may 
operate at either the policy level (such as in Austria 
or Turkey) or at the overall scheme level (such as 
The Netherlands, Belgium, Iceland).  When 
employed at the individual level, an upper limit on 
indemnity means that there is a total maximum 
amount that a homeowner will received in 
recompense for their loss.  For instance, in Austria 
there is an indemnity limit of between 25 and 50% 
and additionally compensation is capped at 50% of 
the losses sustained.  If these limits are known and 
understood by a policyholder it may also have a 
positive impact on individuals taking action to 
reduce their losses; either through pre-event 
mitigation or in-event damage saving.  However, in 
many situations policyholders are not aware of 
these limits unless they have been flooded in the 
past. 
 
The second approach is to have a total event (or 
total fund) limit which applies to all of those 
claiming compensation or insurance.  For instance, 
in The Netherlands there is an annual upper limit 
on the compensation fund of €450 million.  In 
these situations often individual householders will 
only receive a percentage of their claim, often 
calculated as a proportion of the total amount of 
losses sustained within the country.  This approach 
places an upper limit on the exposure of an insurer, 
the insurance system/compensation fund or the 
government and to a degree ensures economic 
viability. 
 
These types of controls might also be extended to 
limit losses from repeated claims.  For instance, 
insurance in Romania operates on an annual 
aggregate basis and the total value to which a 
property is insured is reduced by the amount of 
any claims paid out in any one year. Similarly, the 
French system increases the deductibles in areas 
where multiple disasters occur more than a certain 
number of times in the preceding five years (i.e. 
they are doubled if more than three declarations, 
tripled if more than four times and quadrupled if 
more than five times).  This stipulation however 
applies to declarations within a Municipality rather 
than at a household policy level; although will 
affect all households within that affected 
Municipality.  This again is a mechanism that can 
help ensure the robustness of the approach but 
may also encourage and incentivise risk reduction. 
 
In general, the economic viability of insurers is 
unlikely to be threatened by losses owing to 
catastrophes as they have a range of other 
products on which to fall back and draw reserves. 
Lamond and Penning-Rowsell (2011) also argue 
that if there was a collapse of one insurer due to 
weather-related losses or other perils, usually 
claims are guaranteed by insolvency protection 
arrangements between insurers. These were 
enacted following the collapse of Independent in 
the UK in 2001 whereby claims were honoured 
(although sometimes only up to 90% of the value) 
and divided amongst the rest of the insurance 
industry.  A similar situation occurred in New 
Zealand following the Canterbury earthquakes and 
required the government to ‘bail out’ the failing 
insurer AMI who was threatened with insolvency 
and had insufficient reinsurance coverage.   
Insurers are more likely to be troubled by a 
reduction in the profitability of household flood 
insurance and be particularly concerned where 
there is a high degree of anti-selection and 
penetration in low risk areas is minimal.  This is 
most likely to lead to insurers beginning to refuse 
to cover for the highest risks (thereby reducing 
their exposure) or withdrawing from cover entirely 
as the majority of risks are considered to be too 
high and/or the profitability of the insurance too 
low. 
 
In summary, the most robust flood recovery 
system is likely to be one in which regulation is not 
required; as the pressure of the market will mean 
the system should evolve if the approach is not 
working.  Additionally, the best approach is one 
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which finances itself through the collection of 
adequate premiums and thereby where the risks 
are spread sufficiently so that is becomes 
economically viable.  Finally, an ideal scheme 
would be one that also encourages risk mitigation 
thereby incentivising the uptake of measures and 
promotes risk sharing at the local and even 
individual level (GFDRR, 2011b):  this is discussed 
further in Section 6.4. 
 
6.3 Equity and fairness in flood recovery 
A decision about the most appropriate insurance 
solution cannot be made solely based on 
arguments of robustness and economic viability.  
Section 4.2 introduced an assessment measure 
based on the concept of equity and the fairness of 
the approach.  The degree to which a system of 
flood recovery is equitable or fair may vary 
depending upon an individual’s perspective and 
position relative to a number of variables.  
Amongst many others, these might include: their 
individual level of flood risk, their income and 
consequently their ability to afford premiums, the 
flood experience and views about community 
solidarity.  Local and national ideas about equity 
and fairness may vary according to the culture and 
traditions of a country.  For instance, there may be 
countries whereby there is an expectation of 
government assistance to be provided, whereas in 
another where there is a long tradition of private 
insurance may mean that there is a more 
individualistic perspective and that all should 
contribute. 
 
Each of the systems has been assessed in terms of 
the degree to which they are based on an 
individualistic perspective and insurance is 
provided that is priced according to the flood risk 
that an individual property faces or whether it is a 
more solidaristic approach which takes little 
account of individual flood risk.  Overwhelmingly, 
the majority of international flood recovery 
systems adopted a more solidaristic approach: 
whether this is via compensation schemes (more 
nationalistic solidarity) or through the bundling of 
the flood peril with other types of insurance 
(insurant-solidarity).  Table 6.9 maps the equity 
and justice implications of the different flood 
recovery models identified in Table 6.7. 
 
Reviewing the schemes from Table 6.9 there are 
two approaches which cause most concern from a 
fairness perspective, where:   
 Insurance is provided as optional cover within 
the private market and with graduated 
premiums and ad hoc compensation is provided 
by the State. 
 Insurance is provided as optional composite 
cover from the private market and ex-ante or 
ex-post compensation is provided via the State. 
 
In both of the above situations policyholders will 
have taken the decision to purchase insurance to 
provide them with a mechanism to recover from 
flooding and therefore will have contributed via 
the premiums that they paid (which in high risk 
areas may be considerable).  However, if ad hoc 
compensation is provided to those who have not 
purchased insurance insurants will have 
contributed a second time via general taxation.  
Many international recovery systems, whereby 
both insurance and compensation is available, 
understandably prohibit those who have received 
an insurance pay-out for their losses also receiving 
compensation for the same loses.  However, there 
may be situations (such as in Austria or Italy) 
where there is a limit on the compensation able to 
be received, therefore in these situations some of 
the arguments about fairness may be countered by 
policyholders being able to retrieve some of their 
losses from compensation and some of them from 
insurance (as long as they do not claim for the 
same losses twice).  The numbers of people who 
participate in these two types of schemes is 
demonstrated from the examples to be relatively 
low; however where they do exist there may be 
considerable equitability issues for these people 
which need to be considered. 
 
The negative impact of the presence of financial 
assistance via compensation on insurance 
penetration is discussed in Section 6.1.2.  One 
might question why individuals would choose to 
purchase cover for flooding if they know that not 
only are they paying for their own insurance, but 
also will be contributing to the recovery of others.  
The reasons for this may be complex but may 
include wanting the security of knowledge that 
they will receive payment (as this is not always 
clear from compensation schemes), to provide 
assistance for those events not considered large or 
abnormal enough to trigger compensation.  
Additionally, policyholders may not be aware of 
compensation funds or not make the link between 
the general taxes that they pay and the financial 
assistance via compensation that results. 
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Table 6.9:  The equity components of flood recovery schemes 
Insurance component Compensation 
Dominant equity and fairness 
components 
Little flood insurance available National compensation funds 
A national-solidaristic approach – 
where all citizens will contribute 
via taxation 
Optional flood cover from the 
private market with graduated 
premiums 
No compensation 
An individualistic recovery 
mechanism whereby those insured 
directly contribute to their 
recovery in a price-sensitive way. 
Optional flood cover from the 
private market with graduated 
premiums 
Ad hoc compensation 
Although some will have 
contributed to their own recovery 
– mostly a national-solidaristic 
approach – where all citizens will 
contribute via taxation  
Optional composite insurance from 
the private market 
No compensation 
Where insurance cover is 
purchased – recovery is based on a 
insurant-solidaristic approach as 
perils are bundled together and 
risk is transferred across these 
perils 
Optional composite insurance from 
the private market  
Either ex-ante or ex-post 
compensation  
Although some may benefit from 
an insurant-solidaristic approach; 
generally a national-solidaristic 
approach is dominant whereby all 
contribute via taxation 
Compulsory inclusion of flood 
insurance within standard 
household policies41
No compensation 
 
Where insurance cover is 
purchased – recovery is based on a 
insurant-solidaristic approach as 
perils are bundled together and 
risk is transferred across these 
perils – the compulsory nature of 
the insurance also means that the 
risks are likely to be transferred 
over a more policyholders 
Compulsory inclusion of flood 
insurance within standard 
household policies 
Ex-post compensation 
Pooled flood insurance operated 
by the market 
No compensation 
Pooled insurance with a state 
guarantee42
No compensation 
 
Generally this system follows the 
principles of an insurant-
solidaristic approach; however if 
the state-guarantee is invoked 
then taxpayers will contribute in a 
national-solidaristic way 
State-run and subsidised insurance No compensation 
Although an insurance system the 
state-run nature of the scheme and 
the subsidisation means that 
general taxpayers will contribute 
(therefore national-solidaristic).  
However, there may also be 
elements of insurant-solidarity 
and individualism depending on 
the premium mechanisms 
State-run and subsidised insurance Ad hoc compensation 
 
                                                     
41 The situation for New Zealand (dwellings – via the private market) 
42 The situation for New Zealand (EQC) 
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There are few situations which satisfy the 
condition of ‘pure actuarial fairness’ as proposed 
by O’Neill and O’Neill (2012).  This is based on a 
beneficiary-pays principle and in this situation 
insurance costs to individuals should only directly 
reflect their flood risk level.  In theory, it is possible 
for this situation to be fulfilled.  For instance, in the 
case of the UK flood insurance system it is possible 
for insurers to charge an actuarially-calculated 
premium (the only stipulation in this case is that 
insurance is available); however in this situation 
the competitiveness of the market serves to keep 
the costs of premiums well below this level for the 
majority of policyholders. 
 
Wider fairness issues are raised when considering 
insurance systems which offer cover at full 
actuarial rates (i.e. those in high risk areas pay the 
most and those in the low risk areas pay least) 
when considering investment in flood 
management measures.  In many countries flood 
defence infrastructure is paid for (at least partly) 
out of national, regional or local budgets and 
therefore there is a wider-cross subsidy of risk 
reduction measures between high and low risk 
areas.  There will be many people situated in high 
risk areas who have contributed via general 
taxation to fund defence schemes to reduce the 
risk (and therefore potentially the insurance 
premiums) of those in other high risk areas.  
Property-owners who live in defended areas may 
benefit twice from the development of flood risk 
management measures; firstly via a reduction in 
their level of risk and the probability of loss 
occurring and then secondly from a premium 
reduction if they are reclassified as being at lower 
risk.  These arguments and others relating to the 
distributional consequences of flood management 
in the UK are discussed in more detail in Penning-
Rowsell and Pardoe (2012a; 2012b). 
6.3.1 Other dimensions of equity 
There are other notions of equity and fairness that 
need to be considered and have emerged during 
the comparison.  The first is equality between 
events and whether all victims of flooding are 
treated equally.  This is a central tenet of the 
French recovery system whereby the equality of 
treatment of victims was considered to be one of 
the key aspects when designing the State-backed 
insurance system. However, this equality of 
treatment is undermined in this case by the lack of 
a clear list or description of those perils which are 
included which creates a lack of transparency and 
security amongst policyholders.   
 
This situation is replicated in those countries which 
offer compensation on an ad hoc basis.  As 
described above in Section 6.1.2 this may lead to 
flood victims being treated differently, with some 
receiving compensation and others suffering 
similar losses not receiving any financial assistance.  
Faure (2004) argues that there may be a political 
component to the provision of compensation with 
particularly generous terms being provided 
following the 2002 Elbe-flooding which may not 
necessarily be provided for other events in the 
future. There also appears to be an inequity in 
treatment between those who are affected by 
flood events or a smaller scale to those on a larger 
scale.  Typically, for compensation to be granted 
from some of the schemes an event needs to be 
declared as a disaster or of ‘abnormal intensity’ (in 
the case of the French system) and therefore often 
will only therefore include events which cover a 
large area or encompass high damages.  Even if 
more localised or minor flood events affect 
households in a similar way (in terms of depth, 
velocity, duration or household damage sustained) 
they may not be compensated due to the nature of 
the total event experienced.  The Spanish example 
is identified as being one in which provides an 
added element of equity in this regard.  The events 
which are covered and therefore finances received 
are legally defined and are based mainly on the 
frequency or the intensity of the peril; rather than 
the size of any losses (CCS, 2008).  This means that 
even if only one household is affected by flooding 
(of the magnitude or frequency as legally defined) 
then they will be entitled to claim irrespective of 
the extent of the flooding and any losses suffered 
by other households.  
 
From this specific perspective, on the whole 
insurance might be considered to be a fairer 
approach than compensation.  Insurance systems 
which offer coverage which is insensitive to the 
risk may have inequality between risk areas in 
terms of the cost of the premiums (i.e. those at 
high risk will be paying the same or similar as those 
at low risk) however at the time of a claim 
policyholders are generally treated equally and at 
least they have the security in the knowledge that 
they will be covered.  Additionally, when a 
composite insurance policy is offered policyholders 
at high flood risk may have a lower risk of 
sustaining damage from other perils and therefore 
58 
 
the equity in the premiums paid may be spread 
over a number of perils. 
6.3.2 Addressing the needs of low income 
households 
Another aspect to consider in assessing equity and 
fairness approaches in the provision of flood 
recovery is the degree to which those on lower 
incomes are assisted following flooding.  In this 
regard, generally compensation mechanisms fair 
well as they often will provide assistance to all of 
those impacted (within the specified or declared 
geographical and time limitations of an event).  
Where compensation is not offered to all those 
affected, commonly the lower income households 
are targeted for financial assistance.  This is true of 
a number of the international recovery schemes 
reviewed here; including Germany which offers 
compensation with an element of means testing 
and Mexico whereby recovery funding and 
compensation is targeted towards lower income 
housing.   
 
In addition, there are insurance approaches which 
have some elements of assistance for those who 
may struggle to afford insurance.  For instance, in 
the Romanian system it is reported that the 
government assist by directly insuring those who 
receive welfare payments, rather than expecting 
them to be able to afford cover via the private 
insurers. The proposed UK pooled insurance 
system also introduces a formal cross-subsidy for 
the flood element of the insurance and places a 
premium cap intending to subsidise the high risk 
properties.  The premium cap proposed by the 
scheme however varies for different sized 
properties (based on a property-level band of 
taxation) and is acting as a proxy to ability to pay.  
No premium cap and therefore subsidy is offered 
to the largest properties.  However, despite the 
cross-subsidy there are likely to be many low 
income households who will still be unable to 
afford insurance and therefore the movement 
towards a more risk-sensitive approach will make 
the system even more unjust.  Additionally, in 
situations whereby all are contributing to flood risk 
insurance and there is a cross-subsidy in place to 
support high-risk households there will inevitably 
be some low income households (who are at low 
or negligible flood risk) subsidising those with 
higher incomes; creating a potentially unjust 
situation. 
 
In situations where flood insurance premiums are 
priced at a flat-rate as an add-on to existing 
policies; those whereby it is calculated as a 
percentage of the base policy or as a percentage of 
the insured value (such as New Zealand (EQCover) 
are considered to be fairer than just applying a 
single fixed amount.  This is because the former 
two conditions takes account of the value insured 
and thereby those who will claim less (because 
they have less to lose) will pay less in proportion 
towards premiums.  Where a single fixed amount 
is charged, although it might be considered to be 
more equitable to charge all policyholders the 
same, in actual fact there may be large differences 
in the amounts being insured and the demands 
that policyholders may make if insurance is being 
paid out. 
 
From an equity perspective one might consider the 
fairest approach to be a system whereby the costs 
to individuals should only reflect those risks that 
result from each individual’s choices.  This choice-
sensitive perspective on fairness is reflected in a 
number of the recovery systems which have 
stipulations about not providing cover for newly 
constructed property in known risk zones and in 
others those in the highest risk zones (e.g. 
Germany) are considered uninsurable.   On the 
face of it, this might seem to be a just and fair 
approach to the pricing of insurance, that if a 
householder chooses to live in a risk area then they 
should pay more towards the insurance to gain 
cover and this is a choice that they make.  However, 
O’Neill and O’Neill (2012; 11) argue that “A choice 
is voluntary only if it can be reasonably foreseen 
and the agents have real and acceptably 
alternatives to it (and neither) condition is present 
for many victims of flooding”.  Therefore the 
extent to which many people will make choices, or 
informed choices, about their flood risk is 
questionable. 
 
Flood risks are dynamic and increased knowledge 
about risk and the inclusion of other types of flood 
risk (such as surface water or groundwater) may 
lead to changes in the assessment or designation 
of flood risk areas.  This may occur after a decision 
to move to an area has been made.  Even those 
who purchase new properties in flood risk areas 
may not reasonably expect to know all of the flood 
risks where the planning system may not have 
made explicit all of the facts.  Choices for those 
who are in the rental sector and in particular those 
who are on low incomes may be even more limited.  
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O’Neill and O’Neill (2012) argue that the most 
socially just insurance system is one in which 
solidarity plays a key part and that insurance 
should be provided independently of the risks and 
choices of individuals.   The mechanism of the 
solidarity component of the insurance system is 
considered to be the most important in 
encouraging fairness and equity in flood recovery 
approaches. 
6.4 The efficiency of flood insurance and 
compensation schemes: Implications for 
promoting mitigation, adaptation and 
community resilience? 
The third assessment criteria introduced in Section 
4.1 is the efficiency of the recovery scheme in 
promoting risk reduction, adaptation and 
community resilience. There is a high potential for 
insurance cover to be used to incentivise the 
uptake of flood mitigation and loss reduction 
measures, undertake adaptation and promote 
community resilience.  As Kunreuther (1996; 180) 
argues that “In theory, insurance is one of the 
most effective policy tools for achieving both 
objectives, because it rewards investments in cost-
effective mitigation with lower premiums and 
provides indemnification should a disaster 
occur.”However, the degree to which it is desirable 
for insurers to promote resilience and risk 
reduction depends upon how the cover is 
organised and the premiums which are charged.  
Theoretically, if individual insurers have a good 
understanding of flood risk, are able to assess the 
risk well enough to effectively price that risk and 
achieve actuarially-price premiums from 
customers then there insurers would have little 
interest or need to be concerned about the degree 
of risk nor the need to incentivise resilience 
behaviour. However, from the international 
examples, insurance systems which satisfy these 
conditions are limited.  
 
There is a wide range of ways in which flood 
mitigation and risk reduction activities may be 
introduced and a variety of scales; from individual 
household level measures, to community resilience 
schemes, up to regional or national strategies.  
Insurers and insurance schemes may impact upon 
all of these levels although the mechanism that 
they achieve this (e.g. lobbying government, 
placing restrictions on coverage, offering a 
reduction in premium) and incentivise mitigation 
can vary considerably.  The following sections 
discuss those measures which were identified in 
the comparative review along with international 
examples of where they were present. 
6.4.1 High or actuarially-priced premiums 
The presence of actuarially-priced premiums which 
in high flood risk areas may be substantial may be 
sufficient to incentivise risk reduction measures in 
return for a reduction in those premiums.  This 
may only be the case in situations where insurance 
is compulsory or at least compulsory with a 
mortgage.   There are few international examples 
of this seen in the comparative review.  Where 
actuarially-priced premiums are charged the 
insurance penetration is so low that it will not have 
a major impact on flood risk reduction.  In other 
situations, such as the UK, where risk-reflective 
premiums could be charged the competitiveness of 
the market is such that this keeps premium levels 
low and reduces incentives for individual risk 
reduction activity.   
 
In Turkey, the insurance offered as part of the TCIP 
has some premium variation based on the risk, the 
size of the property and the type of construction; 
ranging from 0.44 per thousand for well-
constructed properties in low risk zones to 5.5 per 
thousand for poor construction in high risk zone 
(CCS, 2008).  Although this relates to the risk from 
earthquakes, premium differentiation of this 
nature could be adopted by other recovery 
systems for flooding and could incentivise better 
construction in areas of risk. 
6.4.2 Exclusions of properties from insurance 
coverage 
Excluding properties from cover is a common 
mechanism which is used to try to reduce both the 
exposure of insurance companies or compensation 
funds. Exclusions primarily relate to newly built 
properties in areas known to be at flood risk and 
aims to improve spatial planning.  This condition 
forms a part of a number of international examples 
reviewed in this study; e.g. Belgium, Norway, 
Denmark, United Kingdom and France.  The 
exclusion acts to try to prevent increasing the 
number of properties in flood risk areas.  However, 
the degree to which an exclusion of insurance 
coverage acts as a deterrent for development in 
areas of flood risk is debatable.  It may have some 
impact in those countries whereby flood insurance 
is compulsory (or whereby household insurance is 
required to secure a mortgage) however in 
situations whereby insurance is optional it may 
have little effect.  In order to be more effective 
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insurance coverage needs to be widespread in 
order to have a significant impact.  Lamond and 
Penning-Rowsell (2011) argue that there is little 
demonstrable evidence that restrictions of 
insurance cover have had a verifiable impact on 
the reduction of development in the floodplain. 
 
In addition to the exclusion of insurance for new 
development in flood risk areas, there may also be 
an exclusion of all properties in the highest risk 
zones.  This is the situation in Germany where 
areas have been categorised by flood risk (ZÜRS) of 
which the highest (probability of flooding is greater 
than 1 in 10 years) is considered to be uninsurable.  
This of course may in theory dis-incentivise the 
construction of new properties in these areas and 
incentivise other risk reduction activities for 
existing properties.  However, the non-compulsory 
nature of flood insurance in Germany means that 
this impact will be significantly muted.  
 
As well as entire properties being excluded there 
was also a situation in Italy where certain contents 
was excluded from coverage.  Fiselier and 
Oosterberg (2004) reported that there are often 
exclusions place upon contents located on the 
ground floor up to a certain height (e.g. 20 or 
30cm).  Insurance penetration in Italy is low and 
therefore the potential impact of this exclusion will 
be extremely limited, however for those who have 
purchased insurance it may serve to encourage 
resistance activities and especially for people to 
evacuate or raise properties before or during a 
flood event. 
6.4.3 The level of indemnification or 
percentage of loss compensated 
The level of indemnification present for any 
insurance system or the percentage of loss 
compensated by any fund, may also impact upon 
risk reduction activities undertaken at the 
household level.  This may be through the 
adoption of pre-flood household level mitigation or 
damage-saving action during a flood event.  As 
briefly discussed in Section 6.2 when examining 
ways in which schemes limit their losses, a number 
of approaches cap the losses that can be claimed 
or limit the total liability of the scheme.  The 
system in Austria is a good example of where this 
is the case whereby insurance is provided with a 
limit on indemnification of 25 to 50% of the 
property value.  Italy also caps the level of the sum 
insured; in this case to 50% of that insured for fire.  
A number of schemes also have total event loss 
limits or fund limits in any one year (Belgium, 
Iceland, The Netherlands).  Both of these limits will 
serve to increase the level of burden on the 
individual householder who may want or need to 
reduce their risk in order to reduce their losses 
following a flood.  Arguably the former situation 
whereby the limit is applied at a household level 
and therefore may also be known in advance of an 
event, will be more likely that that applied at the 
scheme level.  However, in order to be effective to 
incentivise action (i.e. prior to being flooded) the 
policyholder needs to be aware of these limits and 
often commit to spending money to increase the 
resilience and resistance of their properties.    
 
The more common and traditional way of 
introducing a level of co-insurance into an 
insurance scheme is through the application of 
deductibles.  As discussed previously, this is the 
amount that the insurant is required to pay 
following a claim and may be described either by a 
set value or as a percentage of the loss.  Most of 
the international examples of flood insurance 
schemes compared in this study employed 
deductibles; although the value of these varied 
quite considerably.  Deductibles have long been 
used as instruments to control moral hazard the 
rational being that if policyholders have to 
contribute a percentage of the loss before they are 
fully-indemnified then they will make efforts to 
reduce the overall total loss. Indeed, Wang et al. 
(2008) argue than empirical findings strongly 
supported the notion that increasing deductibles 
did help to control moral hazard.  High deductibles 
may create a larger incentive for property-owners 
to consider adopting mitigation measures as they 
will increase the amount of the total loss that they 
would have to bear and absorb following a flood 
event.  Increasing deductibles, particularly in high 
risk areas, might be one way in which the cost-
effectiveness of mitigation measures can be 
increased as this potential extra cost to the 
policyholder should be off-set against the cost of 
implementing mitigation.  However, the extent to 
which policyholders will take notice of high 
deductibles in advance of flooding is debatable.  
The cost to them lies in the future and is one that 
may never even occur. Therefore, an increased 
premium (which to policyholders is a tangible cost) 
may be more likely to impact upon mitigation 
behaviour.  Despite this, there is the potential to 
also introduce graduated deductibles as Thieken et 
al. (2006; 385) suggest that “Ideally, the deductible 
should be linked to the risk of the insured object so 
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that particularly high-risk households have the 
strongest incentive to undertake mitigation 
measures”. 
6.4.4 Conditions in order to participate within 
an insurance system 
A further incentive for mitigation is through the 
placement of special conditions on policyholders if 
they wish to purchase insurance.  The first area 
relates to complying with special building 
regulations.  Insurers seemed to be particularly 
interested in the structural integrity of dwellings; 
however less interested perhaps in other aspects 
of resilient design.  There were many instances 
within the international examples which required 
policyholders to adhere to building codes or 
comply with particular construction standards in 
order to be able to secure insurance.  Insurance 
could be removed or properties excluded if they 
were poorly constructed or maintained.  
International examples of this nature include Spain, 
Turkey, Iceland, Norway and Romania.  However, 
often these construction standards related 
primarily to making a property more resilient to 
earthquakes and therefore may not impact upon 
their resilience to flooding.  There is no reason 
however, why this type of approach might not be 
extended to other schemes in particular in high 
flood risk areas to encourage flood resilience and 
resistance. 
 
The most comprehensive approach which is trying 
to encourage mitigation, often through the raising 
of properties, is the NFIP in the United States.  This 
insurance scheme has many conditions relating to 
risk reduction and communities are only permitted 
to enter the insurance scheme if they participate 
fully in complying with the requirement to 
undertake risk assessment and then further 
mitigation activities. Despite the good intentions 
however, due to a lack of enforcement and the 
often disputed risk assessment process, it is 
unclear the extent to which the NFIP has impacted 
positively on risk reduction.  This is one of the 
aspects that is hoped will be improved upon under 
the new reformed program. Building codes have 
often been considered to be fundamental to 
insurers reducing their risk from future losses 
(Kunreuther, 1996; Kleindorfer and Kunreuther, 
1999).  However, in order to be effective for 
flooding this would need to be water-damage 
specific and go beyond many of the measures 
currently implemented.  Additionally, the issue of 
enforcement would also need to be addressed 
with some relatively easy and cost-effective ways 
of checking whether properties have met (or even 
exceeded) the required building standards.  Any 
change of this level is likely to need government 
involvement and even regulation. 
 
Introducing individual property-level mitigation 
measures is another aspect of risk reduction that 
might be incentivised by insurance or other 
recovery schemes through the placing of special 
conditions on insurance coverage.  In Belgium 
(Appendix A1.3) an insurer can stipulate that a 
property-owner is required to prove that they have 
taken a series of important preventative measures 
in order to limit risks of flooding. However, this 
option is not anchored into the legal framework 
and it is unlikely that it is often invoked.  Both 
Denmark and Iceland have inclusions within their 
policies that if properties have been flooded in the 
past then there is the need to adopt preventative 
measures and that insurance can be reduced or 
refused as a result.  Again it is unclear how often 
these clauses are invoked and cover is actually 
refused.  In the Romanian system a limit on the 
amount claimed is placed on an annual aggregate 
basis (Appendix A1.13).  Although this may only be 
applicable to the very highest risk properties this 
may encourage them to adopt risk reduction 
measures.  These high-risk scenarios are also the 
instances where individual risk reduction measures 
will be most cost-effective. 
 
Evidence from existing insurance systems have 
highlighted that there are actually few instances 
where individual mitigation measures are 
effectively incentivised.  There may be a number of 
reasons for this failing, including: 
 
• Policyholders lack awareness of the fact that 
their insurance policy does not fully cover them 
from loss and therefore they are not aware that 
they might need to reduce their risk 
• A lack of awareness and/or understanding of 
their flood risk and the scale of any potential 
impacts 
• An inability to understand the trade-off in terms 
of availability/affordability of insurance and the 
cost of the mitigation measures. 
• A lack of awareness of the potential options to 
reduce risk 
• Incentives for implementing individual scale 
measures remains insufficient 
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There is often a lack of evidence about the 
effectiveness of incentivising mitigation (and in 
particular household scale mitigation) through 
insurance products (Kunreuther et al., 2013).  
Although there is evidence there can be significant 
financial benefits of the adoption of adaptation 
measures, the numbers of property-owners 
voluntarily investing in measures is limited 
(Kunreuther et al., 2013).  This seems to be for two 
reasons. First, the incentive needs to be 
worthwhile and cost-effective.  For instance, in a 
private market-based insurance system where 
prices are highly competitive the financial 
effectiveness of implementing mitigation may be 
marginal and this may act as a disincentive to 
uptake.  Second, the assessment of the cost-
effectiveness of the measures is often itself 
complex.  In bundled policies, even when there is a 
risk-reflective element to the premiums, a 
policyholder may not appreciate the true cost of 
the flood component of their insurance.  Assessing 
the true value of the adoption of mitigation on 
insurance premium is also difficult within a single-
year policy.  Kunreuther (1996) suggests that 
insurers believed that there would not be 
significant demand in voluntarily adopting 
measures for a small annual premium reduction 
which would look trivial in relation to the outlay on 
risk reduction.  Thirdly, a limited uptake of 
mitigation may be partly due to the insurance 
industry or governments failing to ensure that the 
rewards for action are either inadequate or 
insufficiently promoted.  Finally, another barrier is 
considered to be the short-term nature of 
insurance provision and a lack of certainty that any 
investment will continue to be financially rewarded 
when insurance premiums are set.  Michel-Kerjan 
and Kunreuther (2011) and Kleindorfer et al. (2012) 
have both proposed adopting the use of multi-year 
insurance contracts for natural hazards which will 
better enable mitigation to be encouraged. 
 
All of these are barriers to the uptake of mitigation 
measures and each will need different strategies to 
tackle them. However, if the level or type of 
incentive is appropriate and sufficient then it is 
more likely that there will be motivation for any 
other barriers also to be overcome.  From an 
insurance perspective the more effective 
mechanisms as part of the private market relate to 
availability and affordability of cover.   
 
The inability of some people to obtain insurance 
may have the power to motivate them to reduce 
their flood risk in order to try to obtain insurance.  
This is likely to be most powerful where there is 
some compulsion to purchase insurance including 
when there is the need to have insurance to secure 
a mortgage.  Not being able to secure insurance on 
a house may have severe implications from 
defaulting on the terms and conditions on a home 
loan and will also limit potential opportunities for 
selling the property and its resale value if potential 
buyers are unable to secure a mortgage. 
 
From an affordability perspective a reduction in 
premiums may be a sufficient incentive to adopt 
mitigation measures.  However, from the 
international examples investigated in this study it 
is clear that premium reductions are not currently 
being effectively used to promote risk reduction; 
although research in this area is limited.  Thieken 
et al. (2006) were able to provide some 
information from a survey in Germany which 
highlighted that only 14% of insurers that were 
surveyed suggested that they rewarded voluntary 
private mitigation.   There is much more scope for 
individual mitigation measures in the case of price-
reflective premiums and a lack of uptake is partly 
due to the fact that there are very few situations 
where sufficiently high premiums are charged and 
flood insurance is a compulsory peril.  Therefore, 
those who are unable to afford insurance are just 
not buying it, rather than reducing their risk or by 
making their properties more resilient to flooding.  
There are also a very large number of insurance 
schemes whereby premiums are offered at a flat-
rate and therefore the scope in which to 
incentivise mitigation in this way, by reducing 
premiums, is limited.  Hunter (1994) suggests that 
insurers have been slow to encourage the uptake 
of resilience and mitigation measures as in the past 
they did not see their role as a promoter of safety 
and equally they were concerned about a potential 
negative financial impact on their profits.   
Insurance systems where there is more 
government involvement may have more 
opportunities to add special conditions on the 
insurance in order to compel policyholders to take 
measures.  However, similar to the private market 
where insurance is not compulsory and/or 
widespread it will be difficult to influence 
resilience to flooding on a large scale. 
6.4.5 Retrofitting insurance following flood 
events 
Another area to explore increasing resilience of 
properties in flood risk areas is through retrofitting 
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that resilience or resistance into properties 
following flood events.  There is the real potential 
for this to impact upon the risk of properties and 
any subsequent future damages. However, there 
was little mention of this within the international 
examples investigated in this study. It may be most 
easy to initiate this whereby there is government 
intervention and it is made a requirement when 
insurance is paid out or compensation to try to 
restore the property more resiliently.  However, 
this is often considered to be more expensive than 
restoring it to how it was prior to flooding and 
therefore in the short-term may cost more.  In 
situations where the amount of recompense 
gained is not equal in value to the damages 
sustained, victims may not be able to afford to 
reduce their risk as their properties are restored.   
 
Where insurance is provided via a private market 
there is often also other barriers to retrofitting 
resilience following flooding.  Insurers often 
express a similar argument to the above that 
restoring a property in a more resilient or flood 
resistance state is more expensive for them.  
Although it would be possible for them to invest 
more money and reduce the risk in these 
properties, thereby also reducing their exposure, 
since the majority of insurance policies are 
renewed annually they are only guaranteed this 
business for a maximum of a year in the future and 
therefore it is not cost-effective for them to make 
these investments.    
 
Insurers in the UK have also reported in the past 
other barriers to them working together to try to 
instigate more flood resilient or resistant repair 
following flood claims.  They argue that it may be 
possible for them to come to some agreement 
whereby they would be prepared to try to repair 
resiliently as a standard; even though it would be 
more costly to do so.  However, they are 
concerned that working together in this way would 
be considered to be in contradiction to anti-
competition legislation. 
 
Insurers would also need to gain the agreement of 
the homeowner with regards to the measures that 
were implemented and in the past some insurers 
in the UK have discussed that they have found 
some reluctance from property-owners as they did 
not like how the more resilient properties looked 
(ABI, pers. comm.).  This hesitancy might of course 
be offset in the future if property-owners knew 
that they could drastically reduce their future 
premiums or were aware that they would only be 
able to obtain insurance in the future if they 
undertook these actions. 
6.4.6 Insurer bias towards government-led 
risk reduction and mitigation 
Amongst private insurers there appears to be a 
preference for government-led or community scale 
risk reduction measures or the use of development 
control, above the adoption of individual 
mitigation measures or resilience.  There is often 
the perception amongst insurers that these 
measures are much more effective than 
household-scale resilience and that as they will be 
installed and maintained by authorities they are 
therefore more likely to reduce risk than other 
measures.  There may also be a transaction cost 
and risk assessment argument for preferring large-
scale flood management measures over household 
flood resilience.  Mitigation on the household-scale 
will not be represented in flood risk mapping and 
therefore in order to price the risk for those 
properties risks will need to be assessed on a 
house-by-house basis; thereby increasing the cost 
of writing the business.  They may be more likely 
to offer a reduction in premium when the risk 
reduction action is something permanent (e.g. 
raising the floor level) whereby any reduction in 
the risk will continue to be effective over the long 
term.     Achieving an appropriate balance between 
governments’ providing risk management, yet also 
allowing the insurance market to work effectively 
in incentivising risk-reduction behaviour is difficult 
and complex; not least since ultimately insurers 
would prefer governments to invest public monies 
in risk reduction.  Hung (2009) argues that in many 
situations government’s flood prevention 
construction is considered a normal substitute for, 
rather than a complement to, flood insurance.  In 
many countries insurers can be quite powerful in 
lobbying for increased public spending on flood 
risk management and White (2011) argues that 
establishing strong private-public partnerships 
(between insurers and governments) can both 
guide and have a positive influence on public 
spending on risk mitigation and prevention. 
 
Insurers may also be apprehensive about offering 
premium reductions for certain types of mitigation 
measures (e.g. flood gates, flood boards, flood 
skirts etc.) when there is little long-term evidence 
about their effectiveness.  Similarly, to be effective 
in reducing the risk some of these measures 
require the receipt of a flood warning and the 
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measure to be installed in good time and 
effectively prior to the onset of flooding.  
Therefore, insurers are reliant not on the 
authorities, to install these measures at time of 
flood, but on the policyholder.  Although there is 
clearly the incentive for the policyholder to do 
their best to prevent the ingress of water (not least 
to prevent a huge increase in premiums at policy 
renewal) there may be occasions whereby a 
homeowner is not at home or not able to get 
home quickly enough in order to implement 
measures. 
 
This whole argument raises the issue about 
whether resilience and risk reduction is the 
responsibility of the State or the individual 
property owner. Ideally one might argue that there 
would be elements of both.  There are many 
arguments towards the viewpoint that a scheme 
with actuarially-based premiums is best.  Botzen 
and van den Bergh (2008) identify the key 
advantages of private insurance arrangements.  
They argue that their ability to limit total economic 
losses when they effectively incentivise loss-
reducing measures and additionally premium 
differentiation (with high premiums in high risk 
areas) can be an aid to spatial planning and 
decrease the desirability to settle in risk-prone 
areas.  Whereas, Faure (2004; 21) presents the 
complementary argument that compensation is 
inhibiting the effect of risk-based pricing “If the 
state simply provides full compensation ex post 
this will dilute any ex ante preventive effect that 
one would normally expect with differentiated 
insurance premiums”.   However, currently there 
are few insurance systems which rely upon risk-
based pricing and clear examples of where 
mitigation and resilience has been enhanced 
through insurance involvement (other than via 
lobbying the national government) are limited. 
 
Despite the opportunities and the high potential 
for insurance to impact on mitigation, to date the 
outcomes appear disappointing.  Thieken et al. 
(2006) argue that insurers could be doing more to 
encourage the uptake of measures through clear 
premium or deductible incentives.  However, they 
are also well placed to offer information about 
those measures that might be taken to increase 
the resilience of a dwelling as they will have 
contact with insurants at least on a yearly basis. 
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7 Implications for the resilience of older people 
This section discusses potential implications for 
New Zealand in relation to the use of insurance as 
a mechanism for recovery from flooding and 
associated hazards.  Although the discussion will 
focus primarily on the issues of the resilience of 
older people to flooding many of implications are 
more general and will include implications for the 
rest of the population and questions of 
maintaining insurance cover for other natural 
perils. 
7.1 Functioning of the New Zealand system 
and potential implications from 
international examples of flood insurance 
In comparison to a number of other situations a 
system has emerged in New Zealand, which has 
permitted insurance coverage for a range of 
natural hazards.  In particular, the provisions of 
earthquake cover on a compulsory (i.e. if you have 
household insurance you are not able to opt out) 
and relatively universal basis (i.e. all risks are 
permitted into the pool) is quite an unusual 
feature of natural hazard recovery schemes.  
Although the previous section (and Section 5) 
often examines the role of both the EQCover and 
the private insurance cover separately, in reality 
they both combine and work together to deliver 
financial resilience and recovery and therefore this 
section will consider them as such. 
 
The intervention of the state, the creation of the 
Earthquake Commission and the State guarantee 
that they provide for these potentially high losses 
is described by the EQC (2011) as a ‘market-
enhancing intervention’ as it is believed that the 
private market on its own would not be able to 
cover such high losses.   Importantly, New Zealand 
does not have a compensation scheme for natural 
hazards and therefore citizens are not discouraged 
from taking out insurance cover as they are in 
other countries (i.e. Italy, Austria). A key 
characteristic of the New Zealand system is the 
pooling of the catastrophic risks.  Section 6 
highlights a number of different types of pooled-
system but the value of the one in New Zealand is 
the high degree of solidarity that it affords.  In 
contrast to many approaches, participation in the 
scheme is compulsory and insurance penetration 
in New Zealand is very high which means that the 
risks can be spread widely across the majority of 
homeowners.  This is particularly important in a 
country with a low population.  Indeed, the UK 
Government are trying to adopt a similar model for 
flood insurance (see Appendix 1.18).  The 
difference being that only claims for high risk 
flooding are ceded into the pool; lower risks will 
still continue to be funded on a private market 
basis.  One key difference is how individuals are 
treated. Under the New Zealand EQC approach all 
pay into the pool and when they suffer an event all 
are able to receive out of it.  Under Flood-RE all 
policyholders pay in, but essentially only the higher 
risks are directly benefitting from the funding. 
 
Another unique element of the New Zealand 
approach is the inclusion of losses to land.  Many 
insurance or compensation schemes 
internationally restrict recovery payments to 
property. It is not entirely clear why the damages 
to land remain in the scheme although it is likely to 
relate to the highly vulnerable nature of land to 
earth movements in New Zealand.  Losses to land 
are restricted to areas associated with buildings 
and aims to ensure that properties remain 
inhabitable.  However, it has been suggested that 
this is one element of the scheme which may be 
under review in the future. 
 
One of the key challenges of the approach is the 
balance and interface between the EQC and the 
private insurers and also between private insurers. 
A high level of coordination is needed between the 
EQC and insurers to ensure that a claims process 
runs smoothly. One issue concerns communication 
and relates to the difference in the approach to 
insurance adopted by different insurers. Each 
private insurer is permitted to set different 
entitlements as there is no standardised policy in 
New Zealand.  This means different policyholders 
may have varying terms and conditions which 
create tensions when claims involve both private 
companies and the EQC.  There is much room for 
improvement related to this interaction.  This 
problem is exacerbated when claims are handled 
for multi-units as within the one structure it is 
possible for units to have coverage with multiple 
insurers and/or for some units not to be insured at 
all. This can create a multitude of problems 
following the impacts of adverse natural events. 
 
Only by considering how the different elements 
combine together and function and considering 
the scheme holistically can the true effectiveness 
and robustness of the approach be considered.    
66 
 
Figure 7.1: EQC insurance footprint (potential liability and interaction with private insurers) 
 
EQC (2011; 26).
The EQC (2011) have diagrammatised what they 
have termed the ‘EQC footprint,’ (Figure 7.1) which 
presents an (unscientific) rating of the different 
components of the scheme and how they relate to 
different components of the private market).  This 
highlights that potentially more of the risk could be 
moved to the reinsurance market, although there 
are associated costs.  All of these parameters and 
the balance between them (and thereby the 
balance between the responsibilities and exposure 
of both the EQC and the private insurance industry) 
will need to be considered when potentially 
making any changes to the system.  Both schemes 
are sufficiently flexible to be able to raise 
additional funding (through increased premium 
surcharges and household premiums) in order to 
compensate for any changes made (EQC, 2011):  
however there is a delicate balance to be drawn 
between charging more to increase the 
sustainability of both the private market and the 
EQC and retaining affordability.  High penetration 
is one of the key characteristics of the insurance 
systems in New Zealand as described above and 
this has a positive impact upon the spreading of 
the risks (and thereby the viability of insurance 
products) and the resilience of all citizens.  
 
Although there are some elements of mitigation 
tied to the current system, it is difficult to really 
see what impact this is having on risk reduction.  
Strict building codes are the main mechanism 
being used to modify behaviour in an attempt to 
make properties less susceptible to hazards, but 
these mitigation efforts are dominated by 
earthquakes. Indeed, it has been argued that on an 
individual basis the EQC can lack visibility of 
individual customers.  This raises compliance issues 
and in particular with land settlements and any 
reduction of future risk.  Therefore, it is difficult to 
see whether the pay-outs have had any positive 
impact upon preventing future claims.  Receiving 
multiple claims for the same properties or land is 
one of the key threats to the robustness of the 
scheme and there needs to be an increasing focus 
on ensuring that, where possible, action is taken to 
reduce future risks.  Furthermore, perhaps the EQC 
could learn from other systems such as that in 
Belgium whereby claims are paid in two 
instalments: 60% is granted immediately with the 
remaining 40% only being received once the 
claimant proves that the money had been spent on 
recovery.  Additionally, there is much that New 
Zealand insurers and risk managers might learn 
from other countries in terms of the promotion 
and adoption of flood risk mitigation. 
 
From a negative perspective, the lack of any risk-
based pricing raises questions about the fairness of 
the approach. Although the scheme may be 
positively viewed from an equity standpoint that 
all risks are able to be covered, undoubtedly this 
means that some residents at low risk will be 
overpaying for their cover and some at high risk 
underpaying.  Across a number of perils this cross-
subsidisation element of the risk may balance itself 
out; with some residents being at higher risk of 
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some perils and not others.  However, when we 
consider the move to introduced risk-reflective 
premiums for other risks not included within the 
EQCover other fairness issues emerge and 
questions are raised.  Why are the risks from some 
natural perils effectively ‘nationalised’ and 
subsidised across all citizens 43
7.2 The insurance situation post-Canterbury 
earthquakes 
 and others not.  
Additionally, the lack of a pricing difference means 
that many lack the incentive to take action and 
thereby the positive impact on behaviour may be 
limited.  Similarly, the low deductibles associated 
with the scheme may be contributing in some 
instances to moral hazard. 
 
The importance and benefit of the central role of 
government within such a scheme is highlighted 
when one considers the situation in other 
countries with regard to the provision of natural 
hazard insurance by solely the private market.  In 
many instances (such as the United Kingdom, 
Norway, Sweden), private insurers are removed 
from the management of those risks and as such 
decisions are being taken by government agencies 
(about such aspects as mitigation investment 
decisions and the prevention of new risks through 
spatial planning) which directly impact upon the 
exposure of insurers.  To some extent this is still 
the case in New Zealand in relation to flood 
insurance cover for dwellings and insurers are 
generally concerned about issues such as 
managing increasing risks and the failure to 
prevent new development in flood prone areas.  
However, for those perils covered by the EQC 
those insuring the risk (i.e. the government-backed 
Earthquake Commission) are also directly involved 
in managing and mitigating it.  For instance, the 
EQC has a programme of education and capacity 
building amongst communities and tries to 
promote proactive action as well as offering 
reactive recovery. 
There are of course many individual stories of 
frustration in particular about the lengthy time it 
has for recovery to occur and the levels of pay-outs 
received following the Canterbury earthquakes 
and for those families it must seem like the 
insurance system is not working.  Additionally, 
                                                     
43It is recognised that in most cases this will not include all citizens, 
but only those with household insurance.  However, if the 
government is required to inject funds as they have following the 
Canterbury earthquakes then some of the losses are thereby spread 
over all of society. 
many of those who were affected by the 
earthquakes have also subsequent experienced 
frequent flooding. Despite these issues, at a 
national level, the current insurance system in New 
Zealand has worked relatively well considering the 
stresses that it has been under since the 
Canterbury earthquakes and has proved to be 
robust.  The system has managed to handle an 
unprecedented number of claims: with 
approximately 100,000 properties damaged and 
10,000 properties requiring demolition. 
 
Furthermore, the insurance industry as a whole 
has managed to recover and the vast majority of 
insurance companies have been able to effectively 
manage their risk and although there were a 
number of difficult years the industry has managed 
to evolve and through the use of market tools 
(such as higher premiums) the situation is now 
more stable and the whole household insurance 
market is more sustainable and profitable as a 
result.  Indeed, moving forward the market 
remains competitive and although some insurers 
withdrew from offering commercial insurance, 
only one insurer with a relatively minor market 
share stopped offering residential household 
insurance.   The exception to this situation is AMI 
and the necessity of the government to provide 
financial assistance.  It is hoped that the additional 
regulation and in particular the increased 
reinsurance requirements will limit the chances of 
this being necessary in the future.  Despite the 
recovery of the private insurance market and the 
continued functioning of the Earthquake 
Commission, there are a number of emerging 
challenges (e.g. the NZ Treasury review of the EQC, 
a recognition that the EQC caps may be too low, 
greater knowledge about flood risk, changing rates 
of home ownership) which may also have 
implications to a higher or lesser degree on the 
effectiveness of insurance as a mechanism for 
improving the resilience of older people. 
7.3 Future resilience of older people in New 
Zealand through insurance mechanisms 
The international review and the assessment of 
the current situation in New Zealand have 
highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of the 
approach.  There have already been changes to 
both the EQCover and private market insurance 
and with the NZ Treasury review and further 
developments in the market mean that there may 
be changes in the near future.  This section 
discusses the outcomes of these changes and 
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potential future developments and their 
implications for consumers.  Although many of the 
outcomes are relevant to all householders, this 
section will emphasise the situation for older New 
Zealand residents and highlight the barriers to, and 
opportunities for, promoting the resilience of older 
people to flood events. 
 
7.3.1 Maintaining affordability of flood 
insurance cover for older people 
Over the past few years there has been a 
considerable rise in insurance premiums with some 
homeowners seeing their premiums double, but 
most observing an increase of a third.  There are 
multiple reasons for these increases (see also 
Section 5.3.1.1) and a range of issues which may 
lead to further premiums increases in the future.  
These reasons include: 
 
• The Canterbury earthquakes and the losses 
that insurers have sustained. 
• Threefold increase in the premium 
surcharge of the EQCover 
• Goods and Service Tax (GST) increases 
• Requirements for insurers to significantly 
increase their reinsurance coverage due to 
new government regulations 
• Greater use of geotechnical maps to 
identify areas at high hazard risk and a 
move towards risk-reflective pricing.  
 
Premiums have begun to increase and although it 
is difficult to predict precisely how the market will 
react to issues such as flood risk-based pricing it is 
likely that premiums will rise for some 
homeowners particularly in the high risk areas.  
Although this may be considered to be a negative 
development for individual property owners, 
premium increases may be essential for the 
resilience of the insurance industry in the future 
and for the viability of insurance coverage for all 
householders. 
 
In some regards, a private market should move to 
regulate prices as there is a delicate balance to be 
struck between increasing premiums, so that a 
company obtains enough income for cover to be 
viable (and profitable) but also ensuring they are 
not too high to prevent widespread take up of 
insurance.  If the principles of insurance are 
considered, as soon as prices rise too much, then 
the whole premium structure falls away and the 
viability of the whole system of coverage will 
collapse as insurers will not have a sufficient 
spread of different types of risks and sufficient 
premium income. 
 
However, despite this there is still likely to be 
affordability issues for many residents:  this will be 
particularly pronounced for those on lower 
incomes and for older people who are more likely 
to be on fixed incomes44
Indeed, with the move to the sum insured system 
this may permit those who are having affordability 
issues to purchase lower levels of insurance cover 
than the actual value of their assets which would 
mean a lower premium cost.  Due to the 
prohibition of the ‘condition of average
. People choosing not to 
purchase insurance coverage is likely to be more 
marked for contents insurance which lacks any 
compulsory element and so this is likely to be the 
first type of coverage that gets dropped.  The 
impacts may also be more evident for older 
residents residing in their own homes who may 
have paid off their mortgage and thereby also do 
not have the compulsory requirement to purchase 
buildings insurance.  
 
45
In particular, the greatest threat is arguably to 
older people living in high flood risk areas, if 
insurers do decide to introduce more risk reflective 
premiums. Thereby, measures may need to 
specifically target these groups of residents in 
order to maintain affordability.  This may be 
’ this may 
still allow these homeowners to have some degree 
of financial recovery in the event of a loss although 
of course this may be insufficient to cover all of 
their losses depending on the degree of 
underinsurance. It is also a practice that should not 
be widely promoted due to uncertainties and the 
negative impact that it may have on the private 
insurance market and conversely may also lead to 
rising premiums for all.  However, in reality this 
practice may become more widespread. 
 
Affordability of insurance may prove to be a major 
threat to older people on fixed incomes and 
thereby in order to maintain their financial 
resilience to floods (and other perils) in the future 
there may be the  need to examine creative 
methods to assist them in paying for insurance 
products (such as paying proportional elements).    
 
                                                     
44 The majority of older people in New Zealand are primarily reliant on 
National Superannuation for their income 
45 See Section 5.3.1.2. 
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through looking to individual property or 
community based measures to mitigate the flood 
risk in these locations. Where retirement villages 
are located in areas of flood risk (in particular 
where a unit title model is adopted) operators 
should be encouraged to take mitigation action as 
of course it is also in their interests to protect their 
assets from flood risk and also to reduce their 
insurance premium costs. 
 
7.3.2 Maintaining the availability of flood 
insurance for high risk properties 
There is the potential danger with a move towards 
risk-based pricing that some properties may 
become excluded from cover altogether. Nothing 
has really changed yet and the majority of 
properties are still able to secure household cover 
for flooding, however with a greater awareness of 
flood risk and their exposure insurers may choose 
not to insure in very high risk areas.   
 
Flooding is of particular concern to insurers as 
many of the insurers are Australian-owned and 
therefore have recently been exposed to bad 
flooding in Queensland and elsewhere in Australia.  
In addition, concern about future risks may also 
exacerbate this situation as it may expose 
additional areas to flood risk or increase the 
frequency or severity of areas already at risk.  It 
also raises uncertainties in forecasting risks which 
insurers may be keen to avoid.   
 
The lack of availability of insurance in high risk 
areas will of course impact all groups including 
older residents.  However, older residents may be 
disproportionately impacted.  Those on fixed 
incomes will be less able to self-insure and build up 
their own funds to recover from flooding: although 
many may have strong family and other social 
networks to assist in recovery. 
 
Insurers may decide to withdraw cover on new 
risks in the first instance in order to prevent their 
overall exposure from increasing.  This may mean 
refusing to cover new property built in areas at risk 
of flooding, which also sends a message to 
planners and environmental courts that permitting 
development in these areas is not a good idea – it 
may also serve as a deterrent to developers as it 
will be difficult for them to sell properties where 
residents will struggle to acquire a mortgage (see 
also Section 7.3.3).   
 
Threatening unavailability of cover is also an 
element which may encourage more mitigation as 
residents of all groups may seek to reduce their 
risk and therefore not only lower their risk but also 
encourage insurers to offer them cover.  However, 
there are many barriers to mitigation and the 
potential problems for older people are explained 
below (Section 7.3.6) and thereby older people 
may need to be targeted to assist them in 
assessing the options to reduce their risk 
7.3.3 Increasing exposure of older people to 
flood risks 
Issues of the continued availability and 
affordability of flood risk insurance have been 
discussed in previous sections and both may prove 
to be potential barriers to the resilience of older 
people in the future.  It therefore makes sense to 
take measures to try not to increase the numbers 
of older people residing in areas at risk of flooding: 
and in particular in areas of very high risk.  Those 
already located in flood risk are difficult to 
influence, but it is easier to impact new 
development and in particular try to prevent the 
construction of properties targeted at older people 
(such as retirement villages) in areas of very high 
risk.  Those interviewed by this study were 
concerned that such developments were occurring 
on flood prone land and despite the objections of 
local councils; thereby exposing future residents to 
flood risk. Where development of these villages 
cannot be avoided, required mitigation should be 
introduced to reduce the risk to an acceptable 
standard and developers (and latterly village 
operators) should be held responsible and 
monitored to ensure that they are fulfilling their 
responsibilities. Future residents have the 
potential to be able to influence this process if 
retirement village owners were required to 
formally declare the risks that a village faces as 
part of the registration process and the mandatory 
independent legal advice: the potential influence 
of disclosure is discussed in more detail in Section 
7.3.8. 
7.3.4 Other barriers or disincentives to the 
uptake of insurance for older citizens in 
New Zealand 
Both the availability and affordability have been 
highlighted as potential reasons why older people 
(and other New Zealand citizens) may not benefit 
from the financial resilience that insurance 
provides.  However, there are other potential 
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barriers to the uptake of flood insurance and these 
may become more significant in the future.  
 
The first barrier relates to the ties between home 
ownership and high rates of insurance penetration. 
House prices are generally increasing in New 
Zealand and coupled with demographic changes 
this situation is leading to much lower rates of 
home ownership: thus leading to the potential 
erosion of the traditional culture of having 
household insurance. The insurance industry is 
generally concerned about this trend and as a 
result of these changes is expecting household 
insurance penetration rates to decrease in the 
future as it removes the compulsory element of 
having building insurance if there is a mortgage.  
This situation does not appear to be impacting on 
older people at the moment however will begin to 
have an impact over the next 20 years.  Indeed, 
Tuohy (2010) highlighted through survey analysis 
that the rates of insurance penetration amongst 
older people46
A second barrier relates to the nature of insurance 
sales and the communication between the insurer 
and policyholder.  Insurers are increasingly relying 
on electronic transactions and have closed many of 
their local insurance branches.  This may create an 
obstacle to some older people from accessing 
coverage or at least getting the best deal for their 
insurance premium (potentially causing problems 
of affordability or even availability).  This problem 
is exacerbated by the adoption of the sum-insured 
system which is a more difficult process and much 
of the related consumer information and guidance 
is held online. Insurance brokers may still have a 
large role to play in assisting these groups in 
obtaining insurance.  In addition to using electronic 
methods at the time of purchase, insurers report 
  increased between 2006 and 2008 
from 84.5% to 88.7%. Although this situation is not 
directly impacting on older people at the moment 
it may impact on older people in the future.   
 
Additionally, older people with insurance will be 
affected by any changes to the insurance market 
caused by a reduction in penetration rates across 
the industry.  In practice, this means that risks will 
be spread over fewer people and depending on the 
nature of the risks that remain on their books may 
lead to insurers re-evaluating their exposure and 
may necessitate an increase in all premiums to 
account for this reduction in risk spreading. 
 
                                                     
46 Tuohy considered the group between 54 years and 70 years. 
that they are also increasingly using the internet 
and email to communicate with policyholders as a 
reduction in the numbers of people working in the 
industry means that there are insufficient 
personnel within the industry for personal contact.  
These issues also prevail at the time of a claim (see 
Section 7.3.5 for further comment). Older people 
are often a group disadvantaged when there is a 
dominance of electronic communication. Indeed, a 
survey conducted by the NZ Office of the Auditor 
General (2012) suggested that older people were 
considerably less likely both to have home internet 
access (76% of 65 to 74years and 52% of over 75 
years compared to the national average of c. 85%) 
or to be a recent internet user (61% of 65 to 
74years and 32% of over 75 years compared to the 
national average of c. 85-90%). 
7.3.5 Ensuring the effectiveness of insurance 
as a financial resilience mechanism for 
older people 
Insurance remains the most relevant and 
appropriate mechanism for increasing the financial 
resilience of older people to natural hazards and 
therefore it is essential to ensure that older people 
have adequate coverage, maintain adequate 
coverage and finally utilise that coverage when 
required.  Even when older people take out 
insurance cover to act as a mechanism to provide 
financial resilience from flooding (and other 
natural hazards) it may not always be as effective.  
This section explores these reasons and proposes 
actions that might be taken to reduce them. 
 
Firstly, older residents may decide not to claim 
following an event which may hinder their 
recovery from an event.  There may be a number 
of reasons why residents may not claim.  They may 
make a conscious decision that they can afford to 
cover the losses and thereby do not want to lose 
any no claims bonuses or suffer any premium 
increases that may result. This situation should not 
affect the resilience of these older residents as 
they have made a conscious choice.  However, 
there may be situations where policyholders are 
afraid of the unknown and of potential premium 
increases as a result of making claims and may lead 
to residents not claiming and thereby suffering a 
loss as a result.  In these circumstances, more 
information about the impact of claims on future 
premiums could be made more explicit to ease 
potential worries.  
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Additionally, older residents may in some cases 
require additional assistance in coordinating claims 
and to better understand for what they are 
permitted to claim.  Evidence following the 
flooding in Sheffield (UK) in 2007 highlighted that 
older people had difficulty navigating the 
complexities of insurance claims and felt that they 
were unfairly treated by some insurance 
companies who they accused of not listening to 
their opinions (Walker, 2009). In the case of New 
Zealand, this may be most problematic when long 
term recovery is needed and in particular when it 
is necessary for claims from both the EQC and from 
a private insurer which if there are complexities 
may cause confusion for residents. Indeed, in order 
to speed up payments following the Canterbury 
earthquakes cash settlements were provided for 
the lower claims although this permitted residents 
to receive recompense more quickly it also 
removed the assistance that insurers provide 
policyholders in organising repairs.  Some older 
people may struggle with aspects such as engaging 
and managing builders (particularly at times when 
there may be a shortage of labour and materials 
etc.) as well as managing issues such as compliance 
etc. Thereby, as an insurer is contractually 
obligated to reinstate a property, it is in the 
interest of older residents not to accept a cash 
settlement (and thereby they should not be 
advised to do so) as it means being burdened with 
the complexity of managing the repairs and 
rebuilding themselves.  The disadvantage of this 
would mean that they had to wait longer 
(potentially in temporary accommodation) for 
recovery activities to be completed.   
 
Older people are not only impacted in terms of 
engaging builders but they might also be impacted 
by anti-competitive behaviour of the building 
industry.  Following some natural disasters in New 
Zealand (particularly the Canterbury earthquakes) 
many problems within the building industry have 
been observed including in relation to productivity, 
the occurrence of poor practices such as ‘cover 
bidding’, high levels of bankruptcy and the high 
closure (and subsequent reopening as a different 
business) of building companies to avoid any 
liabilities that may emerge.  These practices impact 
not only on older people, but impact upon the 
whole insurance industry and its ability to deliver 
affordable premiums to all householders.  The 
Commerce Commission NZ is aiming to tackle 
many of these problems and increase the 
compliance of the building industry in following 
consumer and competition legislation (NZ 
Commerce Commission Press Release, 2014). 
 
It might be possible in the future for insurers to try 
to prioritise vulnerable people (including some 
older residents) when considering rebuilding 
activities.  Walker (2009) suggested that providing 
a local advocate to assist local people (and other 
vulnerable groups) as well as ensuring that 
representatives from the insurance companies 
liaised more closely with older people to discuss 
and explain the claims process.  These types of 
activities have been implemented following the 
Canterbury earthquakes as each claimant has a 
claims manager; however for smaller events this 
might not be as effectively implemented.  The ICNZ 
have been proactive in the past following events 
and have set up community drop in centres. 
Although these do make a difference they will only 
have limited capacity and only be able to remain in 
place for a short period of time and recovery from 
flooding can typically take months or years.  
Additionally, older people with health or mobility 
problems may not be able to visit these drop-in 
centres and miss the opportunity for assistance.  
Therefore, perhaps the ICNZ could continue these 
efforts and work with affected communities and 
insurers to particularly target older people to see if 
they require claims assistance.   
 
The effectiveness of insurance may also be 
threatened when adequate coverage is not taken 
out. The move to a sum insured is quite a change 
for policyholders and will be equally so for older 
residents.  Under the new system there is the 
potential for people to underinsure both their 
building and the contents and thereby reduce the 
amount that they will receive following a claim.  
Although as discussed in Section 5.3.1.2 the 
prohibition of the ‘condition of average’ will mean 
that this may not have such as impact as in other 
countries. Nevertheless the impact of 
underinsurance may still be significant.  Companies 
providing valuation assistance have emerged in 
New Zealand following the change to the sum 
insured which may in some cases limit the 
potential for underinsurance; however this may 
also be adding another cost when purchasing 
insurance and again lead to affordability issues.  In 
these situations it is likely that policyholders will 
make their own judgements and may be more 
likely to be exposed to underinsurance as a result.  
In particular if there is a large disparity between 
the actual value and the insured value then it may 
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be difficult for residents to fully recover following 
an event: particularly in the case of a total loss. 
Older people may be significantly affected as they 
will have both limited time and funds to recover.  
Furthermore, as discussed above there is evidence 
to suggest that older people in the past have also 
under-claimed following experiencing damages 
from adverse natural events. 
 
Additionally, with an increased awareness of the 
risk insurers may not only increase premiums but 
also introduce other mechanisms to reduce their 
losses (i.e. introduce higher or separate 
deductibles for flooding or even mitigation action) 
and older people may require additional assistance 
in understanding changing (and potentially more 
complicated) insurance products to ensure that 
they are fully and adequately covered.  As insurers 
are moving towards a system based more on 
electronic communication older residents may 
require alternative approaches to be implemented.   
7.3.6 Increasing insurance-incentivised flood 
mitigation 
Currently, there are few ties between flood 
mitigation and insurance cover in New Zealand and 
there is high potential for insurance to assist in 
increasing the resilience of older people through 
mitigation. Before discussing how insurance may 
be used to promote and enhance flood resilience it 
is pertinent to discuss the current barriers to 
uptake. 
 
Awareness of flood risk is currently a barrier to 
uptake of measures to reduce risk: as a 
policyholder will not mitigate if they do not know 
they are at risk. Firstly, insurance may be used as a 
mechanism for raising awareness about flood risk. 
At time of renewal insurers contact their 
policyholders and this annual opportunity could be 
used to deliver information (or where to find 
information) about their risks.  Although for 
competitive issues insurers are unlikely to provide 
information about the specific premiums being 
associated with flood risk (i.e. if premiums are 
introduced to reflect the risks) this would give a 
policyholder some idea about the level of their risk; 
perhaps a system of banding (high, medium or low) 
could be used to achieve this.  CRESA has 
developed a tool to assist older citizens in 
appreciating the natural risks that they face.  The 
Home Site Selection Guide provides a framework 
for older people to use when selecting a 
retirement location and provides information 
about the types of hazards that they face and 
where to look or who to ask about the risk levels at 
potential sites.  This tool will assist in raising 
awareness of the potential risks and enable older 
people to make balanced and considered decisions 
when investing their retirement capital into 
properties.  It might also be used to assist these 
new residents relocating into risk areas (and 
potentially existing residents) to consider their 
potential insurance needs and making sure that 
they have sufficient coverage to secure their 
financial recovery if an event were to occur. 
 
Cost is often a barrier to mitigation.  Currently, 
there is a lack of assistance in the implementation 
of property-level measures. Following the floods in 
winter 2013/2014 the UK Government has 
implemented a scheme of Repair and Renew 
grants of up to £5,000 to flooded households to 
fund additional flood resilience or resistance 
measures for homes and businesses (HM 
Government, 2014).  The rationale is that these are 
provided in addition to the insurance pay out and 
are specifically intended to be used to make a 
property more resilient or resistant to flooding in 
the future.  Potential suggested measures include: 
waterproofing external walls, the installation of 
sump pumps and demountable door guards.  A 
scheme of this type might be considered in New 
Zealand although will of course only have an 
impact on properties that have flooded rather than 
all properties at risk. 
 
A further barrier is the awareness of the potential 
options for managing flood risk.  This is a very 
difficult area for any residents and older people 
may require additional assistance. As discussed in 
Section 5.3.2, options for mitigation are inherently 
complicated by the typical type of construction 
(timber framed) which means that resistance 
measures are generally difficult to implement.  
However, resilience measures are possible (as 
highlighted in the inset box in Section 5.3.2). 
However residents require assistance to select the 
type of measures that may be suitable for their 
type of property.  In the UK Defra have recently 
developed a simple tool to assist residents in 
understanding the potential options for reducing 
their flood risk and provide some indicative costs. 
For the first time, the Property Protection 
Advisor47
                                                     
47http://nationalfloodforum.org.uk/flood-protection-adviser/ 
 allows people to estimate just how much 
it will cost to protect their home from flooding 
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using flood protection products.  After entering 
basic details about their property, such as the type 
of construction and the number of rooms, the 
Advisor will produce an instant tailored online 
report for a householder, estimating what it would 
cost them to reduce that risk.  Additionally, 
information is also available about companies who 
provide these products and also a directory of 
qualified Property-Level-Protection surveyors, 
professionals who are able to assist in 
understanding these measures and their benefits.  
It will also make recommendations about work a 
householder could consider and direct them to 
further advice.  Similar approaches could be 
developed and tailored to deal with the risks in 
New Zealand; although it should also be provided 
in an accessible way to older people.   
 
Reducing losses from flooding does not necessarily 
only have to come from mitigation action and a 
reduction of the flood risk. The moving and 
evacuation of contents also has the impact of 
reducing loss and can be significant if precious 
possessions are targeted.  One might potentially 
expect older residents to be able to save less than 
other residents:  however there is evidence to 
suggest that the damages saved from the 
properties of older residents were not higher than 
those inhabited by younger people (Parker et al., 
2007). This was because these residents often 
received more outside assistance (friends, family 
and neighbours) in moving property out of the 
path of floodwaters. 
 
The main incentive barrier to the uptake of 
mitigation is potentially changing.  At the moment 
the low premiums mean that there is not the 
scope to incentivise but with the move to higher 
premiums there is much more scope with which to 
incentivise mitigation.  This may mean that 
insurers may offer premium reductions or may 
offer cover when they were considering 
withdrawing it, if residents take action to reduce 
their flood risk.  However, the measure would 
need to be something seen as proven and 
sustainable in the eyes of insurers.  This may 
create a potential disadvantage for older people. 
Currently in New Zealand the main way of 
mitigating flood risk is to raise the floor height of 
properties or to make the living space of houses on 
the upper floors.  This ‘accepted’ and recognised 
type of flood mitigation may not be suitable for 
older residents with mobility issues.  Therefore, 
there is the need for the insurance industry to 
engage with other options for flood risk reduction 
more suitable to the needs of older citizens to 
ensure that they are not disadvantaged in 
insurance coverage.  This may occur anyway if 
flood risk premiums increase and options for flood 
risk mitigation are explored.  
7.3.7 The impact of potential changes to the 
EQCover on older people’s resilience to 
flooding 
Section 5.2.7 describes some potential changes to 
the EQCover that may occur as the result of a NZ 
Treasury Review and all of these will impact upon 
older people in the same way as other residents 
with insurance.  Similar to other residents, the 
removal of cover for land may make residents less 
resilient to the impacts of flooding in the future 
and it is unlikely that the private insurance market 
will pick up these risks.  Additionally, the 
complexity of insurance provision may increase (i.e. 
excess changes, differential premiums etc.) making 
understanding the system potentially more 
complicated for all citizens.   Furthermore, it is 
likely that changes may lead to increased 
premiums for some residents and thereby relates 
to the affordability issues discussed previously 
which may be particularly pronounced for older 
people who are potentially on fixed incomes.  
 
When consulting, reporting and explaining 
potential changes to the EQC scheme and the 
balance between this cover and private insurance, 
the Earthquake Commission should recognise that 
all communication should be accessible to older 
people and there should not be a reliance on 
electronic mechanisms.  It is difficult to predict the 
specific implications for older people without the 
specific changes being finalised.   
7.3.8 The case of flood insurance cover for 
retirement villages and their residents 
Currently there is no requirement for disclosure of 
floods (or other) risks; however the current COP 
requires that details of insurance cover be 
provided to a resident or prospective resident if 
requested.  So if there are any particular risks 
attached to a policy then these would be listed and 
visible to the resident. Improving the disclosure of 
flood risk for those purchasing properties or 
moving into retirement villages would enable a 
more considered and conscious decision about 
flood risk and also increases the awareness that 
mitigation may be required.  Where retirement 
villages are concerned this might be added as a 
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specific clause on a contract agreement which 
would need to be discussed by the independent 
legal advisor prior to a resident joining a village.   
 
The mandatory independent legal advice may be 
having an impact as there is evidence to suggest 
that this advice has included suggesting that 
residents consider their own insurance needed; 
however there is no requirement for a resident to 
take their advice or take out cover and so the true 
impact of these elements is difficult to determine.   
 
What is likely to be more influential is the 
requirement for village insurance coverage to be to 
the satisfaction of the Statutory Supervisor.  
Although there is much work to do to ensure that 
SSs understand their obligations and what 
constitutes adequate coverage  it is likely that over 
time this should ensure that all village operators 
are property covered and thereby residents 
investments fully protected.  Despite having 
adequate coverage this will not prevent hazards 
and residents may still have the stress, anxiety and 
inconvenience of being out of their homes.  
 
More emphasis should be placed on mitigating 
those risks that it is possible to mitigate; which 
would not only potentially reduce the premiums of 
residents (for contents insurance) and reduce the 
chances of exposing them to flooding but also 
reducing the premiums of the village operator. 
With likely increases in premiums linked to the 
knowledge of the flood risk there will be more 
scope to incentivise action.  Villages of this kind 
might be targeted by campaigns or assistance to 
promote flood mitigation options as by doing so 
will improve the resilience of a large number of 
older people and may have more impact than 
targeting individual properties.  In particular, for 
newly built villages in flood prone areas it may be 
possible to require flood risk reduction measures 
to be implemented.  
 
As discussed in Section 5.4, there is a contract 
between residents and the village operator and as 
such there is some legal protection of the financial 
interests of the residents.  There have been some 
efforts to progressively regulate aspects of the 
industry as the public costs of poor provision and 
management have risen.  However, more needs to 
be done in this area to ensure that the legislation is 
clear and effectively empowers residents.  
Currently, residents are able to influence activities 
through raising areas of concern with village 
operators; but it is unclear how many are actually 
doing so and the effectiveness of this action in 
changes in practices.  This informal process does 
not guarantee any action, however operators may 
want to be seen to be resolving conflicts in order 
to satisfy residents and ensure that a village 
remains attractive to prospective new residents.    
Additionally, a good and proactive Statutory 
Supervisor may also be able to draw the attention 
of village owners to these types of issues. However, 
ultimately any flood risk reduction activities are 
likely to be influenced by the costs of interventions. 
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A1 European countries 
This section will provide an international 
comparison of countries in Europe.  Many of these 
countries are Members States of the European 
Union (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden and United 
Kingdom) and therefore they will be subject to 
some EU Directives and Regulations which affect 
how and whether flood insurance is provided.  
 
The first aspect relates to the free trade conditions 
between EU countries and regulations related to 
competition between companies (European Union, 
1992).  This has had a number of impacts on the 
provision of flood insurance.  First, the regulations 
(in particular the EU Directive on non-life insurance: 
European Union, 1992) have affected pre-existing 
insurance monopolies (Porrini and Schwarze, 2014).  
These existed in a number of regions (e.g. Baden-
Württemberg, Germany), whereby household 
insurance (including flood) was compulsory and 
penetration was consequently high.  The new EU 
regulations have led to the cancellation of some of 
these systems and insurance ‘cartels’ and although 
alternatives through the private market are 
available – they are generally not compulsory- and 
therefore insurance penetration has reduced as a 
result (Fiselier and Oosterberg, 2004). 
 
Competition regulation is also often provided as a 
reason why insurers find it difficult to introduce 
actions prompting mitigation or insisting that 
flooded properties are repaired and replaced to 
higher standards (retrofitting for flood 
resilience/resistance).  Priest (2003) argues that 
many insist that they would need to work together 
and come to an agreement in order to be able to 
ensure that they are not undercut by other 
insurance companies; as other insurers may 
choose not to insist on mitigation and therefore 
take on this business.  However, companies are 
unable to act together as this would be against 
competition and anti-monopoly legislation which 
prevents any activities considered to be anti-
competitive. 
 
However, not all of the consequences of EU 
Competition regulations have been negative.  
Under these regulations there are also conditions 
which aim to prevent the binding agreements to 
exclude particular perils (such as flooding) from 
insurance cover. This was a situation in The 
Netherlands where insurers had a binding 
agreement to prevent the cover of flooding.  As 
Faure and Hartlief (2006) report the conditions of 
EU regulation 3932/92 report that “standard policy 
conditions may in particular not contain any 
systematic exclusion of specific types of risk 
without providing for the express possibility of 
including that cover by agreement” (EEC, 1992; 
Consideration 8).  This was resolved in The 
Netherlands by the alteration of the agreement to 
being non-binding which has paved the way for the 
introduction of a new insurance projects (Section 
A1.9).  
 
In addition to competition legislation having a 
large impact upon the actions and activities of 
insurance companies in EU Member States, 
another key EU Directive is Solvency II (The 
European Parliament and of the Council, 2009).  
This replaces a previous Directive, Solvency I, 
which was introduced in 1973 and is a risk 
management device which aims to further codify 
the amount of capital that insurance companies in 
the EU must hold in order to avoid insolvency.  
Introduced in 2009, it is currently still being 
implemented and transposed into the national 
legislation of EU Member States and the 
implications of the Directive are still to be 
understood. However, the aim of the Directive is to 
ensure that an insurer will be able to meet their 
claims and ultimately provide a greater confidence 
in the insurance industry (Matt Cullen, Association 
of British Insurers, pers. comm.).  Although the 
detail of how the Directive will be implemented is 
specific to transposition legislation of the particular 
Member State, it obliges insurers to have a greater 
knowledge of their exposure (at probability 1 in 
200 years) to different risks (all risks not just 
natural perils) and ensure that they have sufficient 
reserve capital.  These requirements mean that 
insurers may begin to question their exposure to 
natural perils (including flood insurance) and take 
action to better manage their risk.  This may mean 
that some insurers will seek to limit, reduce or 
avoid the very high flood risks and start to change 
their terms and conditions. The true implications 
of Solvency II on flood insurance however will 
begin to unfold as the deadlines for each stage of 
implementation elapses. 
 
There are also additional resources available to EU 
Member States that they may be able to draw 
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upon following flooding to provide financial 
assistance for recovery activities; the most 
significant of which is the EU Solidarity Fund. 
A1.1 EU Solidarity Fund 
As well as being able to draw on national reserves 
and the global insurance and reinsurance market, 
Member States of the European Union are eligible 
to apply for financial aid from the European Union 
Solidarity Fund (EUSF) in the event of major 
natural disasters including flooding (Council of the 
European Union, 2002).  However, the terms at 
which the EUSF can be invoked are quite strict and 
it was only intended to provide relief in the more 
severe of circumstances.  Specifically, Article 2 of 
the EU Council Regulation states that “A ‘major 
disaster’ within the meaning of this Regulation 
means any disaster resulting, in at least one of the 
States concerned, in damage estimated either at 
over €3 billion in 2002 prices, or more than 0,6 % 
of its Gross National Income” (Council of the 
European Union, 2002; L311/5).   Member states 
receive assistance in the form of a grant for risks 
which are uninsurable and the aim of the Fund is 
to assist and complement the efforts of the States 
and to enable them to undertake emergency 
operations (e.g. temporary accommodations, 
immediate restoration work and the clean-up of 
affected areas.  The fund is financed outside of 
normal EU funding and the fund has an annual 
ceiling of €1 billion (European Commission, 2011).   
 
Of the 52 EUSF Interventions since 2002 (European 
Commission, 2013) the majority (a total of 32) 
were for floods events (or mixed storm and flood 
events) with a total amount provided in funding of 
€1.36 billion.  More specific information is 
provided in Table A1.  The regulations relating to 
the EUSF are under review however (European 
Commission, 2011).  A key feature of the review is 
to increase the ability of the fund to be able to 
response more rapidly at the time of disaster, 
partly through adopting more simple definitions of 
when a flood occurs.  In addition, the Commission 
are eager to ensure that countries are undertaking 
activities to reduce their risks to natural disasters. 
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Table A1: EU Solidarity Fund Interventions since 2002 for flood events (between November 2002 to April 
2013) 
Country  Flood event Total event damages 
(million €) 
Received from the EU 
Solidarity Fund (million €) 
Austria August 2002 2 900 134 
Czech Republic August 2002 2 300 129 
Germany August 2002 9 100 444 
France September 2002 (Gard) 835 21 
Malta September 2003 (Storm and 
floods) 
30 0.96 
France December 2003(Vallée du 
Rhône) 
785 19.6 
Romania April 2005 (Spring floods) 489 18.8 
Bulgaria May 2005 222 9.7 
Romania July 2005 (Summer floods) 1 050 52.4 
Austria August 2005 (Tyrol, 
Vorarlberg) 
592 14.8 
Bulgaria August 2005 237 10.6 
Greece March 2006(Evros) 372 9.3 
Hungary April 2006 519 15.1 
United Kingdom June 2007 4 612 162.3 
Slovenia September 2007 233 8.3 
Romania July 2008 471 11.8 
Ireland November 2009 521 13 
Portugal February 2010 (Madeira 
floods and landslides) 
1 080 31.3 
Croatia May 2010 153 3.8 
Czech Republic May 2010 205 5.1 
Hungary May 2010 719 22.5 
Poland May 2010 2 994 105.6 
Slovakia May 2010 650 20.4 
Romania June 2010 876 25.0 
Czech Republic August 2010 437 10.9 
Croatia September 2010 47 1.2 
Slovenia September 2010 251 7.5 
Italy October 2010 (Veneto) 676 16.9 
Italy October 2011 (Liguria & 
Tuscany) 
722.5 18.1 
Croatia October 2012 11.5 0.29 
Slovenia October 2012 360 14.1 
Austria November 2012 (Lavamünd) 9.6 0.24 
 Total 34,459.6 1,357.6 
 
Source: European Commission (2013) 
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A1.2 Austria 
Insurance cover for natural hazards is optional and 
insurance penetration for domestic properties is 
low.  Where cover is offered and purchased it is via 
by the private market as a bundled policy along 
with other natural perils (including landslide, 
debris flow, avalanche and earthquake); although 
storm is handled differently.  There are also quite 
unfavourable indemnification limits which on 
standard cover can cap pay-outs between 25% and 
50% of the building cost or a maximum value of 
between €3700 and €7500 (c. NZ$5,965 and 
NZ$ 12,091) (CCS, 2008).  It is possible to purchase 
policies which are based upon a risk assessment of 
the household which will provide higher levels of 
indemnification, but the premiums will also be 
higher to reflect the increased risk.  Additionally, 
many standard policies have a composite 
accumulation clause which means that insurers will 
set a maximum amount that those insured are able 
to claim from the same policy for the same peril 
(Holub et al., 2011). 
 
Paklina (2003) suggested that in Austria the 
penetration rate was less than 10%.  CCS (2008) 
identify that one of the key risks to the system is 
adverse-selection as demand is understandably 
highest in those areas where flooding is frequent, 
thereby raising the cost of premiums and reducing 
the penetration rates.  This situation results in a 
very low percentage of flood losses being 
recoverable through insurance: this was 
considered only to be c. 15% for the 2002 floods.  
There has been some discussion about altering the 
insurance system further so that there is higher 
penetration and more floods are covered but the 
insurance authorities have recognised that “It is 
only in a risk partnership with the State that 
insurance solutions can be found” (VVO, 2005) and 
that a fundamental change to the current system is 
necessary. 
 
Recovery from flooding in Austria is primarily 
based on disaster relief (Katastrophenfonds) 
provided by the National Government (Fiselier and 
Oosterberg, 2004).  To provide financing of the 
disaster fund, tied surcharges were placed on 
income taxes, wage taxes, capital gains tax and 
corporation tax. After being subject to several 
amendments, the legal act from 1966 was revised 
by the so-called Federal Act related to the Disaster 
Fund of 1996 which is still in force (Republik 
Osterreich, 1996).  The budget of the disaster fund 
originates from a defined percentage (since 1996: 
1.1%) of the federal share of the aforementioned 
taxes which amounts to approximately €7(c. 
NZ$ 11) for private households and€30 (c. NZ$ 48) 
for business entities per year (Vetters and 
Prettenthaler, 2004).Porrini and Schwarze (2014) 
argue that citizens do not have a legal right to 
access these funds and if their request for aid is 
granted it only covers approximately 50% of the 
damages incurred. 
 
Funds which are not spent in a respective year are 
subject to a reserve. In accordance with the 
Austrian Court of Audit, the prescribed maximum 
reserve of the disaster fund is limited to €29 
million (Federal Ministry of Finance, 2006, Republik 
Österreich 1996). This regulation has resulted in a 
redistribution of these additional funds to other 
areas of the budget when they are not needed to 
recover from catastrophic events.  This is 
considered to be one of the major stresses on 
liquidity of the disaster fund if above-average 
losses occur (Holub and Fuchs, 2009). 
 
Additional funds are also available from the 
Federal government and also the EU solidarity fund 
(see above section) to compensate from flooding 
events.  Although each of the Regional 
governments are free to implement their own 
rules (within the bounds of the 1996 act (T. Thaler, 
pers. comm.)) in general a regional government 
will grant an indemnity for the losses incurred by 
private households and companies up to 20-30%.  
Regional governments are then able to recover c. 
60% of those funds spent on financial aid from the 
National Disaster Fund (Federal Ministry of Finance, 
2006).   
 
The 2002 event serves to highlight the role of 
public financial aid following flooding.  A Statute 
on the Compensation for Victims of Floods and 
Reconstruction1
                                                          
1the Hochwasseropferentschädigungs- und Wiederaufbau-Gesetz 
 was passed to be able to add to 
the funds in the central Disaster Fund.  In 2002, 
€500 million (c. NZ$ 806 million) was approved as 
compensation from the Federal fund, of which half 
was to be used for the damage of property of 
private citizens and businesses (Hinghofer-Szalkay 
and Koch, 2006). Additionally, they report that 
other instruments were also used to aid and assist 
recovery including subsidies for small businesses 
and a social hardship fund.  Although it is possible 
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to say how much compensation was given to 
individual households in 2002, there is no set 
amount how much funding should go to individuals 
and it is possible that this varies between different 
events (T. Thaler, pers. comm.). 
 
It is pertinent to ask whether a household would 
be able to receive Federal Compensation and claim 
on their insurance policy.  Hinghofer-Szalkay and 
Koch (2006) suggest that an insurer does not ask 
whether a householder is seeking recompense 
from public funds, but conversely any request for 
public assistance will ask whether an individual has 
private insurance.  Since there can be quite strict 
upper limits on indemnities (including cumulative 
limits on payments received) and thereby not all 
the losses are covered, it may be feasible that a 
homeowner receive an insurance pay-out and still 
be eligible to receive some compensation.  
 
There was some concern following large flooding 
events (such as those experienced in Austria in 
2002) that the current disaster relief fund was 
insufficient to provide that level of compensation. 
Therefore, a national law was enforced that 
enabled higher subsidies in individual 
circumstances such as the 2005 events (Republik 
Österreich, 2005) and new system based on 
allowing those who have suffered property 
damages to obtain tax-relief as a form of 
compensation was considered. However, an 
overall system of obligatory buildings insurance is 
still missing in Austria so far (Holub et al., 2011)
 
 
Key Characteristics: Austria 
Insurance scheme: Private insurance is available and optional – some bundling with other perils. 
Types of perils and 
flooding covered by 
insurance: 
Unknown. 
Optional/ 
compulsory cover: 
Where insurance is available it is optional. 
Insurance premium 
mechanism: 
Flooding is included along with some other natural perils. 
Risk transfer mechanism: As low penetration – open to anti-selection but some bundling via other 
perils. 
Penetration/ 
coverage of flood 
insurance: 
Low penetration of insurance. 
Presence of state aid or 
compensation: 
National solidarity disaster relief.  This is provided by an Act of Parliament and 
therefore enshrined in legislation. 
Summary: Most recovery is through the National Catastrophe Fund as insurance 
penetration is low. 
Key principles of the recovery system 
Efficiency:  An upper limit on indemnification may incentivise mitigation and a reduction 
in overall damages.  Also increasing use of building codes but how these 
relate specifically to flooding is unknown. 
Equity principle: National solidaristic whereby all are contributing via subsidies on taxation. 
Robustness of recovery 
system: 
Medium - as although losses are spread via taxes and there is an upper limit 
on indemnification – but susceptible when there are large floods with high 
losses. 
 
 
 A-7 
 
A1.3 Belgium 
A National Calamities Fund was initially established 
by the State in 1976 to provide some 
compensation from losses in the event of natural 
disasters.  CCS (2008; 35) argue that it exists to 
contribute to assisting losses to private property 
“by natural event of exceptional intensity and 
generalised devastating effects, fundamentally for 
risks which are hard to insure (flood, earthquake)”.  
This State-backed fund is in effect publically 
financed through different budgetary mechanisms 
collected when needed following a disastrous 
event.  A disaster has to be declared by a Royal 
Decree which sets the geographic area in which 
the law is applied (Durant, 2006).  There is also the 
specific requirements that: the event is exceptional, 
total direct damages exceed €1.25 million (c. NZ$ 2 
million) with an average damage claim exceeding 
€5,000 (c. NZ$ 8,061) (CCS, 2008).  Losses are 
adjusted by the State and are compensated at the 
real value of the loss with a deductible of €250 (c. 
NZ$ 403). However, the role of the Fund is 
changing due to increasing demands and losses 
occurring and the country has moved towards an 
insurance-oriented approach; importantly any risk 
which can normally be covered by an insurance 
policy will not receive any financial aid via the Fund 
(Durant, 2006).  The Fund is financed by a number 
of mechanisms including advances of the Treasury, 
public donations, investment incomes or short 
term loans to the Fund (Durant, 2006). 
 
Belgium has adopted a system of disaster cover 
which provides insurance for flood-related losses 
as part of simple-risk fire insurance policies.  The 
original was originally implemented in 2003 and 
was restricted solely to flooding and only those 
properties at flood risk, which of course does not 
efficiently and effectively adopt the principles of 
insurance.  It was therefore amended in 2005 and 
a compulsory flood guarantee was placed on all 
fire-policies irrespective of the flood risk of the 
property as well as extending the requirement to 
include other perils such as earthquakes, overflow 
or blockage of public drainage and landslides or 
subsidence (CCS 2008) (Act of 17 September 2005, 
changes into force as of 2 March 2006).  Cover is 
administered and sold via private insurers however 
an insurers’ exposure is limited by the total 
amount of cover they underwrite and per event.  
Any losses above these limits are covered by the 
National Calamities Fund up to a total of €280 
million (c. NZ$ 451 million) (for floods) with monies 
received from a claim being reduced proportionally 
if this limit is reached.  The National Disaster Relief 
Fund is composed of two funds: the Disaster Fund 
which is for general disasters including floods and 
the second dedicated to disasters affecting the 
agricultural sector.  These funds have elements of 
both pre and post-event financing.  The Disaster 
Fund can be considered to be ex ante because it 
manages a continuous flow of finance for its 
operational costs (gathered from multiple sources 
including national lottery, investment income and 
taxation on insurance policies); however the fund 
often also relies on additional (ex post) funding if 
the balance of the Fund proves inadequate.  This 
additional money comes from the National 
Treasury and also contributions from the budget of 
the Ministry of Finance.  
 
The policies have deductibles applied but these are 
limited by the legislation and in 2005 were around 
€1000 per claim (c. NZ$ 1,612) (CCS, 2008).  For the 
very highest risks areas for which high premiums 
or deductibles would make the insurance 
unaffordable a ‘Tariffs Office’ is established to 
specify the relevant ratings and the tariffs are 
distributed amongst all insurers (CCS, 2008).  The 
system has the advantage that there now a much 
higher penetration of flood insurance cover in 
Belgium and greater degree of solidarity amongst 
policyholders. 
 
The 2005 Act has a clause which aims to mitigate 
further development in flood risk areas as insurers 
have the power to refuse cover to new properties 
(or contents of properties) constructed in areas 
designated as being at risk.  There is also a 
stipulation that the state, regional and local 
government tries to prevent construction permits 
being issued in flood-risk areas which has required 
improvement in flood risk assessments and the 
locations of high risk areas.  The main piece of 
legislation stems from the federal level, and 
applies equally to the Flemish Region, the Walloon 
Region and the Brussels Capital Region. This Royal 
Decree of 28 February 2007 (Belgian Official 
Journal of 23 March 2007) delineated the areas 
that are at risk of flooding of which the 
cartography in the Walloon Region was refined and 
modified by a further Royal degree of 6March 2008.  
In addition to this, the Regions are also responsible 
for identifying and delineating the areas at high 
risk of flooding according to the rules established 
at a Federal level (Royal Decree of 12 October 
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2005), although this has yet to be achieved in the 
Brussels Capital Region.   
 
It should be noted that the maps delineating the 
zones at high risk of flooding are different from the 
maps delineating flood sensitive areas (e.g. in the 
Flemish Region). The latter are used as an 
instrument by the authority granting a building 
permit, more specifically in the application of the 
water test. The insurance coverage restrictions 
only apply on the basis of the maps delineating the 
high-risk zones on the basis of the Royal Decree of 
28 February 2007. For those buildings that have 
been constructed in the high-risk areas after the 
date of 23 September 2008 (18 months upon 
publication of the Royal Decree determining the 
high-risk zones), insurers are not obligated to cover 
the building for water damages. If the insurer does 
decide to insure said building, the maximum tariffs 
of the “Tariff Office” are no longer applicable. As a 
consequence, the cost of the premium is at the 
discretion of the insurer and a risk-related 
premium can be charged where desirable. Also, 
the owner of the building is no longer entitled to 
benefit from the intervention of the Calamities 
Fund.  An insurer might also stipulate that a 
property-owner is required to prove that they have 
taken a series of important preventative measures 
in order to limit risks of flooding. However, this 
option is not anchored into the legal framework.    
These restrictions do not apply if the building 
already existed prior to 23 September 2008; for 
these buildings the maximum tariffs as set out by 
the Tariff Office apply. 
 
Since 2013, the Disaster Fund is in the process of 
being regionalised, rather than being undertaken 
at a national level.  However it is not yet clear what 
impact this will have on compensation and how 
the fund will function  
 
 
Key Characteristics: Belgium 
Insurance scheme: Private insurance – as part of fire policies and bundled with other 
natural perils, but is backed by the government. 
Types of perils and flooding 
covered by insurance: 
Unknown. 
 
Optional/ 
compulsory cover: 
In effect optional as although flood cover is compulsory on all fire 
policies; fire policies are themselves optional. 
Insurance premium mechanism: Bundled with other perils – some actuarial elements. 
Risk transfer mechanism: Bundled – therefore subsidised and transferred across risk categories. 
Penetration/ 
coverage of flood insurance: 
Unknown – though of course higher than it was prior to 2005. 
Presence of state aid or 
compensation: 
State-backed National Calamities Fund – but only for uninsured risks 
and therefore unlikely to be available for flooding. 
Summary: A mixed system whereby the government is backing recovery via 
insurance, rather than via compensation. 
Key principles of the recovery system 
Efficiency:  Possibility to refuse cover on grounds of inappropriate development – 
but few clear ties to mitigation activities. 
Equity principle: Solidarity amongst policyholders. 
Robustness of recovery system: Medium to High – Compulsory cover means high penetration and 
limiting of exposure but is relatively risk-insensitive. 
 
 
A1.4 Denmark 
Insurance cover is available in Denmark for all 
types of flood, storm and hail damage.  Flooding 
from the sea is compulsory, whereas all of the 
other types of flood insurance are optional (CCS, 
2008).    The compulsory flood insurance includes 
all sectors (domestic, commercial, agricultural and 
industrial) and two elements specify the scope of 
the insurance cover: 
 
 Flooding must be caused by seawater, and 
 The intrusion of salt water must have been due 
to a rise in sea level caused by a cyclonic (storm) 
event. 
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Cover is specified by the 2000 Act No. 349 
Compensation for Damages Caused by Storm 
(replacing the original 1991 Act No. 340) and is 
administered by the Storm Council, a Danish State 
body, which makes the judgement about whether 
a flood event satisfies the two conditions specified 
above.  The insurance cover is guaranteed by the 
State and must be included within fire insurance 
policies (excluding boats and vehicles) (Machetti, 
2009) although it appears that the insurance is 
only available for properties which are not able to 
procure flood insurance cover via the private 
market.  As well as this exclusion, there are many 
others which include both the type of damages 
which are insured as well as mechanisms which 
aim to introduce better management of flooding 
and a reduction in future flood losses.  CCS (2008) 
discusses the following key exclusions in which 
cover may be reduced or refused: 
 
 The contents of basements, cellars and 
underground premises 
 Indirect damages 
 Damage to land 
 Personal damage 
 To property constructed in areas known in 
advance to be of high risk 
 The property contributed or worsened the 
damage because of a failure to comply with 
building legislation – e.g. the use of 
inappropriate materials, inadequate design or 
maintenance of the property 
 Damage was intentionally worsened or could 
have been avoided or limited 
 
Importantly, the Act may require property owners 
who have suffered flood damage in the past to 
take preventative measures if they are going to 
continue to be entitled to compensation in the 
future. 
 
The cover is funded by a levy surcharge of DKK 20 
(c. NZ$ 4.33) which is placed upon all property fire 
and other flood insurance policies collected by the 
private insurers and transferred to the Storm 
Council.  All other aspects of the policies are 
administered by the private insurance company 
(e.g. issuing of policy, appraisal of damages, and 
collection of premiums and receipt of claims for 
the loss).  However, from a legal perspective there 
is no contract between a property owner and an 
insurance company with regards to the cover for 
seawater flooding; that responsibility passes to the 
Storm Council.   Although claims are administered 
by the private insurer, the Storm Council makes 
the judgement about whether the claim is valid 
and the amount of compensation to be paid.  
There is a general deductible on the policy of a 
minimum of DKK 5000 (c. NZ$ 1,082) or 5% of the 
losses for single or two-family properties or 10% 
(minimum DKK 10,000 (c. NZ$ 2,163)) for other 
properties.    
 
The Danish Government provide a limited 
guarantee for the scheme and will provide an 
additional DKK 200 million (c. NZ$ 43.3 million) if 
there are insufficient funds collected by the Storm 
Council to settle claims.  However, there is a 
provision to recover these additional losses 
(including interest) by increasing (by DKK 10; c. 
NZ$ 2.2) the surcharge placed on all fire and flood 
insurance policies.  There is an increasing concern 
that under climate change losses attributed to 
seawater flooding due to storms is increasing and 
that the provisions in the 1991 and 2000 Act is 
insufficient to continue to cover these losses (CCS, 
2008).  Additionally, severe flooding due to heavy 
rainfall in summer 2007 caused significant losses 
and there are increasing discussions about 
whether river flooding should also be included 
within the provisions of the Act.  
 
For other types of flooding and storm damage 
insurance is all provided by the private market 
although there are many variations on how 
insurance cover is offered.  A separate policy 
covering flood damage may be offered or cover 
may be attached to a main policy.  Additionally, 
cover may be offered for a single peril (e.g. river 
flood or hail damage) with an individual insurance 
policy or it may be grouped into a single block 
within one policy (CCS, 2008). There is also 
variation in what damage is covered, with policies 
potentially covering personal loss, direct material 
damages and/or consequential indirect losses.  The 
specific clauses in terms of indemnity limits and 
deductibles are also variable. 
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A1.5 France  
 
The French system of flood insurance is based 
upon the principle of national solidarity and that 
also all citizens should be treated equally in the 
face of national disasters.  The current system was 
introduced by legislation passed on 13th July 1982 
which made it a legal requirement for insurance 
companies to insure damages resulting from 
natural perils (Cannarsa et al., 2006).  The CATNAT 
system (Catastrophes Naturelles) is in effect a 
State-backed insurance scheme whereby insurance 
is provided by private insurance companies but 
reinsured and therefore guaranteed by the state 
Caisse Centrale de Réassurance (CCR). 
 
Insurance is mandatory under the terms of the 
1982 Act and cover is provided within fire policies 
as well as that for other property damage (e.g. 
vehicles) (CCS, 2008) and so almost all households 
have insurance.  This has created a situation 
whereby nearly all households are covered against 
flooding.  High penetration is also seen amongst 
private renters, a group where coverage is typically 
lower.  This is due to the requirement of landlords 
to verify that renters have purchased insurance as 
a condition of their tenancy (Michel-Kerjan, 2001). 
Indemnity mirrors that of the underlying policy for 
instance if coverage was only purchased for direct 
material damage to building and contents then this 
is what is covered against natural catastrophes.   
However, if business disruption is also purchased 
then this too will be covered against natural perils. 
The CCR, since 1993, is a limited company and is 
100% owned by the State of France.  Insurers do 
not have to reinsure with the CCR, they are able to 
purchase cover on the international reinsurance 
market: however, they largely choose to reinsure 
with the CCR (Gaschen et al., 1998), the 
attractiveness being the State backing for deficit 
years.  The State CCR provides an unlimited 
guarantee (Porrini and Schwarze, 2014).  
 
Machetti (2009) reports that reinsurance may take 
one of two forms. Firstly, a purely proportional 
quota-share solution which currently operates at a 
standard 50% for natural disasters and for which 
there is no reinsurance commission.  Secondly, 
there is a non-proportional ‘stop-loss’ reinsurance.   
For excesses in this solution the guarantee is 
unlimited after the deductible is applied.   
Additionally, Machetti (2009) argues that the CCR 
is able to retrocede cover onto the international 
reinsurance market (and it has done so in the past) 
but often chooses not to.  
 
Key Characteristics: Denmark 
Insurance scheme: State-guaranteed insurance scheme for cyclone-induced sea flooding 
administered by private insurers. 
Types of perils and flooding 
covered by insurance: 
 Sea flooding, River flooding from private insurers.  Rainfall flooding is 
excluded. 
Optional/compulsory cover:  Compulsory for sea-flooding and Optional for river flooding. 
Insurance premium 
mechanism: 
For sea flooding premium is via surcharge on all fire policies at a flat-rate. 
Risk transfer mechanism: Subsidised via the bundling system across risks – compulsory so spread 
widely. 
Penetration/ 
coverage of flood insurance: 
High for sea flooding due to the state-guaranteed system. 
Presence of state aid or 
compensation: 
Not clear regarding compensation funds 
Summary: Recovery from sea flooding is basically from the state-backed insurance – 
but only for this specific type of flooding. 
Key principles of the recovery system 
Efficiency:  Caveat that buildings are not included if built in areas known to be at risk 
and if flooded before there is the need to take preventative measures. 
Equity principle: For cyclone-induced sea flooding – Solidaristic risk-insensitive. 
Robustness of recovery 
system: 
Medium – not risk-based so unclear how economically viable this is in the 
long term if premiums and levies prove to be insufficient. 
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One of the main aspects of the CATNAT insurance 
scheme is that the natural peril needs to be 
considered to be of ‘abnormal intensity’ (CCS, 2008) 
and therefore privately uninsurable.  There is no 
clear list however of those perils that are included 
(although there was a further Act of 1990 which 
excluded storms and hurricanes from guarantee) 
and the key elements appear to be the scale of the 
event, the duration and the damages experienced.  
This lack of clarity and the absence of a clear 
definition of an event cause a lack of transparency 
and a lack of security amongst policyholders about 
whether they are insured and is a major criticism 
of the system (Gaschen et al., 1998; Michel-Kerjan, 
2001). 
 
A disaster needs to be declared by a decree for the 
cover to be invoked. An interministerial 
Commission  (Arrêté Interministériel) has this 
authority and are able to designate the affected 
areas, the types of damages for which the 
guarantee will apply and, as discussed above due 
to the lack of clarity in the Act, even the events to 
which the system can apply (CCS, 2008).  
Additionally, the damage incurred needs to have 
directly (and only) resulted from the declared 
natural event.  This clause may cause issues when 
flooding is experienced when mixed with other 
natural events, for instance storms, as these 
damages are now excluded from cover.  The 
definition and declaration of an event are 
therefore critical to the recompense victims 
receive. 
 
In order to be covered against these perils an 
additional premium is charged: at a flat rate.  No 
differentiation is afforded regionally or by hazard 
type – therefore premiums are not risk-reflective 
in terms of the exposure.  The additional premiums 
are varied according to type of asset covered and 
in 2008 were 12% for property damage, 12% for 
business disruption and 6% for damage to motor 
vehicles (CCS, 2008).  The percentages are added 
to the price of the base policy, rather than on the 
amount insured (Machetti, 2009).  Private insurers 
are required to settle any relevant claims under 
the terms and conditions provided in the base 
contract – i.e. if households have taken out a new-
for-old policy they the guarantee provides this or 
replacement cost if their policy stipulates this.  
Deductibles are part of the system; both applied 
per contract and per event and are set by the State 
(CCS, 2008). These also vary according to the 
particular insurer but are considered to be low 
(Porrini and Schwarze, 2014). They are in the order 
of €380 for domestic motor vehicles, 10% of direct 
damages (minimum of €1140; c. NZ$ 1,838) for 
commercial properties or those owned by local 
communities and 3 days worked (minimum of 
€1140) for business interruption. 
 
In general, the State-declared flat-rate premium 
does not distinguish between levels of risk and 
therefore provides little incentive for mitigation 
measures (Gaschen et al., 1998).  However, there 
are other characteristics of the system which 
provide more encouragement. CCS (2008) report 
that the deductible was increased in 2001 in those 
locations where losses accrue in areas with a 
Foreseeable Natural Risk Prevention Plan (PPR) 
which aims to prevent indemnities being paid for 
repeated events.  Deductibles are doubled in those 
Municipalities where disasters were decreed three 
times in five years, trebled when four times and 
quadrupled if more than five times.  It is unclear 
whether these stipulations are having an impact on 
either local government or individual 
commitments to reducing flood losses (CCS, 2008).    
 
Mitigation may also be encouraged through the 
unavailability of cover.  Insurers are able to refuse 
to provide cover for natural catastrophes if 
properties are located in areas where construction 
is prohibited following the publication of a PPR or 
properties have been constructed below standards 
aimed to prevent damages from natural perils. 
 
In addition to the CATNAT scheme, flood insurance 
can also be included in France within an all-risk 
policy or as a separate policy (Gaschen et al., 1998).  
This would cover flooding in less ‘abnormal’ 
situations as it would not require a decree for 
claims to be paid.   
 
The public-private partnership and the spread of 
the risks through both the private market and 
public system are both considered to be the key 
advantages of the CATNAT scheme (Michel-Kerjan, 
2001).  He also goes on to suggest some limitations 
including that there is insufficient knowledge of 
the risks to permit risk-related premiums to be 
charged if this was desirable.   This lack of 
comprehensive risk analysis is also hampering 
efforts to understand the needs for risk transfer 
and financing.  It has also been criticised on the 
grounds that the current system does not do 
enough to promote and incentivise mitigation 
(Michel-Kerjan, 2001). 
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Key Characteristics: France 
Insurance scheme: Privately-run, but largely State-guaranteed through reinsurance. 
Types of perils and flooding 
covered by insurance: 
Not clearly defined – no storm damage covered. 
Optional/compulsory cover: Compulsory. 
Insurance premium 
mechanism: 
Additional premium at a flat-rate – as a percentage of the base fire policy 
 
Flood-risk insensitive. 
Risk transfer mechanism: Some across risks – but largely State-Guaranteed. 
Penetration/ 
coverage of flood insurance: 
Very high – up to 100%. 
Presence of state aid or 
compensation: 
No separate compensation fund. 
Summary: Compulsory insurance backed by state guarantee. 
Key principles of the recovery system 
Efficiency:  Aims to avoid claims from repeatedly flooded properties by deducible 
increased – which may influence mitigation – but this is currently a poor 
element of the scheme. 
Equity principle: National solidaristic approach – affords a minimal protection to everyone. 
Robustness of recovery 
system: 
Medium – the system appears to work well although the unlimited 
guarantee by the CCR makes it potentially vulnerable. 
 
 
A1.6 Germany 
Germany is a Federal state with a number of 
regional governments known as Bundesländer.  
Some flood risk management responsibilities are 
held at the central Federal level, whereas other 
including flood insurance availability and terms 
and conditions have varied between different 
regions. However, Magnus (2006; 121) argues that 
there is “no single instrument dealing exclusively 
with the compensation of damages through 
catastrophes”.  Importantly, Federal law prohibits 
compensation from flood damages either centrally 
or regionally provided; however assistance is 
provided in events termed to be catastrophic 
(Fiselier and Oosterberg, 2004).  For example, 
following the 2002 flood event the Flood Victims 
Assistance Act (Flutopferhilfesolidaritätsgesetz) 
was passed to provide financial aid amounting to 
approximately €10 billion (c. NZ$ 16.1 billion) 
provided from both Federal and EU funding 
sources (Germany received €444 million (c. 
NZ$ 716 million)  from the EU solidarity Fund 
following the 2002 floods). Government funds 
were considered to cover over 60% of all losses in 
the 2002 floods (Mechler and Weichselgartner, 
2003).  Residential claimants to the fund received a 
high amount of compensation and up to 80% of 
their property damages (at the full cost of repair or 
reconstruction); although a deductible was applied 
(Mechler and Weichselgartner, 2003).  This high 
value of recompense is quite unusual for 
compensation schemes and Magnus (2006) argues 
that was to protect the economic situation in the 
East of Germany and not to affect the 
reconstruction process in that region.  It remains 
to be seen whether a similar Act in the future will 
have such generous terms of compensation. 
 
Although the Act mentioned above was only 
passed to provide assistance solely from the 2002 
event Magnus (2006) argues that it should be 
taken as a precedent to how the German state 
may react following other disastrous floods; where 
the losses are significant enough the solidarity of 
the public at large is required.   The Fund is 
financed both at the Federal and State levels, 
through general taxation and therefore in essence 
all contribute.  He also goes on to suggest that 
there are stipulations in the Act which allow 
discretion about how the funds are allocated 
permitting the circumstances of those affected to 
be taken into account when assigning disaster 
funds.  For instance, a loss (such as a car) suffered 
by a household considered to be wealthy may not 
be treated in the same way as from a poorer 
household (Magnus, 2006).  This is thereby adding 
an element to compensation related to the 
perceived vulnerability of different households. 
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Some areas of Germany have a long tradition of 
insurance cover.  Insurance cover for fire and 
(latterly) natural perils (including flood) was 
compulsory in Baden-Württemberg and was part 
of standard household policies (Thieken et al., 
2006).  Additionally, premiums existed for the 
natural perils component and were charged at 0.08 
per thousand of the fire insurance value (CCS, 
2008).  Cover was provided by non-for-profit 
insurance entities from which householders had to 
purchase insurance.  Similar procedures existed for 
Hamburg.  In the former East Germany (the GDR) 
the State insurer covered natural perils within a 
standard household policy.  When Germany was 
reunified in 1990, the insurance was moved to the 
company Allianz which continued to offer natural 
perils insurance, but at an increased premium. In 
1994 the insurance entities in Baden-Württemberg 
and Hamburg lost their ability to act as a monopoly 
due to the need to satisfy EU conditions and free-
market regulations.  The insurance system was 
required to open-up which led to the end of 
compulsory flood insurance in these areas.  
 
Flood insurance has been available in Germany via 
the private insurance market on a purely voluntary 
basis since 1991.  Although banks require fire 
insurance cover in order to secure a mortgage this 
does not include insurance cover for natural perils 
(Porrini and Schwarze, 2014). Insurance is available 
as part of the ‘Extension of Natural Risk Insurance’ 
formula (CCS, 2008) and flood is available as a 
supplement (and provided independently of) to 
household buildings or contents policies. Flood 
risks are managed and spread by insurers either by 
the obligation of bundling flooding with other 
perils (e.g. landslide, earthquake, avalanches etc) 
or by placing specific restrictions on the coverage 
(such as excluding very high risks or risk-reflective 
pricing) (Fiselier and Oosterberg, 2004).   
 
Premiums for flood and heavy rain have been 
differentiated by risk zone (ZÜRS) since 2001 which 
enables some degree of risk estimation (Mechler 
and Weichselgartner, 2003).  Four different risk 
zones are used based on flood probabilities (< 1 in 
200 years; 50 to 200 years; 10 to 50 years and > 1 
in 10 years) with the highest risk (i.e. more 
frequent than 10 years) being considered to be 
uninsurable and the lowest risk (i.e. less frequent 
than 200 years) being fully insurable (CCS, 2008). In 
addition, deductibles are also often differentiated 
by risk zone; with those at the highest risk paying a 
higher deductible than those at lower flood risk 
although the specific terms vary between 
insurance companies (Gaschen et al., 1998).  The 
terms of the insurance are the same as the base 
household policy and therefore largely also include 
household-related items outside of the property 
(such as fences, paths, cables etc). 
 
Market penetration for household insurance was 
considered to be low (in 1998 was considered to 
be 10% (Gaschen et al., 1998) and in 2005 was 
between 5 and 10% (Machetti, 2009)) with 
contents insurance penetration being slightly 
higher.  The low coverage of insurance is creating 
issues with anti-selection as flood risk is not being 
transferred and spread widely enough between 
households. Penetration is generally considered to 
be higher in those regions where flood insurance 
was once compulsory (e.g. 30 to 40% in areas that 
were part of the former GDR and up to 90% in 
Baden-Württemberg (Thieken et al., 2006)). 
 
It is difficult to ascertain the impact of 
compensation funds and public assistance on 
insurance penetration as although there is no 
obligation on the Federal or regional governments 
to provide compensation for flood damage, the 
presence of financial aid for victims in the large 
events may be dissuading the purchase of 
insurance (CCS, 2008).  Indeed, Seifert et al. (2013) 
explored through willingness-to-pay surveys the 
impact of so-called ‘Charity hazard’ on flood 
insurance penetration.  On average those who did 
not obtain government aid in the past were more 
willing to spend €2 (c. NZ$ 3.22) more per month 
on flood insurance than those who did not, 
however there was no statistically significant 
difference between those who received 
government aid and those who did not in respect 
to their intention to purchase flood insurance.  
 
Recent experiences (in particular the 2002 floods) 
raised concerns about the low penetration of 
insurance and, proposals were developed to 
explore the implementation of a new system of 
insurance for natural hazards (e.g. Schwarze and 
Wagner, 2004).  These included the principles of 
mandatory insurance (of course to increase 
penetration) and having the Federal Government 
as the guarantor of last resort for extreme events 
(CCS, 2008) and the introduction of a system of 
bundled flood insurance backed by a pool 
(Schwarze and Wagner, 2004).   
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In a small way, the voluntary insurance in Germany 
does go some way to encouraging mitigation 
measures as accessing insurance is conditional on 
adopting legally-demanded preventative measures 
or construction standards depending upon the risk 
zone (CCS, 2008).  However, the low penetration 
rate of insurance means that this is unlikely to 
have any large impact in promoting mitigation.  
Indeed, Thieken et al. (2006) suggest that only 14% 
of insurers that they surveyed rewarded voluntary 
mitigation. 
 
 
Key Characteristics: Germany 
Insurance scheme: Insurance cover available from private insurers. 
Types of perils and flooding 
covered by insurance: 
Flood, torrential rain. 
Optional/compulsory cover: Optional insurance cover. 
Insurance premium 
mechanism: 
Actuarially-based premiums are differentiated according to risk zones. 
Risk transfer mechanism: Some premium input but low penetration means high chance of anti-
selection. 
Penetration/ 
coverage of flood insurance: 
Variable depending on region but generally low (c. 10%). 
Presence of state aid or 
compensation: 
Ad hoc Government compensation from extreme flood events.  
Summary: Main mechanism of recovery is through government assistance – 
potentially deterring growth of insurance products. 
Key principles of the recovery system 
Efficiency:  Large focus on flood protection in Germany and the voluntary insurance 
does depend upon the adoption of preventative measures or standards – 
but low penetration means this is largely ineffective. 
Equity principle: Insurance is based on the 
individualist, risk-sensitive principle. 
Most compensation is via the 
government adopting the National 
solidaristic approach – but this is 
partly means tested which means 
all are not treated equally. 
Robustness of recovery 
system: 
Low – Although spreading risks across a very large group (all taxpayers) 
the ad hoc nature of compensation provision means it is difficult to plan 
for losses.  Also no limit is specified. 
  
A1.7 Iceland 
Insurance for flood damages are included 
alongside other natural perils within the Iceland 
Catastrophe Insurance (ICI) system.  Windstorm 
damages are not included within this system and 
are instead covered by the private insurance 
system.   The ICI is a public corporation which was 
created in 1975 and operates as an insurance 
company today regulated by the Icelandic 
Catastrophe Insurance Act 1992 (Act No 55) and 
the Regulations on the Icelandic Catastrophe 
Insurance Act 1993 (Act No. 93).  All property 
owners – both commercial and domestic - are 
required to take out insurance cover for natural 
perils which also covers contents against fire 
damages.  Insurance for natural perils is covered in 
a separate policy which is purchased by customers 
alongside the compulsory fire insurance policy.  
Private insurers administer this process for which 
they are paid a collection fee and they also collect 
premiums and claims which are subsequently 
forwarded to the ICI.  
 
Penetration is close to 100% as the insurance cover 
is collected with fire insurance which is compulsory 
in Iceland (CCS, 2008).  Only direct damages are 
covered (indirect damages being excluded) but are 
both for contents and building damages and are 
valued according to their real value at the time of 
loss and accounts for property depreciation (i.e. 
not new for old).  Additionally, if underinsurance 
occurs, losses are provided proportionally.  CCS 
(2008; 80) discusses the principles of the premiums 
and deductibles included within the system: 
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 A 0.25 per thousand premium for buildings and 
contents (collected by fire insurance companies) 
 A 0.20 per thousand premium for 
infrastructures (collected directly by the ICI) 
 A deductible of 5% of each loss (minimum 
deductible)  
 Universal premiums which are set by law. 
 
There is a set liability within the system of 10% of 
the total insured capital for each event.  This 
means that if claims exceed this amount then all 
claims are reduced in proportion, so as to not 
exceed the total of 10%.  The main concern to the 
ICI are losses from earthquakes, rather than floods, 
and in order to protect themselves the ICI also 
purchase reinsurance for this scheme on the global 
market. 
The Icelandic system does include some provision 
for the better management of flood risks as 
“indemnification does not extend to damage to 
structures built in breach of the rules in place for 
reducing risk, thereby aggravating their 
vulnerability to the natural perils covered” (CCS, 
2008; 80).  There is also an inclusion to suggest 
incentives towards the adoption of preventative 
measures as Article 15 of the 1992 Act states that 
“an indemnification may be reduced or refused if a 
building suffers damage more than once from a 
similar event”.    But it is unclear to what extent 
this clause is ever invoked, leading to a refusal of 
cover or claims not to be paid. 
 
 
 
Key Characteristics: Iceland 
Insurance scheme: Privately administered insurance. 
Types of perils and flooding 
covered by insurance: 
Unknown. 
Optional/compulsory cover: Insurance cover is compulsory. 
Insurance premium 
mechanism: 
Premium is a flat-rate calculated as a percentage of the value insured. 
Risk transfer mechanism: Transferred to government and reinsured on the international market. 
Penetration/ 
coverage of flood insurance: 
Very high (c. 100%). 
Presence of state aid or 
compensation: 
No state compensation. 
Summary: State-backed compulsory insurance scheme. 
Key principles of the recovery system 
Efficiency:  No losses covered if building standards are not met –but these are mostly 
in relation to earthquakes rather than flooding.  
Equity principle: Solidaristic risk-insensitive insurance. 
Robustness of recovery 
system: 
Medium to High – High penetration of cover and guaranteed by the state 
but is limited and losses are adjusted accordingly.  Also aims to manage 
losses for repeated events.  But needs to ensure that premium 
contributions are high enough – at the moment they are not risk 
differentiated. 
  
A1.8 Italy 
Flood insurance in Italy is offered purely by the 
private market although not all insurers offer 
coverage.  For those insurers who do, flood 
insurance (as well as earthquake insurance) is 
offered as an endorsement for an additional 
premium.  Both premiums and deductibles are 
differentiated according to risk (Gaschen et al., 
1998) and only cover direct material damages.  
Additionally, Fiselier and Oosterberg (2004) report 
that there are often exclusions placed upon 
contents located on the ground floor up to a 
certain height (e.g. 20 or 30cm).  These exclusions 
may act as an incentive to take action prior to 
flooding and raise or evacuate belongings; the 
extent to which this is undertaken is however 
uncertain.  Gaschen et al. (1998) also suggest that 
there are quite strict limits on indemnification with 
a maximum of 50% of the sum insured for fire 
being covered.  Penetration of insurance for 
domestic households however, is very low being 
reported in 1998 at only 5% (Gaschen et al., 1998) 
and less than 10% in 2003 (Paklina, 2003).  More 
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recent penetration rates indicate that there is a 
high variation with roughly a north/south divide 
and also a rural urban split; although penetration 
rates are still generally very low.  The South of Italy 
has the lowest penetration averaging less than 0.5% 
whereas the North is considerably higher (ANIA, 
2011). Urban agglomerations in the North have the 
highest insurance penetration rate of c. 7% but 
overall the Northern regions average between 1 to 
5% (ANIA, 2011).  ANIA (2011) report some major 
improvements in the area of flood risk assessment 
and that in total 48% of all Italian communities 
have a degree of flood risk.  This increased 
awareness of the scale of flood risk may 
consequently lead to a greater awareness of the 
need to take out insurance.  However, low uptake 
of insurance is mainly connected to the fact that 
there is state compensation for the damages of 
natural events. 
 
In Italy there is a strong expectation that the 
government will intervene in the case of natural 
disasters with the Italian government reportedly 
contributing €35 billion (c. NZ$ 56 billion) in the 
decade preceding 2006 (Monti and Chiaves, 2006). 
 
State-funded aid following natural disasters is 
provided mainly through enacting emergency 
legislation on a case-by-case basis and is provided 
in an ex-post manner (Monti and Chiaves, 2006).   
They go on to describe the routine procedure 
when the State provides assistance following 
natural catastrophes.  This involves the Regional 
government proposing that a declaration of a state 
of emergency be made which requires approval by 
the National government, the approval of which 
then paves the way for further government 
intervention.   
 
There have been calls to reduce the reliance on 
government aid and proposals for a compulsory 
scheme for disaster insurance.  Indeed, many 
different Reform Bills (notably in 1993, 1999, 2001 
and 2003) proposing the adoption of various 
schemes were introduced and debated within the 
Italian Parliament (Monti and Chiaves, 2006).  
Despite some positive moves none of the Bills 
were passed and agreed.  The most recent attempt 
began in 2012 and involved the creation of a 
system of mandatory cover and the pooling of risks 
from climate change (T. Thaler, pers. Comm.); 
however to date this scheme as not been passed 
and agreed by the Italian Government. 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Characteristics: Italy 
Insurance scheme: Private insurance which is available as an endorsement to household 
policies. 
Types of perils and flooding 
covered by insurance: 
Unknown. 
Optional/compulsory cover: Where insurance is available it is optional. 
Insurance premium 
mechanism: 
Risk-related – therefore flood-risk sensitive flood insurance. 
Risk transfer mechanism: Likely to be anti-selection as very small pool and not bundled. 
Penetration/ 
coverage of flood insurance: 
Low penetration of insurance cover – due to the presence of state 
financial assistance. 
Presence of state aid or 
compensation: 
State financial assistance provided on a case-by-case ad hoc basis. 
Summary: Flood recovery provided mainly through Government assistance. 
Key principles of the recovery system 
Efficiency:  Currently there are few incentives to undertaken mitigation actions. 
Equity principle: Primarily a national solidarity principle due to the state involvement. 
Robustness of recovery 
system: 
Low – Emergency ad hoc compensation does not allow for the advanced 
planning of losses, nor the build up of a reserve.  Also there are few 
limitations on the total amounts. 
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A1.9 The Netherlands 
Flooding is a considerable natural hazard the 
Netherlands with a loss potential from coastal 
flooding (the most significant hazard) estimated at 
€300 billion (CCS, 2008).  However, flooding from 
other sources including extreme rainfall also have 
the potential to cause losses with localised 
flooding in September and October 1998 leading to 
economic damages of €400 million (c. NZ$ 645 
million) (CCS, 2008). 
 
Flooding (from both river and the sea) has been 
excluded from all household insurance policies 
since the 1950s.  CCS (2008) suggests that flooding 
(and earthquake) has been excluded on the basis 
that it would be technically difficult to assess the 
risk and the high potential losses that could be 
experienced.  There is also the situation that in The 
Netherlands there is a large emphasis on flood 
protection; with high protection standards (of 1 in 
10 000 years) which leads to the perceived sense 
of security and a lack of interest in flood insurance 
cover.  This decreases the pool of potential 
customers and leads to concerns over anti-
selection.    
 
However, since 2000, losses due to flooding caused 
by extreme rainfall are covered by household 
policies (Faure and Hartlief, 2006).   This includes 
both precipitation considered to be both ‘direct’ 
with water causing damage as a result of heavy 
rainfall or ‘indirect’ surface water flooding.  Storm 
damage cover (including consequential losses such 
as rainwater damage) is included by virtually all 
insurers for an additional premium of 
approximately €0.15 per thousand of the insured 
value and a deductible of c. €2 per thousand (CCS, 
2008). 
 
There has been a relaxation to the binding 
agreement between insurers not to provide cover 
for riverine floods, in line with complying to EU 
competition regulations (see Section A1), and so 
flood insurance can now be provided by Dutch 
insurers.   There have been some proposals 
suggesting mandating flood insurance cover 
(thereby reducing the chances of adverse selection) 
and other potential solutions to introduce more 
comprehensive flood insurance (Botzen and van 
den Bergh, 2008). On the whole, however, these 
have been unsuccessful in creating widespread 
cover.   This has led to one insurer offering a new 
catastrophe insurance product from 2012 which 
includes insurance cover for flooding2
                                                          
2 http://www.eigenhuis.nl/webwinkel/verzekeringen/catastrofeverzek
ering/ 
.  In this case 
for flooding insurance is bundled into a composite 
package with other risks including the risks of 
earthquakes, a terrorism incident affecting a 
property and damages caused by the explosion of 
World War II bombs.  Insurance is purchased at an 
additional premium cost and provides cover of 
€75,000 (c. NZ$ 120,900) per property.  However, 
insurance penetration for this cover is currently 
very low.  Seifert et al. (2013) argues that this 
product alone will be insufficient to produce 
widespread cover for flooding for a number of 
reasons; the coverage it provides is limited, due to 
a shortage of insurance cover is only available for a 
limited number of households and the premium is 
currently too high to attract customers. 
 
The government does have a system in place to 
provide financial assistance following uninsurable 
natural events; which Faure and Hartlief (2006) 
argues is based upon the Belgian catastrophe fund.  
The Calamities Compensation Act (Wet 
Tegemoetkoming Schade bij Rampen en Zware 
Ongevallen, WTS) (Faure and Hartlief, 2006) was 
passed in 1998 and provides assistance following 
flooding or earthquake loss and generally for 
uninsurable risks.  This is considered to be an ‘ex-
post’ compensation scheme for which no funds are 
collected before the event in a routine way (Seifert 
et al., 2013). The fund has an annual upper limit of 
€450 million (c. NZ$ 725 million); however it 
appears to exclude damages from seawater and 
thereby the greatest loss potential in the 
Netherlands.  It is thought that the scope of 
compensation could be broadened by Royal 
degree if required (Faure and Hartlief, 2006). 
 
Faure and Hartlief (2006) present a number of 
criticisms of the Dutch system; one of the key ones 
is that it fails from an equality perspective as the 
government only intervenes on an ad hoc basis 
and therefore not all victims of natural disasters 
may be treated the same.   Additionally, there is 
uncertainty about the level of compensation that 
victims will receive and the compensation scheme 
lacks incentives for households to undertake 
mitigation and prepare for flooding (Seifert et al., 
2013).  Ultimately, the decision about whether to 
compensate and the scale of the compensation 
depends upon political will (Botzen and van den 
Bergh, 2008). 
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Furthermore, the willingness-to-pay surveys 
conducted by Seifert et al. (2013) indicated that in 
The Netherlands the existence of a government 
compensation scheme was hampering the 
development of a private insurance market.  
Despite this, the results did suggest that many 
homeowners in The Netherlands did have a 
positive willingness-to-pay result for purchasing 
flood insurance; suggesting that there is a market 
for private flood cover in The Netherlands (Seifert 
et al., 2013). 
 
Key Characteristics: The Netherlands 
Insurance scheme:  Private insurance is available for heavy rainfall and surface water 
flooding – included within standard household policies; whereas other 
floods are excluded from cover. 
 There is one insurance company providing an optional product for river 
flooding. 
Types of perils and flooding 
covered by insurance: 
 Heavy rainfall has been covered since 2000 including flooding for surface 
water. 
 River and sea flooding is generally excluded. 
 New single product for river flooding. 
Optional/compulsory cover:  Cover for rainfall is compulsory for properties which have a mortgage. 
 Optional for new river flooding product. 
Insurance premium 
mechanism: 
 Standard policies – bundled with other risks. 
 New river flooding bundled with other perils – but some risk-related 
element and high premiums reported. 
Risk transfer mechanism: Where available bundled with other perils and therefore transferred 
across perils. 
Penetration/ 
coverage of flood insurance: 
 High penetration for other standard policies. 
 Low penetration for other optional products. 
Presence of state aid or 
compensation: 
Compensation is available from the State by currently excludes sea 
flooding – but arguably intervention still operates partly on an ad hoc 
basis. 
Summary: For the most serious flooding hazards – there is no flood insurance and a 
general reliance upon high flood protection standards to try to prevent 
losses.   
Financial assistance is available from the state via the Calamities 
Compensation Act 1998. 
Key principles of the recovery system 
Efficiency:  Few ties and incentives for individual mitigation. 
Equity principle: National solidarity through State compensation – but the main principle is 
also national solidaristic via spending on flood defences. 
Robustness of recovery 
system: 
Medium - losses are spread widely via taxes, but the ex post nature of the 
compensation means that there is little ability to plan and build up 
reserves.  But high defence standards limit the risks in many areas. 
  
A1.10 Norway 
Storms and floods are considered to be the largest 
natural risks in Norway (CCS, 2008).  Similar to a 
number of other countries natural perils insurance 
cover is provided and administered by private 
insurance companies as a mandatory clause within 
all fire insurance policies   This provision is set out 
in law via the 1979 Act on Natural Damage, the Act 
on Insurance Contracts and the special Act on 
Natural Perils Insurance in 1989. These stipulate 
that all property which is insured by fire is also 
covered for natural perils if that property is not 
covered by specific insurance for these hazards.  
Cover for natural perils is provided via the Norsk 
Naturskadepool a national pool run by a council to 
which all private insurers providing fire insurance 
cover belong.  Sea floods are included within this 
policy, but rainfall is one of the exclusions 
suggesting that surface water damages would not 
be covered. 
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The pool provides for losses due to the direct 
damage of both buildings and contents, as well as 
certain aspects of the clean-up costs such as 
demolition, removal of materials, salvage costs and 
temporary storage of properties (Norsk 
Naturskadepool, 2008).  There are also many 
exclusions within this policy, most significantly any 
property in transit, motor vehicles, ships and 
aircrafts and if there is poor maintenance of 
properties which may have exacerbated damages.  
Indemnification covers the repair, replacement or 
reconstruction of the property or contents.  
 
The system is funded by an additional premium 
which is applied to all properties at the universal 
rate of 0.11 per thousand of the sum insured and is 
therefore not risk based (Machetti, 2009).  
Importantly, the pool is a losses (or distribution) 
pool, rather than a premium pool and premiums 
are retained by these private insurance companies 
who are members of the pool.   The pool only acts 
to equalise losses (CEA, 2005). When an event 
occurs, a deductible of NOK 8,000 (c. NZ$ 1,696) is
applied and charged to a policyholder and 
companies then pay the remaining claim and cede 
any losses into the pool.  The total Pool loss from 
the event is shared amongst the members of the 
pool according to their market share; thereby 
spreading the loss amongst all insurers.  If the 
premium accrued by a company is greater than 
that company’s share of the compensation 
payments made through the pool and the claims 
reserve for unsettled claims, then the remaining is 
allocated to a special disaster fund within the 
company for use in the future. Therefore, the 
system benefits greatly from this ability to build up 
a reserve.  
 
The Pool has a total event limit of NOK 12.5 billion 
(c. NZ$ 2.65 billion).  If this amount is exceeded 
then the indemnification is reduced proportionally 
between the overall amount and the total damage 
caused.  There is also an ‘excess of loss’ 
reinsurance programme (CCS, 2008) which offers 
coverage for NOK12.5 billion and which each 
company can be a reinsurer for a part of the 
programme equitable to their share of the pool 
(Norsk Naturskadepool website, 2013). 
 
Key Characteristics: Norway 
Insurance scheme: Private insurance as part of all fire policies – backed by a losses pool 
system. 
Types of perils and flooding 
covered by insurance: 
Unknown. 
Optional/compulsory cover: Compulsory cover for natural perils within the standard household policy – 
but it is unclear whether household insurance itself is compulsory – likely 
to be when tied to mortgages. 
Insurance premium 
mechanism: 
Bundled with other perils with a flat-rate additional premium – calculated 
per thousand insured. 
Risk transfer mechanism: Bundled and therefore subsidised across risks. 
Penetration/ 
coverage of flood insurance: 
Unknown – but due to the compulsory nature of natural perils insurance in 
all household policies it is likely to be medium to high. 
Presence of state aid or 
compensation: 
Compensation is not provided for insurable losses. 
Summary: Compulsory private insurance backed by a loss pool. 
Key principles of the recovery system 
Efficiency:  Claims can be refused (or reduced) where damage is due to poor 
construction or maintenance or where an individual fails to prevent 
damage.  However, there are no other specific requirements on 
mitigation.   Additionally, properties subsequently constructed in known 
risk areas will not be covered. 
Equity principle: Solidaristic and risk-insensitive – all premiums have cover. 
Robustness of recovery 
system: 
Medium to High – insurance is backed by a reinsurance pool which is 
spread across all national risks and there is the ability to increase 
premiums. 
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A1.11 Poland 
The primary recovery mechanisms available in 
Poland is through insurance policies; however 
since 1989 flood insurance has become voluntary 
and Fiselier and Oosterberg (2004) suggest this has 
had a negative impact on penetration. There is 
only an obligation to take out insurance in the 
agriculture sector (Porrini and Schwarze, 2014).   
Recent events such as those in 1997 and 2002 have 
highlighted that little assistance was available from 
the central government and many had to rely on 
charitable donations for any kind of financial 
assistance. The Polish government is able to apply 
for financial assistance from the EU Solidarity Fund 
the extent to which any of these funds would be 
distributed to assist recovery from private 
households is unclear.  Porrini and Schwarze (2014) 
indicate that for floods insurance density is 
between 25 and 50% indicating that there are 
many people who have no means of flood recovery. 
 
The CEA (2005) report that compulsory insurance 
exists for agriculture against natural hazards and 
that compulsory flood insurance for the rest of the 
market was being considered. 
 
Following both the 1997 and 2010 floods the 
government did provide some compensation to 
those affected.   However, this approach appears 
to be enacted on an ad hoc basis and there are few 
formal rules governing this intervention.  It is 
unclear whether the government would again 
intervene in this way and provide compensation 
following future floods.  The intervention in 1997 
and 2010 was prompted by the large scale of the 
floods and the high loss to public property.  It is 
not clear whether individual householders were 
directly compensated or whether most of the 
monies were directed at primarily reinstating 
public infrastructure. 
 
Key Characteristics: Poland 
Insurance scheme: Exclusively a private insurance market. 
Types of perils and flooding 
covered by insurance: 
Unclear. 
Optional/compulsory cover: Optional. 
Insurance premium 
mechanism: 
Unclear how much this is tied to risk. 
Risk transfer mechanism: Low penetration means that there is a high risk of anti-selection. 
Penetration/ 
coverage of flood insurance: 
Low to medium penetration c. 25 to 50%. 
Presence of state aid or 
compensation: 
Some government compensation may be provided on an ad hoc basis 
following large flood events 
Summary: For those with no flood insurance there is the need to rely on charitable 
aid and they are unlikely to receive sufficient compensation to repair 
properties. 
Key principles of the recovery system 
Efficiency:  No tie to mitigation measures mentioned. 
Equity principle: Individualistic. 
Robustness of recovery 
system: 
Low – low penetration means that there is a high chance of anti-selection.  
The State is not overly exposed in terms of requirements to compensate – 
but the lack of a viable system of recovery for individuals will have 
negative economic effects. 
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A1.12 Portugal 
Portugal has a high potential for both fluvial and 
flash flooding, particularly in urban areas. Cover for 
flooding is provided by private insurance 
companies and is included primarily with other 
perils as part of fire policies.  Gaschen et al. (1998) 
reports that penetration is high despite insurance 
not being compulsory or automatic.  This is 
thought to be due to the traditional grouping of 
flood insurance with earthquake insurance – the 
peril which is considered by many (including the 
public) to be the key natural risk and therefore 
encourages people to seek insurance.  Premium 
rates are to cover flood, storm and landslide perils 
range between 0.1 to 0.25 per thousand and a 
deductible is set at around 10% of the loss incurred 
(CEA, 2005). 
  
Key Characteristics: Portugal 
Insurance scheme: Private insurance as part of fire policies. 
Types of perils and flooding 
covered by insurance: 
Unclear. 
Optional/compulsory cover: Optional. 
Insurance premium 
mechanism: 
Bundled with earthquake for an additional premium – calculated as a 
percentage of the sum insured 
Risk transfer mechanism: Subsidised via bundled policies and therefore transferred across risks 
Penetration/ 
coverage of flood insurance: 
High penetration. 
Presence of state aid or 
compensation: 
Unknown. 
Summary: Flood recovery appears to be mainly via private insurance. 
Key principles of the recovery system 
Efficiency:  Unknown. 
Equity principle: Solidaristic risk-insensitive. 
Robustness of recovery 
system: 
Medium - the high penetration means that the system is relatively robust 
– but only if premiums are sufficient in comparison to disaster losses. 
 
 
A1.13 Romania 
The PRAC (Programul Roman de Asigurare la 
Catastrofe) scheme provides coverage for flood (as 
well as landslide and earthquake) and is hailed as a 
simple and inexpensive scheme (CCS, 2008).  It is 
administered by private insurers who collect 
premiums, issue policies (named PAD), assess 
losses and pay claims.  The scheme is compulsory 
and applies only to the property component of 
private households whereby cover is provided on a 
replacement basis; no cover is provided for 
contents.  CCS (2008) describe the two types of 
properties based on their building materials; those 
with reinforced concrete frames, metal or with 
walls of burnt brick or wood and those with walls 
made of burnt brick. The limits of scheme vary 
according to the class of the building with the 
former having a limit of approximately €20,000 (c. 
NZ$ 32,240) and the latter €10,000 (c. NZ$ 16,120); 
although these are annually variable. 
 
The scheme is compulsory and compliance is 
checked by comparing all dwellings in an area with 
a list of policies taken out.  Those who do not take 
out cover are reminded and subsequently may be 
fined.  The central government provides the 
premiums for those who receive social welfare and 
are unable to afford the cover and will thereby act 
as the insurer in these cases. 
 
A company entitled PAID runs the scheme which 
comprises a group of insurers.  The scheme is 
underwritten by a pool formed on the basis of a 
joint stock company whose shareholders are the 
insurers.  Each of the insurers is required to 
contribute to the fund and dividends will be paid 
out if the fund accrues any profits.  A National 
Disaster Fund has been established by PAID to 
finance claims; although the scheme itself is 
reinsured on the international market.  
Additionally, the government commits to covering 
the shortfall if the PAID fund runs short of money 
following major disasters.  However, this scheme 
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will replace any other governmental assistance and 
none will be paid out to private households. CCS 
(2008) describes the PRAC scheme as being an 
interesting international example due to the 
centrality of the insurance industry to the scheme 
and the lack of intervention of the government in 
the running and governing of the approach.  They 
also suggest that some insurers will use the access 
to customers as an opportunity to up-sell 
insurance cover for other perils such as fire.
There are some limits on the scheme as policies 
are provided on an annual aggregate basis (CCS, 
2008).  This means that there is some guarding 
against repeated claims as the total to which a 
dwelling is insured is reduced by the amount of 
any claims paid in the same year.  This provides an 
incentive for homeowners to take out mitigation 
measures as they will recognise that they will not 
be compensated to the same degree.  However, 
this is likely to only be effective for the very  
highest risk areas which will be subjected to very 
frequent floods.   
 
 
 
A1.14 Spain 
In Spain there is a legal obligation to insure 
property against damages from natural perils 
(Porrini and Schwarze, 2014). Natural hazards are 
insurable via the Consorcio de Compensacion de 
seguros (Insurance Compensation Consortium) and 
some types of flooding are included within this.  
The Consorcio de Compensacion de seguros 
originally acted as a monopoly until 1991, when 
private insurers were also able to offer natural 
perils insurance.  Insurance is still provided by the 
Consortium however and cover for “extraordinary” 
risks (natural perils and other social risks including 
terrorism) are included as standard.   The 
Consortium is a public corporation, however it has 
its own assets and its activities are subject to 
private law and it subject to the same restrictions 
and laws as other insurance companies (CCS, 2008).  
Cover for natural perils is compulsory and included 
automatically in all household buildings and 
contents policies as well as for life insurance and 
personal accident.  Cover is administered by 
private insurance companies who collect the 
premiums for which there is an additional cost 
(Porrini and Schwarze, 2014).    
 
The CCS assumes cover for the extraordinary risks 
on a subsidiary basis and will pay indemnifications 
when there is no cover expressly assumed within a 
policy issued by a private insurer or when a private 
insurer has assumed cover and it subsequently not 
Key Characteristics: Romania 
Insurance scheme: Privately administrated insurance backed by an industry-run pool. 
Types of perils and flooding 
covered by insurance: 
Unknown. 
Optional/compulsory cover: Compulsory for buildings.  
Insurance premium 
mechanism: 
Unknown. 
Risk transfer mechanism: Bundled and therefore subsidised across risks. 
Penetration/ 
coverage of flood insurance: 
High penetration. 
Presence of state aid or 
compensation: 
Unknown if there is government compensation – but the government 
assists those on social welfare by providing insurance cover. 
Summary: Private insurance for natural hazards with a backing-pool; but with 
government intervention for those who cannot afford insurance. 
Key principles of the recovery system 
Efficiency:  Level of indemnification is linked to building type. It is also an annually-
limited scheme to avoid repeated losses and therefore may encourage 
mitigation for high risks. 
Equity principle: Solidaristic across those insured. 
Robustness of recovery 
system: 
High to Medium –Clearly planning for losses through the pool.  The 
scheme has upper limits on the indemnification; thereby limiting losses.  
Also annually-limited reducing exposure to repeated loss. 
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able to settle claims (e.g. through bankruptcy). It 
effectively acts as the reinsurance cover for natural 
perils insurance. It is funded via a surcharge on 
every insurance policy and a fixed percentage of 
every premium contracted by insurance companies 
is paid to the organisation (Auffret, 2003).  
Importantly, the surcharge must be paid on all 
household policies irrespective of whether a policy 
provided by a private insurer actually includes 
cover for natural perils. Therefore all of those 
insured contribute to funding natural disaster 
recovery spreading the risks geographically, 
temporally and across risks (CCS, 2008) and 
thereby avoids adverse selection.  For household 
insurance the surcharge to be paid to the 
Consortium is 0.09 per thousand (CEA, 2005) which 
are collected as part of the normal premium and 
then ceded to the Consortium each month, minus 
a 5% collection and administration fee which the 
insurance company retains (CCS, 2008).   
 
Those events covered need to be ‘extraordinary’ in 
nature and are legally defined based principally on 
the frequency and intensity of the peril; rather 
than the loss experienced (CCS, 2008). This has the 
benefit of equity of cover as “even if an event only 
affects a single insured, that insured, 
independently of the extent of the damage, will be 
entitled to compensation” (CCS, 2008; 141).  As 
there is already clear guidelines about what is 
covered, those insured can be confident about the 
terms of their coverage and there is no need for a 
disaster to be declared.  For the purposes of cover 
floods are considered to be “the inundation of the 
terrain caused by rainfall or melt water, by water 
from lakes with a natural outlet, from estuaries or 
rivers, or from natural watercourses on the surface 
whenever they overflow their normal channels” 
(CCS, 2008; 141).  Additionally, flooding from the 
sea is also included.  Damages caused by heavy 
rain falling directly on the property are excluded 
from the definition of flood as are any damages 
caused by dam break or the inadequacy of sewers 
or a property’s drainage network.   There are also 
exclusions based on the need for effective 
maintenance of properties or due to defects with 
the property’s construction. 
 
Generally, claims will be made directly to the 
insurer and a deductible is applicable if damages 
are covered by the Consortium which for property 
losses is in the order of 7% of the value of the 
insured damages (CCS, 2008). The Consortium is 
required to establish an equalisation reserve which 
is cumulative and exempt from taxes.  This allows 
funds to be reserved and accumulated across years 
to be able to cover the more infrequent larger 
events.  Auffret (2003) argues that the current 
system in Spain means that penetration of 
insurance is high and that securing insurance 
against flooding is relatively straightforward.  
Porrini and Schwarze (2014) suggest that 
penetration varies between sectors (e.g. buildings, 
contents, life etc.) however it reaches as high as 
80%.  It can also be considered to be a guaranteed 
system which protects the insurance industry from 
excessive losses (D. Perez, pers. comm.).  Machetti 
(2009) highlights that one of the unique aspects of 
the Spanish system is that it does not use risk 
transfer tools towards third parties (i.e. there is no 
international reinsurance) all of the risk is held 
nationally. 
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A1.15 Sweden 
Nyquist and Persson (2006) stress the need for 
Swedish citizens to rely upon private insurance to 
recover from damages from natural events.  They 
argue that although voluntary, insurance is 
widespread and that most people have some kind 
of insurance to provide cover for property 
damages; including general household policies as 
well as additional insurance products.  As in many 
countries insurance in Sweden is divided into 
buildings and contents insurance with over 95% of 
the population having coverage for their properties 
(Svensk Forsakring, 2013).  Most policies are 
composite in nature and bundle many different 
perils together. Standard policies will generally 
have some coverage for flooding that has flowed in 
from the ground's surface through for example a 
doorway or window, or made its way up a sewer; 
water damage which penetrates through the walls 
as a result of faulty drainage is not insured. If flood 
insurance is provided for water damage which has 
been caused by heavy rains, snow melt or from 
water from a rising lake or watercourse (S. Goytia, 
pers. comm.).However, there may also be relevant 
exclusions.  Nyquist and Persson (2006) provide an 
example of “damage due to flooding because of 
the failure to build a barrage” and thereby 
mitigation measures are encouraged.  
 
A relatively high deductible is usually charged; 10% 
of the damages (but with a minimum of SEK10, 000 
(NZ$ 1,882) (Konsumenternas website, 2012).  
Although in a formal sense there is no State 
compensation for the damages from flooding, 
financial compensation may be provided to 
property owners if the municipality is in some way 
responsible for the damages.  An example of this 
may be if a municipal sewerage system was unable 
to cope with all of the rainwater (S. Goytia, pers. 
comm.) however the extent of the liability of a 
municipality for extreme events is unclear and in 
the first instance property owners should seek to 
claim from their insurance policies.  
 
There is no generalised compensation system for 
recompense under Swedish Law and therefore 
victims of catastrophes will be required to apply to 
the Social services and insurance system to get 
assistance for their basic needs (Nyquist and 
Persson, 2006). 
 
Key Characteristics: Spain 
Insurance scheme: State-backed insurance system. 
Types of perils and flooding 
covered by insurance: 
Unknown. 
Optional/compulsory cover: It is a compulsory element of all household policies.  
Insurance premium 
mechanism: 
An additional premium on all policies – but this is at a flat-rate calculated 
as a percentage of the sum insured. 
Risk transfer mechanism: Subsidised across all risks via a bundled policy. 
Penetration/ 
coverage of flood insurance: 
High penetration.  
Presence of state aid or 
compensation: 
No. 
Summary: Recovery is via the state- guaranteed system. 
Key principles of the recovery system 
Efficiency:  Unknown for flood – but building codes are in use but not clear if these 
relate to flooding. 
Equity principle: Solidaristic. 
Robustness of recovery 
system: 
High – there is a high spreading of the risks via bundling and also high 
penetration.  The pooling system permits planning for losses, collection of 
the levy on all policies and also a state-guarantee.  But all of the losses are 
held nationally and if many natural events occur it may expose Spain to 
high losses. 
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A1.16 Switzerland 
Flooding causes the most material damages of all 
of the natural perils suffered in Switzerland (CCS, 
2008) and in the last 40 years has accounted for 71% 
of the natural perils claims (Hausmann et al., 2012). 
Similar to a number of other countries, household 
fire policies are the mechanism by which 
households are covered for flooding.  All insurers 
offering fire cover are required to provide natural 
perils insurance under the Swiss Federal Council 
Order on the Supervision of Private Insurance 
companies (2005); with Article 173 mandating that 
flood and storm cover be included.  However, 
there is a dual system of flood insurance provision 
in Switzerland: with insurance provided by single 
Canton insurers in 19 of the Cantons and private 
insurance available in the remaining eight 
GUSTAVO cantons (CCS, 2008).  Additionally, 
buildings contents insurance is only available via 
private insurers across all of Switzerland (except 
for in Vaud and Nidwalden). 
 
Cantonal Buildings Insurers (CBIs) provide the 
cover in the former of these situations; however 
the specific terms of the insurance varies between 
Cantons. However in general, premiums are fixed 
for all natural perils and are not risk-related.  In the 
19 Cantons where there is this type of insurance, 
property owners are legally obliged to take out 
natural perils insurance (including flooding) for 
their building structure (Hausmann et al., 2012) 
and therefore penetration is high (at almost 100%) 
(Gaschen et al., 1998). When claims occur, 
indemnities are provided at new value (provided 
that the real value of the asset is greater than 50% 
of the indemnified value) and there are some 
funds available for demolition and repair.   
 
Deductibles are conditions of the policies of all of 
the Cantons but the terms and conditions of these 
vary considerably including; ranging between 10 
and 15% of damages to properties (with a 
minimum of CHF 200 and a maximum of CHF 2,000 
(between c. NZ$ 259 and NZ$ 2,592) (CCS, 2008).  
Canton building insurers take out loss excess 
reinsurance through the Intercantonal Reinsurance 
Union (IRV) (CCS, 2008).  Due to the quasi-State 
nature of the IRV, reinsurance operates on a 
“‘solidarity-based’ distribution of risks, focussed on 
the Intercantonal Community for Risks from 
Natural Elements (IRG)” (CCS, 2008; 150) and 
provides cover of up to CHF 750 million (NZ$ 972 
million).  If the IRG needs to be invoked the canton 
insurers are then required to contribute to the 
fund to spread the risks depending upon the 
capital insured; therefore the approach is 
considered to be a system of reciprocal 
Key Characteristics: Sweden 
Insurance scheme: Bundled insurance via the private market. 
Types of perils and flooding 
covered by insurance: 
Flooding directly to the property from rivers or other watercourses, heavy 
rainfall or snowmelt. 
Optional/compulsory cover: Household insurance is optional. 
 
Insurance premium 
mechanism: 
No additional premium for flooding – bundled policies. 
Risk transfer mechanism: Risk is transferred via spreading across all risks in the bundled system – 
spread further by reinsurance. 
Penetration/ 
coverage of flood insurance: 
Very high coverage – 95%  
Presence of state aid or 
compensation: 
None. 
Summary: Recovery from flooding is almost exclusively based on the purchase of 
insurance from the private insurance market. 
Key principles of the recovery system 
Efficiency:  Unknown.  
Equity principle: Solidaristic, risk-insensitive insurance but was aiming to move towards 
higher premiums for those at greater risk and therefore individualist, risk-
sensitive insurance. 
Robustness of recovery 
system: 
Medium – The system should be relatively robust depending upon the 
balance between premium income and claims. 
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contribution obligations (i.e. with no premium 
collection) (Machetti, 2009). 
 
The second type of flood insurance cover for 
buildings is provided by the private market in the 
other eight GUSTAVO cantons; Geneva, Uri, 
Schwyz, Ticino, Appenzell Innerrhoden, Valais and 
Obwalden) (Hausmann et al., 2012).  Household 
premiums for this insurance (as well as for 
contents) are at a flat rate (i.e. not risk related) and 
in 2008 were calculated as 0.21 per thousand of 
the insured amount for domestic contents and 
0.46 per thousand for buildings (CCS, 2008).  
Deductibles for domestic contents are similar to 
the Canton buildings insurance at CHF 500 and 10% 
of damages for domestic buildings (with a 
minimum of CHF1000 and a maximum of CHF10, 
000). 
 
For natural hazards cover, private insurers retain 
20% of losses with the remaining 80% being ceded 
to the Schweizer Elementarschaden-Pool (Swiss
                                                          
3The split in some of the cells the left hand column reflects the dual 
nature of the insurance system.  Where there is a split the Cantonal 
Insurers is described first, before the private insurance in the 
GUSTAVO cantons. 
 Natural Hazards Pool).  This entity acts as a claim 
Pool whereby 80% of insured losses are recovered 
by insurers from this pool which is reinsured 
externally; the remaining 20% of losses are 
redistributed proportionally across all of the Pool 
members according to their market share.  Some 
insurers may choose to reinsurer their remaining 
20% on an individual basis (CCS, 2008).   
 
In addition to insurance for flooding, there is also a 
Swiss Fund for Aid for Non-Insurable Damage 
caused by Natural Hazards which was created in 
1903.  This is a private institution which provides 
aid for damage for uninsurable and unforeseeable 
natural events.  Monies are generated for the fund 
by donations, income generated by management 
of its assets and a percentage of the takings of 
gaming houses (CCS, 2008).  It is not clear however, 
whether any financial assistance has been 
provided for flooding as in the most part this 
should be considered to be an insurable risk.
Key Characteristics: Switzerland3 
Insurance scheme: Cantonal insurance. Private insurance system in 
GUSTAVO. 
Types of perils and flooding 
covered by insurance: 
Varies by policy. 
Optional/compulsory cover: Compulsory part of building cover. 
Insurance premium 
mechanism: 
Generally are fixed and not risk 
related. 
Additional premium at a flat-rate – 
based on a percentage of the sum 
insured 
Risk transfer mechanism: Bundled and subsidised across risks. 
Penetration/ 
coverage of flood insurance: 
Generally high – almost 100%. 
Presence of state aid or 
compensation: 
Privately-funded compensation fund but is not for insurable risks 
Summary: A duel system of insurance backed by a pool system or reinsured via the 
IRV. 
Key principles of the recovery system 
Efficiency:  Unknown – there is the existence of building codes but these are likely to 
be related to earthquake risk. 
Equity principle: Solidaristic. 
Robustness of recovery 
system: 
High to Medium – a system with high penetration and a reserve pool to 
spread losses.  Should be very resilient if premiums are high enough.  
These are not risk-reflective however. 
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A1.17 Turkey 
Following the devastating earthquake in Marmara 
in 1999, the World Bank assisted the Turkish 
Government in establishing the Turkish 
Compulsory Insurance Pool (TCIP) (OECD, 2004).  
The insurance system was created to provide cover 
and compensation for material damages from 
earthquakes, as well as enabling the spreading of 
the financial burden within Turkey and onto the 
international reinsurance market and use 
insurance as a mechanism for incentivising the 
better construction of houses.  Insurance policies 
are wholly administered by private insurers 
although the TCIP ultimately bears the risk.   In 
2001 earthquake insurance become compulsory 
for a range of buildings and dwellings on privately-
owned land are included; but importantly 
dwellings in residential areas of villages are 
excluded from the compulsory cover.  This is due 
to the difficulty in regulating building construction 
standards and the low incomes of these dwellers; 
they are however still able to participate and can 
optionally choose to purchase insurance cover  
 
 
(CCS, 2008).  Properties can be insured up to a 
total amount of NTL 110 000 (c. NZ$ 72,650) and 
premiums are altered and are partly-based upon 
the earthquake insurance risk, the size of the 
property and the type of construction.  Premiums 
therefore range between 0.44 ‰ for strongly-
constructed properties in the lowest risk zone to 
5.5 ‰ for properties with weaker construction in 
high risk zones (CCS, 2008). 
 
The TCIP is a first loss policy and losses are 
calculated based on the new construction value 
with a deductible of the 2% of the total insurance 
amount (CCS, 2008).  Critiques of the approach 
claim that the approach has not yet solved moral 
hazard issues, that risk-related premiums are 
falling short of their necessary value and that 
deductibles are still too low (OECD, 2004).  In 2004, 
insurance penetration had only reached around 26% 
despite the compulsory nature of the cover; too 
few dwellings are mandated to take out insurance 
(OECD, 2004).  However, there is a condition that if 
a household is not registered with the insurance 
system there are restrictions on accessing water, 
electricity and gas services which is aiming to 
increase the numbers participating in the 
insurance system (F. Atun, pers. comm.). 
 
The TCIP is an example of a framework for the 
insurance of natural perils. However, the 
associated Act makes no mention of flooding; 
however it does supposedly cover the indirect 
impacts of an earthquake.  The Act mentions that 
this includes fire, explosion, tsunami and landslide 
and therefore it is possible that some indirect 
water-related damages stemming from an 
earthquake may also be covered. 
 
 
 
Key Characteristics: Turkey 
Insurance scheme: Government established Turkish Compulsory Insurance pool. 
Types of perils and flooding 
covered by insurance: 
Possible that some earthquake related flood risks are included. 
Optional/compulsory cover: n/a. 
Insurance premium 
mechanism: 
n/a. 
Risk transfer mechanism: n/a. 
Penetration/ 
coverage of flood insurance: 
n/a. 
Presence of state aid or 
compensation: 
Not for flooding. 
Summary: Generally flooding is not included – but there is now a framework for 
insurance and so it would be possible to extend it to include flood. 
Key principles of the recovery system 
Efficiency:  n/a. 
Equity principle: n/a. 
Robustness of recovery 
system: 
n/a. 
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A1.18 United Kingdom 
There is a long tradition of flood insurance in the 
United Kingdom.  Flood insurance cover has been 
available as part of composite household policies 
since 1922 and total loss insurance was offered 
from 1929 (Arnell et al., 1984).   Cover has always 
been provided by private insurers with arguably 
little government involvement.  However, in the 
early days of flood insurance cover was optional 
and market penetration low (Arnell et al., 1984) 
suggested that it was as little as 10% in some 
events in the 1960s).  Repeated flooding in the 
1940s, 1950s and 1960s and the necessity of 
government to provide funds to assist the recovery 
of those affected, raised concerns that this 
assistance would become normalised, would be 
unaffordable and was deterring the purchase of 
flood insurance.  In the early 1960s there was 
some suggestion in Government that reforms were 
needed and additional regulation was required.  
This led to what was known as the Gentleman’s 
Agreement between the UK government and 
insurers, set out in a Memorandum on flood cover 
to be provided by the private insurance market. It 
was issued by the British Insurance Association and 
the Fire Officers Committee (the predecessors of 
the Association of British Insurers (ABI)) in which 
insurers provided the following reassurance to HM 
Government: 
 
“Insurers...are prepared, on request, to provide 
Flood cover at reasonable rates for the contents 
of all private dwellings (including farm 
dwellings) which are permanently occupied
 Provided by the private insurance market 
.  Such 
cover will normally be granted only in conjunction 
with cover against Fire, and the Insurers may find it 
necessary to require that Storm and Tempest cover 
is also effected.  In the case of swellings vulnerable 
to flood the additional rate for Flood cover would 
not normally exceed 10/-d% and the insurance 
would be subject to a small excess.” 
Source: BIA/FOC (1961) 
 
Additionally, over the next decade or more both 
insurers and the government tried to raise the 
profile of flood insurance (through national 
campaigns) and increase market penetration.  This 
ultimately led in the 1970s to flood insurance 
becoming a compulsory peril for all properties 
which were secured with a mortgage.   
 
Fundamentally, flood insurance in the UK has 
existed on the same principles ever since.  Flood 
insurance is: 
 
 Available as part of a composite household 
policy (e.g. with fire, theft, other natural perils) 
 Available within these bundled policies on both 
contents and household insurance 
 Insurance is available for direct damage to 
business and business disruption – mostly as 
part of composite policies. 
 In general, the flood insurance component of 
the cover is cross-subsided across the other 
perils within a policy. 
 
The Gentleman’s Agreement between the UK 
government and the flood insurance industry 
enjoyed a long period of relative stability until 
following the 2000 floods.  Following this, a series 
of evolving Statements of Principles were issued by 
the Association of British Insurers (ABI) in 2001, 
2003, 2006 and 2009 which aimed to redefine the 
relationship between insurers and UK government 
and reemphasise the need for effective flood 
management (ABI, 2001; 2002; 2005; 2008).  These 
agreements aimed to ensure the UK government 
committed and resourced certain key features of 
flood management and in return insurers would 
continue to provide flood insurance to the majority.  
The main management measures featured: 
 
 Increased funding for flood defences. At least 
£145 million (c. NZ$ 273 million) more per year 
is needed to enable flood defences to be 
strengthened to meet minimum standards and 
new defences to be built to protect vulnerable 
areas. 
 Tighter planning controls. The ABI supports 
Government efforts to reduce building on 
floodplains and to improve the protection of 
developments that do take place. 
 The maintenance, planning and execution of 
flood defences in vulnerable areas needs to be 
improved. Existing arrangements are far too 
complex and lead to huge regional 
discrepancies and unnecessary delays. 
 
The agreements also had conditions which aimed 
to limit the exposure (of insurers in particular in 
high-risk areas and those repeatedly affected) 
including: 
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 A statement about acceptable levels of risk and 
through which they divided requirements into: 
a. areas of 1 in 75 or less (cover available as a 
standard feature of household) 
b. areas of significant flood risk 1 in 75 or more 
and where improved defences are planned 
within 5 years (cover available as a standard 
feature of household) and 
c. areas of significant flood risk where no 
improved defences are planned (insurers 
cannot guarantee to continue cover). 
 Exclusion of newly built property and a specific 
clause that the Statement of Principles does not 
apply to any new property built after 1 January 
2009” 
 The premiums charged and other terms - such 
as excesses - will reflect the risk of flooding but 
will be offered in a competitive market. 
 
Despite these terms, there was an increasing 
recognition amongst insurers with business in the 
UK that premiums were too low and not reflecting 
the risk.  Although general underwriting principles 
have been enshrined even from the initial 1960s 
Gentleman’s Agreement as those who were at the 
highest risk were meant to pay a modest increase 
in premium.  Subsequent agreements maintained 
this provision that those at the very highest risk 
should pay more.   
 
Despite these caveats, and the reiteration in the 
Statements of Principles that risk-reflective pricing 
was necessary to make cover robust and efficient 
coupled with improvements in technology making 
the pricing of risk better and more cost-effective, 
in reality there was very little pricing difference 
between high and low risk properties (Lamond et 
al., 2009).  Recent flood events have led to some 
increases in premiums in high risk areas (for those 
who have been flooded) leading to affordability 
issues and anecdotal evidence of unavailability.  
However, on the whole evidence suggests that the 
flood insurance component of policies is under-
priced; this is primarily due to the high 
competitiveness of the UK insurance market (Defra, 
2012).   In 2010, the ABI reported that 78% of 
those at significant flood risk have lower premiums 
than they should if the price properly reflected the 
risk and on average these properties were under-
priced by 165% or £430 (c. NZ$ 810) (ABI, 2010).   
 
This - amongst alongside other drivers - including 
the need to comply with Solvency II, repeated 
large claims, concern about how climate change 
may affect their exposure and a better 
understanding of their exposure to surface water 
flooding – has led to the insurers ending the 
Statement of Principles in Summer 2013 and 
moves towards the introduction of a new system 
of insurance. Currently, insurance penetration is 
quite high.  In 2010, 75% of properties had 
household contents insurance and 63% of 
properties has structural insurance (ABI, 2012). 
 
Huber and Amodu (2006) argue that although 
there are no government compensation funds in 
the UK for insurable risks and therefore to provide 
financial assistance, private insurance depends 
upon the state in two ways:  insurance provision 
relies upon a certain level of flood protection and 
that the state has to guarantee the independence 
of the compensation-regime.  The balance 
between public and private intervention is 
changing with the recent announcement (June 
2013) of a new system of insurance coverage in the 
UK and a greater involvement of Government. 
 
Currently, there are few incentives (either as a 
requirement or financial) from an insurance 
perspective to mitigate against flood risk (Lamond 
et al., 2009) and there appears currently to be a 
weak link between flood risk reduction and 
premium reductions (Penning-Rowsell and Pardoe, 
2012a). 
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New system of insurance in the United Kingdom – 
the system post-Summer 2015 
A proposal for a new system of insurance within 
the United Kingdom was announced in late-June 
2013.  The proposal is currently undergoing a very 
short period of consultation (6 weeks) and requires 
new legal arrangements to be included within the 
draft Water Bill (UK Government, 2013).  The 
proposal is based upon the establishment of ‘Flood 
Re’ which is a pool-backed system whereby 
premiums for properties at high-flood risk will be 
capped and subsidised by the pool (Defra, 2013a).   
There will be some differentiation of premium cap, 
but this appears to relate only to the size of the 
property (and is administered via council tax band).  
 
The new approach will maintain insurability by 
spreading the higher risks across all household 
policies and geographically; rather than merely 
within individual insurers.  Defra (2013a) provides 
a table which indicates some projected end prices 
for household insurance and indicates the level of 
subsidy that would be provided by the pool for the 
high-risk properties (Table A2).  As part of the new 
approach premiums are set to rise and be more 
risk related. They are considered to be 20 to 25% 
higher than the current premiums being paid 
(Defra, 2013a); but Table A2indicates this is 
considerably less than might be the case. The 
Flood Re pool will essentially act as a reinsurance 
or claims pool from which insurers will be allowed 
to draw upon to settle claims (or a proportion of 
the claims) from properties at high flood risk for 
which they do not achieve an adequate premium.  
The premiums (and therefore any subsequent 
claims) are subsidised by a levy payable by insurers 
at an annual rate of around £180 million (c. 
NZ$ 340 million) for each of the first five years 
(Defra, 2013a) although this is set to be 
renegotiated after this initial five year period (ABI, 
2013).  This will be passed on to every household 
insurance customer through a cross-subsidy; which 
is roughly in the order of £10.50 (c. NZ$ 19.75) for 
each policy with buildings and contents insurance 
Key Characteristics: United Kingdom – System prior to Summer 2015 
Insurance scheme: Bundled insurance via the private market. 
Types of perils and flooding 
covered by insurance: 
All types of flooding are included within standard policies. 
Optional/compulsory cover:  Buildings insurance is compulsory with a mortgage loan. 
 Contents cover is optional. 
Insurance premium 
mechanism: 
Premiums are cross-subsided by its composite nature. 
 
Also has reinsurance. 
Risk transfer mechanism: Risk is transferred via spreading across all risks in the bundled system. 
Penetration/ 
coverage of flood insurance: 
Quite high – estimates vary but for buildings it is in the range 60 to 65% 
and for contents 75%. 
Presence of state aid or 
compensation: 
None. 
Summary: Recovery from flooding is entirely based upon the purchase of insurance 
from the private insurance market. 
Key principles of the recovery system 
Efficiency:  The insurance industry exerts pressure on the government to better 
manage flood risk. 
 
There is some pressure on high risk properties to try to minimise their risks 
for insurance to be available – however there is little evidence to suggest 
whether there would be a premium reduction if measures were 
implemented. 
Equity principle: Solidaristic, risk-insensitive insurance but was aiming to move towards 
higher premiums for those at greater risk and therefore individualist, risk-
sensitive insurance. 
Robustness of recovery 
system: 
Medium – Large losses and inadequate premiums have called into 
question the economic viability of the insurance system – also a higher 
awareness by insurers of the loss potential. 
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(Defra, 2013a).  Defra (2013a) suggest that this 
new system is only a formalisation of the current 
way in which all the composite insurance cross-
subsidises higher risk and that the that the price of 
insurance should not be significantly increased for 
the majority.    
 
Despite the pool being set up, owned and 
managed by the insurance industry as a not-for-
profit entity, as the levy is payable on all insurance 
policies some of the funding may be classified as a 
tax and therefore the status of the pool is to date 
undecided.  If there are some elements of tax (and 
therefore essentially public resources) these might 
need to have a higher degree of accounting and 
transparency and therefore the pool might need to 
be classified as part of the public, rather than the 
private sector (ABI, 2013); this will be resolved as 
part of the draft Water Bill (UK Government, 2013) 
and the consultation about the Flood Re proposal 
(Defra, 2013b). 
 
 
 
Table A2:    Projected end prices to high-risk policyholders for a combined buildings/contents policy 
 
 
ABI (2013) also indicate that the overall liability of 
the pool will be limited.  “Flood Re’s aggregate 
annual liability collectively to insurers would be 
capped at a monetary level equivalent to a 1:200 
year loss” which at current modelling and prices 
suggest an amount of £2.5 billion (c. NZ$ 4.7 billion) 
(ABI, 2013; 2).  Above these losses the ABI want 
the UK Government to take primary responsibility 
who should work with Flood Re and the rest of the 
insurance industry to decide how to allocate 
available resources. However, from a negative 
perspective there appears to be no provision in the 
new system for directly encouraging the uptake of 
mitigation, nor limiting the access to the pool for 
those who suffer repeated claims.  Newly built 
properties (those built after 2009) are excluded 
from receiving the premium cap and benefitting 
from the pool as well as any non-residential 
properties. 
 
The full details of the proposal are still not 
completely available and there is of course 
uncertainty about how it will work in practice; 
there are many governance and administrative 
issues to consider and decide.  There may also be 
some concern that it may not be possible to 
achieve all of the advantages of the new flood 
insurance scheme solely via the private market.  
Defra (2013a) argues that the draft Water Bill (UK 
Government, 2013) contains additional powers for 
the Secretary of State so that the government has 
the legal power to intervene if the proposal is 
unable to work as intended to ensure that flood 
risk remains universally available at an affordable 
price.  Additionally, the Water Bill will legalise and 
ensure the levy is paid by all those participating in 
the home insurance market (ABI, 2013). 
 
There are many elements of the insurance scheme 
still to be confirmed; not least the requirement for 
the system to gain State Aid approval from the EU.  
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This approval is required to ensure that the any 
new system does not distort the market and 
competition within the EU (European Commission 
website, 2012).  It is thought that this new scheme 
will not be available for roll-out until summer 2015: 
in the interim the current Statement of Principles 
(ABI, 2008) will be maintained and extended (ABI, 
2013). 
 
The proposal includes some transitional 
arrangements and suggests that there will be a 
gradual rising of premiums and that the maximum 
cap will be increased year-on-year in the first 
instance so that households can adjust more easily 
to raising premiums: and may also take action to 
reduce their flood risk.  Additionally, this is also 
considered to be an interim measure and is only 
intended to last for the next 20 to 25 years as 
mechanism to allow additional time for other 
choices to be made (Defra, 2013a) when the 
benefits for high flood risk households will be 
phased out (ABI, 2013) and a longer transition into 
what is likely to be a more risk-related system. 
 
 
 
 
Key Characteristics:  United Kingdom – System post-Summer 2015 
Insurance scheme: Private insurance backed by an insurance-industry pool. 
Types of perils and flooding 
covered by insurance: 
Likely to be similar terms to the existing approach - All types of flooding 
are included within standard policies. 
Optional/compulsory cover:  Buildings insurance is compulsory with a mortgage loan. 
 Contents cover is optional. 
Insurance premium 
mechanism: 
A formalised cross-subsidy at a flat-rate for all policies but reports indicate 
that across the board premiums should not significantly increase. 
Risk transfer mechanism: Bundled across risks and the presence of the flood pooling the higher risks 
and spreading across all household policyholders. 
Penetration/ 
coverage of flood insurance: 
Penetration should remain high as it will still be compulsory - however 
premiums will rise and therefore there may be many more people where 
affordability may be an issue. 
Presence of state aid or 
compensation: 
No. 
Summary: A private-system will remain but backed by an industry-run, not-for-profit 
pool 
Key principles of the recovery system 
Efficiency:  It is unclear if mitigation will result – but if greater flood-risk reflective 
pricing results then there would certainly be the incentive.  Newly built 
property (since 2009) is excluded. 
Equity principle: Solidaristic, risk-insensitive insurance – however through a formalised levy 
mechanism than previously.  There is a move towards a risk-sensitive 
approach through the adoption of higher premiums and a greater 
reflection of risk in the pricing. 
Robustness of recovery 
system: 
Medium to High – in principle this system should be more robust than the 
current system as it permits the collection of a reserve pool to meet 
claims; thereby spreading the risk more widely between all policyholders 
(rather than just within companies as it was before).  Additionally, there 
are greater ties between risk and premium value.  However, it will be 
necessary to ensure that the levy and the cap are at the right level to 
ensure an appropriate balance between claims and premiums. 
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A2 The Americas 
A2.1 Argentina 
There is very low penetration of flood insurance in 
Argentina and in general insurance companies 
rarely provide flood insurance for properties.  
Where insurance is offered it is in the main by 
private insurance companies as an addition to fire 
insurance policies for domestic policies (and as a 
separate policy for commercial risks).  Currently, 
there is very low market penetration and as cover 
for flooding is voluntary few households have 
purchased this product (S. Goytia, pers. 
comm.).There is high loss potential from flooding 
in the large cities (in particular in Buenos Aires) 
which could amount to several million US dollars.  
Gaschen et al. (1998) indicate that they believe 
that flooding is the most important natural hazard 
in Argentina and that as economic development 
increases in the country, so will the demand for 
flood insurance.  It is however very difficult for 
insurance companies to accurately price flood 
products as data for risk assessment is deficient 
and therefore few insurance companies offer cover. 
 
Similar to many other countries if there is evidence 
that damages were caused by some action or 
inaction by the state, then they would be liable to 
pay some compensation (S. Goytia, pers. comm.).  
However, it is unclear the extent to which this is 
undertaken in practice.   In some locations some 
financial assistance is provided to residents to 
recover from flooding.  For instance, in Buenos 
Aires the city council offers grants of up to a 
maximum of US$ 20 000 (c. NZ$ 24,720), tax 
exemptions and also more favourable lending rates 
(Buenos Aires Ciudad website, 2013).  However, 
the regulations state that the taking of any 
assistance implies the resignation of any other 
legal action or claim against the city for the same 
flooding; a stipulation which has raised some 
criticism (S. Goytia, pers. comm.). 
 
 
 
A2.2 Brazil  
Brazil has a high loss potential from flooding which 
is likely to increase due to further economic 
development and climate change.  Average annual 
economic losses in Brazil are in the order of 
US$ 1.4 billion (c. NZ$ 1.7 billion) with estimated 
damages of up to US$ 14 billion (c. NZ$ 17.3 billion) 
for a 1 in 100 year event (Sprissler, 2011).  Sprissler 
(2011) goes on to estimate that 17% of the 
population (or 33.3 million people) are living in 
areas at risk of flooding. 
 
Insurance is available in Brazil, provided via private 
companies and is flood automatically covered as 
part of a composite household buildings and 
contents insurance policy.  However, flood damage 
from direct rainfall is excluded and all flooding is 
Key Characteristics: Argentina 
Insurance scheme: Private insurance where available. 
Types of perils and flooding 
covered by insurance: 
Generally no flooding is covered. 
Optional/compulsory cover: Optional. 
Insurance premium 
mechanism: 
Unknown. 
Risk transfer mechanism: Where available is bundled and transferred between risks. 
Penetration/ 
coverage of flood insurance: 
Low. 
Presence of state aid or 
compensation: 
Some financial assistance appears to be available – however may come 
with conditions. 
Summary: Very little financial assistance available for recovery from flooding. 
Key principles of the recovery system 
Efficiency:  Unknown. 
Equity principle: Individualistic in nature as insurance coverage is low and therefore people 
will have to rely upon themselves to recover.  
Robustness of recovery 
system: 
Low – low availability of insurance leads to concerns of anti-selection, but 
the conservative approach of the insurers may prevent this. 
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excluded from single household contents policies 
(Gaschen et al., 1998).  Reinsurance was 
monopolised by a State organisation the Instituto 
de Resseguros do Brasil however it was 
transformed into a joint-stock company although 
the majority shareholder remains the Brazilian 
government (Auffret, 2003).   
 
However, despite the automatic cover for flood on 
many insurance policies penetration remains low 
and for the non-life sector (including natural perils) 
was only 3% (Sprissler, 2011).  Providing a better 
functioning insurance market in Brazil would 
dramatically improve the situation for flood 
recovery as currently individuals and the 
government are required to finance reconstruction 
and bear the risk.  One of the barriers to increasing 
penetration was the old reinsurance monopoly 
which limited cover to only a proportion of 
insurers’ losses.  The transformation of this system 
and the liberalisation of the reinsurance market 
have led to an increase in the options for 
reinsurance which it is hoped will mean that 
insurance in the residential sector will become 
more attractive.   
 
However, the introduction of a reformed or new 
system in Brazil is compounded by the 
considerable contrast in socio-economic 
circumstances of those at significant risk.  Different 
systems of insurance might need to be introduced 
to enable all at risk to be able to afford insurance.  
Sprissler (2011) argues that microinsurance 
schemes available for fire, explosion and lightning 
might also be extended to include flood insurance 
for homes and contents and might be available for 
42 million households. 
 
 
 
 
 
A2.3 Ecuador 
Insurance is available in Ecuador via private 
companies and most fire policies also include 
coverage for natural perils including flood.  
 
 
However, for domestic properties insurance 
penetration is low and therefore there are few 
households with flood insurance.  Where cover is 
taken out flood insurance is bundled with other 
risks and there is no separate premium calculated 
for flooding (Gaschen et al., 1998). 
 
 
 
Key Characteristics: Brazil 
Insurance scheme: Private insurance - Included within composite household policies. 
Types of perils and flooding 
covered by insurance: 
All flooding except direct rain water damage. 
Optional/compulsory cover: Optional. 
Insurance premium 
mechanism: 
No risk-reflected pricing. 
Risk transfer mechanism: Bundled and therefore subsidised across risks. 
Penetration/ 
coverage of flood insurance: 
Very low – due to low penetration of household insurance. 
Presence of state aid or 
compensation: 
Unknown. 
Summary: Purely market-driven system of optional household insurance. 
Key principles of the recovery system 
Efficiency:  Unknown – but does not appear to include any incentives for mitigation. 
Equity principle: Solidaristic risk-insensitive – but solidaristic principle may be limited due to 
low penetration. 
Robustness of recovery 
system: 
Low – there is a high risk of anti-selection with low penetration of 
insurance – though the bundling offers some cross-risks transfer. 
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A2.4 Mexico 
Due to the high losses from previous events, the 
Mexican Government established the Fondo de 
Disastres Naturales (FONDEN) or a Natural Disaster 
Fund in 1996 to enable the better financing of 
losses.  FONDEN was established as it facilities the 
management of budgetary resources as the 
Federal, State and local governments lacked an 
effective way of reinsuring and transferring the 
high risks being generated by natural hazards.  The 
purpose of the FONDEN is to provide financial 
assistance to the State and Federal agencies who 
are required to prove that their budgets are 
insufficient to deal with the after-effects of natural 
disasters. Many natural perils are included within 
the FONDEN system including the damages from 
flooding and intense rainfall.  In the main, the 
Disaster Fund is used to assist State governments 
and Federal Agencies in repair and reconstruction 
of assets such as motorways, schools, hospitals 
and other public assets with the FONDEN and 
State/municipal resources assuming different 
percentages of the recovery of assets.  However, 
CCS (2008) does suggest that dwellings are one 
type of public infrastructure for which assistance 
can be sought at a ratio of 70% FONDEN resources 
and 30% State/Municipal resources.  However, it is 
not clear exactly what is covered: whether all 
affected homeowners will receive aid to repair the 
properties, whether cover is included in all events 
and the precise conditions of insurance.   GFDRR 
(2011b) suggests that this may be limited to the 
rehabilitation and reconstruction of low-income 
housing.  
 
Despite suggesting that an advantage of FONDEN is 
to be able to supply aid to the population in times 
of event CCS (2008; 105) also reports that a 
weakness of the scheme is the long time it takes 
for the reconstructions of dwellings due to high 
legal regulation of the scheme and the “The 
absence of aid for the replacement of household 
effects for people who have lost the contents of 
their homes as a result of a natural disaster.”   
 
In 2006 a law was passed which aims to ensure 
that funds to not fall below a set value.  The law 
ensures that the Ministry of Finance commits a 
fixed percentage of its annual budget to FONDON 
and that the total reserve (including monies 
committed coupled with uncommitted funds from 
previous years) should be not less than 0.4% of the 
annual Federal budget of approximately US$800 
million (c. NZ$ 990 million) (GFDRR, 2011b). 
 
There has also been movement towards protecting 
the assets in the FONDEN trust Fund through the 
use of insurance policies and in particular 
catastrophe bonds (cat-bond) to protect against 
the larger risks.  In 2006, Cat-Mex was established 
and the Mexican Government purchased a 
parametric reinsurance contract of US$290 million 
(c. NZ$ 358 million) and a cat-bond of US$ 160 
million (c. NZ$ 198 million) specific to earthquake 
perils. Multi-Cat Mexico was established in 2009 
Key Characteristics:  Ecuador 
Insurance scheme: Private insurers via composite policy – linked to fire cover. 
Types of perils and flooding 
covered by insurance: 
Not clear – although likely flash floods and river floods included. 
Optional/compulsory cover: Optional. 
Insurance premium 
mechanism: 
No separate premium –bundled policies 
Risk transfer mechanism: Compound policy – between risks and across low risks. 
Penetration/ 
coverage of flood insurance: 
Very low. 
Presence of state aid or 
compensation: 
Unknown. 
 
Summary: Purely market-driven system of optional household insurance. 
Key principles of the recovery system 
Efficiency:  Unknown – but does not appear to include any incentives for mitigation. 
Equity principle: Solidaristic risk-insensitive – but solidaristic principle may not actually 
occur due to low penetration. 
Robustness of recovery 
system: 
Low – there is a high risk of anti-selection with low penetration of 
insurance – although the bundling offers some cross-risks transfer. 
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through the World Bank’s MultiCat facility to 
extend coverage to include both earthquake and 
hurricane with a parametric cat-bond of 
US$ 290million (Lobato Osorio, 2012).  Those risks 
below catastrophic status are reinsured via a 
separate scheme and the Mexican government are 
also beginning to take out insurance products to 
directly insure some public assets.  This complex 
multi-level system of risk transfer (illustrated in 
Figure A1). There has also been movement 
towards protecting the assets in the FONDEN trust 
Fund through the use of insurance policies and in 
particular catastrophe bonds (cat-bond) to protect 
against the larger risks.  In 2006, Cat-Mex was 
established and the Mexican Government 
purchased a parametric reinsurance contract of 
US$290 million (c. NZ$ 358 million) and a cat-bond 
of US$ 160 million (c. NZ$ 198 million) specific to 
earthquake perils.   Multi-Cat Mexico was 
established in 2009 through the World Bank’s 
MultiCat facility to extend coverage to include 
both earthquake and hurricane with a parametric 
cat-bond of US$ 290million (Lobato Osorio, 2012).  
Those risks below catastrophic status are reinsured 
via a separate scheme and the Mexican 
government are also beginning to take out 
insurance products to directly insure some public 
assets.  This complex multi-level system of risk 
transfer (illustrated in  
Figure A1) is enabling Mexico to become much 
more financially resilient to natural hazards. 
However, there appears to be little movement on 
the availability and penetration of private 
household insurance products to enable 
individuals to take out their own cover.  Paklina 
(2003) argues that penetration in Mexico is less 
than 5% and that availability is quite limited. 
Where insurance cover is available it is generally 
bundled with fire and earthquake coverage.  
Although there appears to be some scope for low 
income housing to receive recovery the degree to 
which others receive financial assistance through 
the FONDEN system is unclear. 
 
Figure A1: FONDEN disaster risk financing strategy 
(as of 2011) 
 
Source: GFDRR (2011b; 34) 
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A2.5 Canada 
Flood is considered to be the most frequent 
“significant disaster event” with 53 events being 
recorded by Public Safety Canada (2011) between 
1900 and 2005 which is more than three times the 
next most common peril.   Additionally, flood and 
flood-related windstorm damages account for high 
proportions of the insurance pay-outs in Canada 
(Sandink, 2011).  
 
Within Canada the situation in relation to flooding 
and water is complicated with some water 
damages being insurable, whereas others are not 
included within traditional household policies. The 
precise definitions and exact coverage varies 
between policies in Canada, however Table A3 
summarises those damages which are generally 
insurable and those for which no coverage is 
purchasable.  This illustrates that the majority of 
coverable perils are those which are caused by the 
more man-made releases of water or those 
associated with other wind-related damages; in 
the most part flooding from overland sources such 
as fluvial or rainfall-based sources are not 
insurable.  
 
The government in Canada have created 
programmes to financially-assist homeowners 
following flooding (Sandink et al., 2010).  The 
responsibility for disaster assistance begins at the 
regional level and the Provincial and Territorial 
governments provide disaster recovery assistance 
programmes and make the decision about the 
level of disaster payments and when they should 
be provided.  These regional systems are backed 
by the Federal Disaster Financial Assistance 
Arrangements (DFAA).   This system is designed to 
provide some assistance and recompense to those 
Territories and Provinces which have sustained 
Key Characteristics: Mexico 
Insurance scheme: Limited private insurance is available. 
The FONDEN scheme has elements linked to the insurance and 
reinsurance market to create a fund to underpin recovery from disasters in 
Mexico. 
Types of perils and flooding 
covered by insurance: 
Both river flooding and heavy rain are included within FONDEN 
For private insurance – unknown. 
Optional/compulsory cover: Private insurance is optional. 
Insurance premium 
mechanism: 
For private insurance it is usually bundled with fire and earthquake – 
unclear how premiums are set. 
Risk transfer mechanism: Bundled and therefore subsidised across risks. 
Penetration/ coverage of 
flood insurance 
Penetration of private insurance cover is very low. 
Presence of state aid or 
compensation: 
There is the ability to provide relief in cases of natural catastrophes 
through FONDEN. 
Summary: FONDEN is an instrument for governments and state entities to quickly 
providing funds in response to natural disasters without compromising 
existing budgets. 
Key principles of the recovery system 
Efficiency:  Not clear how much mitigation is incentivised through either private 
insurance or payments received through FONDEN.  However, in 
conjunction with the FONDEN scheme there is an associated budget for ex 
ante protective risk management. 
Equity principle: The FONDEN scheme is funded through the national budget – solidaristic 
principles. 
For private insurance this is bundled and therefore also a degree of 
solidarity – although penetration is low and so the risk is not spread very 
widely. 
Robustness of recovery 
system: 
Medium – the FONDEN scheme has developed since its inception and the 
risks are being spread more widely and transferred to the reinsurance 
market.  But recovery for ordinary households is arguably 
underdeveloped.  
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significant damages.  In the event that financial 
assistance is provided by the DFAA, the funds are 
provided directly to the regional government and it 
is their responsibility to reallocate these funds to 
individual households.  The DFAA is designed to 
take effect when losses greater than CA$1 (c. 
NZ$ 1.2) per capita are experienced.  Assistance 
then increases proportionally as the losses 
increase.  Up to a maximum of 90% of losses being 
absorbed by the Federal Share when per capital 
losses are greater than CA$5 (Public Safety Canada, 
2008). 
This system however, is not protected by 
legislation and Sandink et al. (2010) describes it as 
an arrangement rather than a law; suggesting its 
use (and when and the terms of use) is 
discretionary rather than absolute.   Furthermore, 
since 2008 the Federal government have also 
added a mitigation element to the DFAA to try to 
reduce repeated damages. 
 
Table A3: Insurable water perils in Canada 
Insurable water perils Water damages that are not insurable 
 Sudden and accidental escape of water from 
a water main  
 Sudden and accidental escape of water or 
steam from a plumbing, heating, sprinkler, or 
air conditioning system  
 Sudden and accidental escape of water from 
a domestic container located inside or 
outside a dwelling (except when the result of 
freezing)  
 Water that enters a dwelling through an 
opening that has been created suddenly and 
accidentally by an insurable peril (e.g., a 
falling object like a wind-‐ blown tree)  
 Sewer backup  
 Sump-pump failure  
 Overland flooding caused by  
- waves  
- tides  
- tidal waves  
- dam breaks  
 - storm surges  
 Flooding from any stream, river, or water body, 
natural or man-‐made  
 Coastal flooding from lakes, oceans  
 Tsunami  
 Flooding from groundwater (except in Quebec)  
 Overland flood waters or storm-‐water flows that 
enter the home through cracks in foundation walls 
or any opening above the surface of the ground.  
Source: The Insurance Bureau of Canada model wordings –Sandink (2011; 12) 
 
However, there is a desire in Canada to introduce 
flood insurance and different options have been 
explored (Sandink et al., 2010). They describe the 
provision of robust and extensive insurance cover 
as requiring a partnership between insurers and 
government.  Their proposed solution would 
require governments (amongst other activities) to 
zone flood risk and undertake action to prevent 
new development in high risk areas; work to 
reduce flood risk to homeowners; increase public 
awareness of flooding and flood risk and alter the 
flood relief assistance procedures so as not to 
contradict with flood insurance.  This final point is 
critical and financial assistance may in the future 
be prohibited for those households were insurance 
is available.  In return, insurers would have the 
following role (Sandink et al., 2010; 59):  
 
 Provide bundled flood coverage to all 
homeowners, aside from those occupying very 
high risk areas; 
 Apply risk based insurance premiums or 
deductibles; 
 Keep track of environmental and structural 
changes to watersheds and streams that have 
implications for the flood risk of their policy 
holders; 
 Participate in flood risk communications with 
their policy holders, including possible damages 
and mitigation options; 
 Ensure policy holders are aware of the 
characteristics of their insurance coverage, and 
ensure that policy holders are aware of changes 
in their coverage or premiums, and why their 
coverage may change over time, and; 
 Monitor their accumulation of flood risk. 
 
The exclusion of high-risk properties, the bundling 
of flood coverage with other perils and the risk-
based premiums are all insurance mechanism 
which aims to ensure the robustness of the system 
and prevent over-exposure of the insurance 
industry. Financial assistance along with 
mechanisms for recuing risk will be critical in the 
high-risk flood areas where insurance would not be 
available.  Despite potential options for the 
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introduction of flood insurance in Canada there 
has not need any movement towards this in recent 
years – maybe the recent severe flooding in 
Calgary in June 2013 will reopen the debate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
A2.6 United States of America 
Flood insurance in the United States of America 
operates through the National Flood Insurance 
Program (NFIP) which was first implemented in 
1968.  The scheme is widely documented and has 
been extensively studied over a long period of time 
with the advantages, disadvantages and ultimately 
the overall effectiveness of the Program assessed 
(e.g. Platt, 1976; 1999; Arnell, 1985; Pasterick, 
1998; FEMA, 2000).  The NFIP comes directly from 
the US National government (although it is 
implemented at a state level) and in which the US 
Congress agreed to subsidise flood insurance for 
existing properties in flood-risk areas.  Any new 
development was meant to have actuarial-based 
premiums.  The guidance and policy of the scheme 
is very rigid and inflexible in nature and it can be 
argued that the approach is centralised, co-
ordinated and controlling. 
 
Communities’ involvement in the NFIP is voluntary 
and operates on the basis that those who wish to 
obtain subsidised insurance need to commit to 
adopting appropriate mitigation measures (CCS, 
2008).  Risk maps are drawn to designate a risk 
zone - named Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs) 
and communities are required to prevent or 
modify new construction so that it is protected 
from flooding below a certain magnitude: floods 
with an annual probability of 1% (1 in 100 year 
flood).  In return for this, insurance premiums 
would be reduced and subsidised via the 
establishment of a community-rate.  In 2010 the 
average premium was US$ 568 (c. NZ$ 702) and 
there were over 5.6 million policies written (FEMA, 
2011). 
 
Machetti (2009) argues that originally the 
premiums within the program were intended to be 
calculated actuarially, however the government 
ordered subsidies to encourage uptake and to 
Key Characteristics: Canada 
Insurance scheme: The limited flooding that is insurable is included within standard policies. 
Types of perils and flooding 
covered by insurance: 
 Only drainage or sewer related flooding is covered. 
 There is no flood insurance for flooding from rainfall, river flooding, 
groundwater flooding or flooding from the sea. 
Optional/compulsory cover: n/a – as types of flooding is limited. 
Insurance premium 
mechanism: 
n/a – as types of flooding is limited. 
Risk transfer mechanism: n/a – as types of flooding is limited. 
Penetration/ 
coverage of flood insurance: 
n/a – as types of flooding is limited. 
Presence of state aid or 
compensation: 
Financial relief mechanisms provided by the National or State government. 
Summary: Generally, it is not possible to insure against flooding in Canada and 
therefore recovery in the most part is from National and regional financial 
assistance programmes – however it is an arrangement rather than a law 
and is considered to be discretionary. 
Key principles of the recovery system 
Efficiency:  Little requirement on individuals to undertake mitigation or any aspects of 
risk reduction for the receipt of disaster-relief assistance. 
Equity principle: Most compensation is via the government adopting a national solidaristic 
approach. 
Robustness of recovery 
system: 
Low to Medium – Although spreading risks across a very large group (all 
taxpayers).  However it does potentially expose the government to large 
losses and there is a desire to introduce a flood insurance system in order 
to better plan for losses and to spread the risks into the private market. 
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ensure affordability.  There are two different types 
of subsidy.  In the initial (or emergency) stage of 
the program before a community has been 
assessed, premiums are subsidised and calculated 
at a nationally-set level.  Following the initial Flood 
Insurance Study and the creation of the Flood 
Insurance Rate map, subsidised premiums are 
calculated based on risk ratings for each individual 
community assessed by a range of variables 
including; the location, the age, the type of 
occupancy, the building and (for Special Flood 
Hazard Areas) the elevation (Machetti, 2009).  
Additionally, an individual property’s insurance 
premium is also calculated as a percentage of the 
insured capital. 
 
For those located in the designated SFHAs the 
decision to take out insurance is still voluntary and 
this has had a negative impact upon uptake with 
many of those at risk still remaining uninsured.  
Browne and Hoyt (2000) found that there was a 
positive relationship between insurance uptake 
and income and that affordability of premiums 
remains a real issue; despite the subsidies. 
Although flood insurance is not compulsory there 
are incentives for uptake as homeowners who 
have benefitted from Federal aid are required to 
take out cover to receive any assistance in the 
future and those who have federal mortgages are 
also mandated to take out cover.  Whether to 
insure contents remains voluntary (CCS, 2008). 
Those areas with a flood risk lower than a 1% 
annual probability do not have to partake in the 
scheme (although some communities chose to 
participate) and purchasing insurance cover is not 
mandatory.  Policies cover the real value of insured 
properties (the cost of replacement minus physical 
depreciation) or the cost of repair and 
replacement – whichever is the lower (CCS, 2008).  
A deductible also exists for both contents and 
buildings insurance. 
 
Private insurers administer 95% of insurance 
policies established as part of the NFIP including; 
the selling and processing of policies, assessment 
and the payment of claims.  Insurers are then able 
to submit their own claim against any losses 
occurred (i.e. premium funds minus claims) to the 
National Flood Insurance Fund in the US Treasury 
(CCS, 2008). 
 
The National Flood Insurance Fund effective 
finances the NFIP using the premiums collected 
and monies from the Treasury.  The original aim 
was to make the Program self-financing, however 
Congress also wanted to make insurance 
affordable and therefore the subsidies mean that 
this has not been achieved. Although NFIP is meant 
to replay any additional funding received from the 
US Treasury when it does not have sufficient funds, 
Abbott (2008) argues that the NFIP has never 
achieved full solvency and that it currently owes 
around US$ 17 billion (c. NZ$ 21 billion).  This is 
one of the main criticisms of the system that is it 
not a viable mechanism for providing insurance, 
the main reason being relatively straightforward; 
the value of claims has always exceeded the 
amount of premiums collected.   
 
There were other clear problems with the Program. 
Table A4provides statistics on repeated losses 
suffered by properties as part of the NFIP 
(reproduced from King, 2013; 21). FEMA (2011) 
also recognises this as a problem and lists that in 
2010 over 80 000 properties are suffering repeated 
losses, with over 8000 of these are considered to 
be severe.  The problem of repeated flooding is 
reinforced when you consider that 30% of all of the 
claims are attributable to 1% of insured properties 
(FEMA, 2011).  Additionally, 25% of properties 
were rated at below actuarial rates, only 75% of 
properties complied with the mandatory nature of 
the insurance (i.e. those who have mortgages) and 
50% of all of the damage occurred outside of the 
designated risk areas with only 1% penetration 
within these areas.  
 
The high debt within the scheme, recognition that 
insurance is not effective in preventing 
development in areas of high flood risk and 
concerns about the cost of insurance under climate 
change conditions (Mills et al., 2005) have all 
contributed to calls for a reform of the NFIP. 
 
Table A4: Total flood losses from the repeated 
flooding of properties in the NFIP: 
1878 to 2011 (as of 31st December 
2011: $nominal) 
Building payments $ 9, 332,087,006 
Contents payments $ 2,768,293,788 
Total payments $12,100,980,774 
Average payment $24,388 
Number of losses 496,178 
Number of properties 166,368 
Data source: US Department of Homeland Security, 
FEMA 
Source: King (2013; 21). 
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The Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act 
2012 (US Government, 2012) aims to resolve some 
of the perceived failings of the original approach.  
There have been many documents and 
commentaries that describe in detail the 
characteristics of the reforms (including NAIC/CIPR, 
2012; EDEN, 2013; King, 2013).  
 
Key changes to the scheme enshrined in the new 
legislation include (after King, 2013 and US 
Government, 2012): 
 A reform of the premium rate structure – 
including: 
- The removal of the subsidy on premiums for 
second homes, homes sold to new owners, 
those properties which receive repetitive 
losses, any owners who have refused a FEMA 
mitigation offer and business properties 
- Raising the annual cap on premium increases 
from 10 to 20% 
- Increasing rates so that they are in line with 
average historical losses 
- Increasing the minimum annual deductible on 
properties. 
- Introducing more actuarial rates for 
properties which have been newly designated 
into special hazard areas. 
 
 Increasing the privatisation of the scheme – in 
particular obliging FEMA to purchasing 
reinsurance on the global market to reduce the 
liability on the US national government. 
 Accuracy of flood mapping and designation of 
Special Hazard Zones – this mainly includes 
provisions for improving mapping and mapping 
processes – including processes for settling 
wind- versus water-damage claims, for 
communities to request remapping and 
improving mapping data.  
 
 Streamline processes for flood hazard 
mitigation and planning 
- Improve the efficiency of the NFIP this mainly 
involves improving the management of the - 
program and ensuring better compliance 
including; 
- Imposing penalties for non-compliance with 
the requirements of mandatory flood 
insurance (these will range between US$350 
to US$2000 per violation (c. NZ$ 433 to 
NZ$ 2,472) 
- Better monitoring of contract and claims 
- Better data sharing between relevant 
organisations  
 
 Repayment of NFIP debts and improving the 
overall solvency of the Program – including:  
- The creation of a US$ 12 billion (c. NZ$ 14.8 
billion) reserve fund to spread losses better 
over time 
- Establishing a repayment schedule to the 
Treasury. 
 
A timeframe for the implementation of the 
changes outlined in the new Act has been 
proposed (FEMA Website, 2013) this highlights a 
number of key dates whereby premiums are 
gradually increased over a period of up to five 
years.  This is planned to increase premiums by 20% 
each year until premiums are at the full-actuarial 
rates.   
 
The NFIP has clear links to mitigation measures 
which are of course fundamental to the offering of 
insurance and the subsidising of premiums.  
However, the effectiveness of this provision can be 
called into question with the numbers of repeated 
losses arguably indicative that the risk reduction 
mitigation component of the scheme is not 
functioning correctly.  Mitigation becomes all the 
more important under the reforms of 2012 
whereby the additional compliance clauses and 
penalties implemented provide an even greater 
incentive. 
 
Although the Insurance Reform Act 2012 has been 
passed by the US government and the timeline for 
implementation has commenced, there is clearly 
still opposition to the reforms.  In particular, a 
Flood Insurance Implementation Amendment Bill 
was introduced to Congress in early 2013 (US 
Government, 2013) which aims to further delay 
and phase in flood insurance premium rates for 
some properties and for some purposes. 
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Key Characteristics:  United States of America 
Insurance scheme: State-funded insurance scheme administered in the most part by private 
insurers. 
Types of perils and flooding 
covered by insurance: 
Quite comprehensive as the definition of flood is “an excess of water on 
land that is normally dry” and therefore for instance will cover heavy rain, 
fluvial and sewerage back-up as long as the back-up is caused by a flood. 
Optional/compulsory cover: Optional (but compulsory for those with federal mortgages and for those 
who receive federal aid who may need to receive it in the future) 
Insurance premium 
mechanism: 
There is an additional premium which is a percentage of the sum insured 
but there is some degree of risk-reflective pricing.  But for areas in special 
risk zones that adopt mitigation these are (at least initially) subsidised. 
 
Risk transfer mechanism: Subsidised and backed by the state. 
Penetration/ 
coverage of flood insurance: 
Inside SFHAs the market penetration rate for single-family households is 
considered to be around 50% - but there is high variation across the US. 
 
Outside of risk areas only 1% penetration – although in terms of numbers 
approximately one third of policies are outside SFHAs. 
Presence of state aid or 
compensation: 
Federal aid - which for repeated assistance is subsequently tied to 
insurance. 
Summary: Recovery is both via Federal aid and a subsidised state-funded insurance 
scheme. 
Key principles of the recovery system 
Efficiency:  Mitigation is a requirement and under the new act becomes even more 
important. 
Equity principle: Solidaristic both in terms of Federal aid, but also in terms of the current 
subsidies from the state – but moving towards a more individualistic risk-
sensitive system. 
Robustness of recovery 
system: 
Low – In the old system the fund is not big enough to settle all the claims 
and clearly risk reduction is not completely effective as there are a large 
number of repeated claims.  Robustness should increase under the new 
system as premiums increase and are more reflective of flood risk. 
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A3 Rest of the world 
A3.1 Australia  
Private insurance cover is available in Australia for 
a number of perils (including rain): however flood 
insurance for rivers and the sea had traditionally 
been excluded from insurance policies. There were 
nevertheless small pockets of flood insurance 
availability.  For instance in West and South 
Australia flood cover has been a standard peril in 
household insurance policies and the Territory 
Insurance Office (TIO) has long offered flood cover 
in the Northern Territory (Mason, 2011). Despite 
these, coverage was not widespread and those 
households in areas with the highest potential 
exposure had little opportunity to purchase cover.  
CCS (2008) highlighted moves by the Insurance 
Council of Australia towards introducing separate 
flood insurance products for flash flooding and 
mainstream flooding and cover has slowly been 
increasing in recent years with insurers such as 
Suncorp, Zurich and NRMA beginning to offer 
products (Mason, 2011). 
 
Insurance is provided via the private market and 
cover for rainfall-based or flash flooding was 
initially considered to be more successful – with a 
penetration rate of 60% (Paklina, 2003) - with 
many of the larger insurers including some limited 
cover on their household buildings and contents 
policies as well as motor insurance.  Cover for 
mainstream flooding was initially more limited; 
however since 2006 it has been more widely 
available.  This change was considered to be due to 
the better understanding of risk and an increased 
ability to identify properties at risk of flooding and 
in particular the introduction of the National Flood 
Information Database. Consequently, penetration 
of insurance is increasing with 75% of selected 
policies currently providing cover (ICA, pers. 
comm.).  The ICA also indicated that they expected 
coverage to increase to over 90% in 2013 and that 
availability of insurance was no longer an issue; 
with only 7 to 8% of insurers not offering cover for 
flooding.  It is important to note however, that this 
value relates to only policies sold and therefore 
only applies to that proportion of the population 
who have purchased household insurance.    
 
Flood cover appears to be treated differently by 
different insurers and between products; some 
being available as part of a bundled household 
policy and others available as an additional extra 
product.  This is situation can cause confusion for 
insurers.  An additional premium appears to be 
charged for the flood component of the insurance 
(or for the additional component if it is a separate 
policy) to reflect the risk which can be considerable 
and may total an additional 45% of the policy cost 
for properties of the highest risk (CCS, 2008).  The 
ICA (2011) also highlight that the failure of many 
owners of properties located in high risk areas to 
take out insurance for flooding is related to the 
affordability of the cover. 
 
The high losses in the Queensland floods in 
2010/2011 have reinforced the need to consider 
the introduction of a new standardised approach 
to flood insurance in Australia.  A number of 
concerns and questions about insurance were 
raised in the Queensland Floods Commission of 
Inquiry (QFCI, 2012) and included that many 
policies did not cover flooding (or only partially 
covered it – e.g. storm and flash flooding was 
included but river was not), many homeowners 
were unaware that they were not covered and 
definitions of flooding were opaque and 
complicated.  This may have been mostly 
addressed by the introduction of new legislation 
providing a clear definition of flooding.  
 
 In the aftermath of the floods three additional 
reviews were undertaken into the insurance 
situation; reviews by the Commonwealth Treasury 
(Commonwealth of Australia Treasury, 2011), the 
House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Social Policy and Legal Affairs (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2012) and perhaps most importantly the 
National Disaster Insurance Review 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2011a; 2011b). The 
Insurance Review highlighted the problem of cover 
in Australia through an effective diagram 
(reproduced in Figure A2 below).  This illustrates 
that there are a relatively small number of 
properties (1% of all properties or c. 50, 000) at 
high risk of flooding and a few more at moderate 
risk (3 to 6%).  This causes problems in spreading 
cover sufficiently across at-risk properties and 
introducing risk-reflective premiums as it would be 
likely that insurance cover would largely become 
unaffordable for those at higher risk (the curve on 
the right).  This means that it would be difficult to 
introduce a purely market-based flood insurance 
product; cover would almost certainly require 
either a subsidy or the introduction of a product 
where insurance is cross-subsidised across risks. 
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Figure A2:  What is the flood insurance problem? 
Source: 
Commonwealth of Australia (2011b; ii) 
 
 
The Insurance Review describes two potential 
alternative models of insurance (Commonwealth 
of Australia, 2011b; iii):  
 
 “that flood cover be provided automatically as 
part of home insurance, just as it provides cover 
automatically for bushfire and storm;  
 or that flood cover be provided automatically 
but that homeowners be able to ’opt out’ and 
have home insurance that includes cover for 
other causes of damage but not flood.” 
 
The first of these models would increase insurance 
penetration amongst homeowners; but without 
some level of assistance many of those in high risk 
areas will struggle to afford increased premiums.   
The second model would lead to an increase in 
coverage but market penetration will still be 
limited.  Both of these models would require the 
identification of high-risk properties and the 
establishment of thresholds (whether risk-based or 
price-based) above which properties would receive 
assistance (via a subsidy or discount) to purchase 
insurance.  These subsidies or discounts would 
need to be managed and covered by some kind of 
central pool or similar.  In total there were 47 
recommendations from the Review with the 
following five being identified as most significant 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2011a; 11): 
 
 All home insurance, home contents insurance 
and body corporate insurance products need to 
include flood cover. 
 Discounted insurance premiums are needed for 
homes, home contents and home units in areas 
of medium and high flood risk, so as to render 
flood insurance affordable. 
 National coordination of flood risk 
measurement and mitigation is needed, in 
order to improve flood risk management for the 
benefit of the community generally and to 
ensure the continuing development of a 
competitive market for flood insurance. 
 A mechanism is needed to fund the discounts 
that are to be offered for affordability purposes. 
 Insurers will need access to a government-
sponsored reinsurance facility if they are to 
deliver flood insurance discounts without 
compromising their own commercial positions. 
 
The Australian Government has responded to the 
Insurance Review.  They agreed that they do not 
intend to make flood insurance for building and 
contents compulsory for all households, suggested 
that some of the recommendations have 
significant budgetary implications and in the most 
part greater consultation with stakeholders and 
understanding of the implications of the 
recommendations is needed.  The ICA (2011) also 
responded to the review and do not consider the 
introduction of a pool to be the best or most viable 
option.  They consider that the private market in 
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itself is not failing, however that the government 
needs to intervene to improve the mitigation in 
high flood risk areas and thereby reduce the risk of 
those properties being flooded.  In the meantime 
they suggest that the government should subsidise 
the premiums of the highest risk householders 
(thereby making insurance affordable) whilst 
mitigation is being constructed (ICA, 2011). 
Although penetration has clearly increased, flood 
insurance is still not mandatory and individual 
households retain the ability to choose not to 
purchase cover for flooding.  Penetration in high 
risk flood areas is consequently still quite low. 
 
The principal Commonwealth funding mechanism 
for State disaster relief is the Natural Disaster 
Relief Arrangements (NDRA). This formal structure 
has been in place since the late 1970s and its 
purpose is to; “reduce the excessive financial 
burden on the States caused by the effects of 
natural disasters” Australian National Audit Office 
(2000; 73).  Many different types of assistance are 
available, many being provided through the social 
security system and cover those who are out of 
employment due to the consequences of a disaster.  
The Australian Government Disaster Recovery 
Payments (AGDRP) are provided in only the most 
serious of disasters and are a one-off, means-
tested payment for individuals (AUS$1000 for 
adults and AUS$400 for children (c. NZ$ 1,195 and 
NZ$ 478)) (Commonwealth of Australia website, 
2011) which although will assist with emergency 
costs, they payments are not intended to be 
significant contributions to recovery. 
 
The Queensland floods in 2010/11 also saw a 
strong and positive response by the Australian 
Federal Government to recovery and 
reconstruction with the creation of the 
Queensland Reconstruction Authority (QldRA) by 
Act of Parliament to co-ordinate and manage the 
recovery and reconstruction of areas affected by 
flooding. Furthermore, the Australian Government 
also introduced a “flood levy” for 2011-12 through 
two pieces of legislation; the Tax Laws Amendment 
(Temporary Flood and Cyclone Reconstruction Levy) 
Act 2011 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011c) and 
Income Tax Rates Amendment (Temporary Flood 
Reconstruction Levy) Act 2011 (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2011d). Both of these Acts were passed 
to raise funds by imposing a levy on higher rate 
tax-payers for recovering from the floods.  The 
Australian Treasury estimated that this would raise 
AUS$ 1.7 billion (Australian Government Treasury 
website, Accessed May 2012). 
 
The disaster payments do provide State and Local 
Authorities with some recompense for action 
taken immediately following flooding events; 
however little was directly passed on to individuals 
for recovery. Despite their being both State and 
Federal compensation, recovery from flood losses 
still fall heavily upon the victims of flooding to bear 
the risk. 
 
The historical lack of flood insurance in higher-risk 
areas, and in turn recompense for losses sustained 
during flooding, have meant that individuals are 
considering introducing flood resistance and flood 
resilience measures at their own expense. In effect, 
this is paying out a sum in the present in order to 
reduce the total losses sustained in the future. This 
action has been supported by many local councils 
in Australia, who have initiated schemes whereby 
homeowners are provided with a proportion of the 
funding for these measures or given access to 
loans for these types of action. Similarly, the lack 
of recompense for flood losses also means that 
homeowners are willing to consider more extreme 
measures such as voluntary purchase and house-
raising.  However, as the Queensland floods in 
2010 demonstrated for the larger events some of 
the individual property-level measures 
implemented may not be effective.  Additionally, 
any new insurance cover may alter the balance in 
householder responsibility for mitigation 
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A3.2 China 
China has a huge loss potential for flooding and 
economic losses can run to many billions of US 
dollars.  Flood cover is available and similar to 
many other countries it is included as part of a 
standard fire policy (Gaschen et al., 1998).  
However, insurance penetration is low as policies 
are often only taken out in urban locations.    
Gaschen et al. (1998) argue that as affluence 
increases the demand for insurance may also 
increase, but this is likely to remain to be 
concentrated in urban areas.   
 
Surminski (2013) argues that catastrophe 
insurance coverage for natural perils is limited for 
individuals and that coverage for the property 
market is underdeveloped. Wang (2012) suggests 
that for private properties only one out of every 
hundred dwellings has insurance against natural 
perils.  Penetration for cover relating to floods, 
earthquakes and typhoons for properties was 
estimated to be in the order of 5% in 2008 (Swiss 
Re, 2008 cited in Surminski, 2013).  Part of the 
issue is thought to relate to the general 
underdevelopment in the domestic private 
insurance market due to the fact that historically in 
China private-property ownership was limited 
(Surminski, 2013).   Both private market solutions 
as well as regulatory solutions are being 
investigated; although earthquake risks are initially 
the highest priority for insurance coverage. 
 
Wang (2012) provides a proposal for the Chinese 
government to step in to stimulate the growth and 
availability of catastrophe insurance.  A pool 
system is recommended whereby the government 
would either provide direct insurance or 
reinsurance for natural perils.  However, they 
suggest that the nature of flooding (including the 
“scope for immediate post-disaster mitigation 
action and use of soft loans”) would mean that it 
would require a separate arrangement although 
this might be administered within the same system 
(Wang, 2012; 2). 
 
Key Characteristics: Australia 
Insurance scheme: Flood insurance is available via the private market and is available as 
either a component of household policies or as an additional insurance 
product.  
Types of perils and flooding 
covered by insurance: 
Varies between policies – but the new legislation about the definition of 
flood may standardise this. 
Optional/compulsory cover: Optional cover. 
Insurance premium 
mechanism: 
An additional premium is charged for flood insurance related to risk. 
Risk transfer mechanism: Actuarial premiums are charged to spread the risk - also via reinsurance. 
Penetration/ 
coverage of flood insurance: 
Up to 84% of policies selected by households purchasing insurance have 
coverage. But this % only relates to those who have purchased insurance. 
Presence of state aid or 
compensation: 
Some disaster assistance is available although this appears to be limited. 
Summary: Insurance primarily available via the private market with some limited 
other assistance available in very hardship cases by the government. 
Key principles of the recovery system 
Efficiency:  The premiums charged are risk-reflective therefore this might provide 
some incentives for mitigation – but it is not clear whether there would be 
a premium decrease for properties which undertake individual measures. 
Equity principle: There is some degree of solidarity if insurance is offered as part of a 
composite policy.  However, due to the premium differentiation in the 
most part the insurance is individualist and risk-sensitive. 
Robustness of recovery 
system: 
Medium – the increasing penetration and risk-reflective premiums of flood 
insurance spreads the risk further and makes the insurance system more 
economically viable.  However, from the point of view of the recovery 
system, the failure of those in high risk areas to purchase flood insurance 
leaves a large number of properties exposed to flood risk without an 
adequate mechanism for recovery. 
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A3.3 Indonesia 
Indonesia is at risk from a range of different 
flooding mechanisms and frequently suffers from 
fluvial and flash flooding and well as storm surges.  
Flood insurance is offered by both provide and 
state-owned insurers and where available is part of 
fire policies with an additional tariff (but not 
differentiated by risk). Both contents and buildings 
are covered under the same terms and conditions.  
However, penetration of insurance remains low 
with approximately 20% of fire policies having 
additional cover for flooding (Gaschen et al., 1998).  
Flood insurance is not really economically efficient 
in Indonesia because premiums are not reflective 
of the risks and “not differentiated by the degree 
of the hazard” (Gaschen et al., 1998; 19). 
 
Key Characteristics: China 
Insurance scheme: Private and state owned insurers via composite policy; linked to fire cover. 
Types of perils and flooding 
covered by insurance: 
Not clear. 
Optional/compulsory cover: Optional. 
Insurance premium 
mechanism: 
Actuarial. 
Risk transfer mechanism: Compound policy – between risks and across low risks.  Risk may also be 
transferred to the government in the case of public insurance and to 
reinsurance via the private market. 
Penetration/ 
coverage of flood insurance: 
Low, (c. 5%) with a higher penetration in urban areas. 
Presence of state aid or 
compensation: 
Unknown. 
Summary: Very limited insurance cover available via the private market. 
Key principles of the recovery system 
Efficiency:  Unknown  
Equity principle: Individualistic risk-sensitive insurance – although most recovery is likely to 
come from the state and therefore solidaristic in nature. 
Robustness of recovery 
system: 
Low – very limited cover and potential for anti-selection. 
Key Characteristics: Indonesia 
Insurance scheme: Insurance offered by both state and private insurers: added to fire policies. 
Types of perils and flooding 
covered by insurance: 
Unknown. 
 
Optional/compulsory cover: Optional. 
Insurance premium 
mechanism: 
An additional premium tariff is charged but this is not differentiated by flood 
risk. 
Risk transfer mechanism: Risks are transferred between different areas of flood risk – but this is not 
very widely.  Also it is spread by reinsurance if necessary. 
Penetration/ 
coverage of flood insurance: 
Low (c. 20%). 
Presence of state aid or 
compensation: 
Unknown.  
Summary: Recovery is primarily via insurance. 
Key principles of the recovery system 
Efficiency:  Unknown. 
Equity principle: Solidaristic risk-insensitive insurance – but the solidarity pool is quite limited 
due to the low penetration of cover. 
Robustness of recovery 
system: 
Low – considered to be economically inefficient as it premiums are not 
flood-risk reflective.  Also only 20% of fire policies actually offer flood cover. 
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A3.4 Israel 
Israel suffers from a number of different types of 
flooding with the most severe damages being 
caused by fluvial and flash flooding due to intense 
rainfall, in particular in urban areas.  Flood 
insurance is available in Israel solely through the 
private market; the government has no 
involvement in natural hazards insurance.  
Optional flood insurance is available as a 
supplement to fire policies on domestic properties 
for an additional premium (Gaschen et al., 1998).  
A deductible of a minimum of US$100 (c. NZ$ 124) 
is applied to each claim.  Gaschen et al. (1998) 
report than penetration for flood insurance is very 
high (c. 95%). This may be for two main reasons; 
firstly until 1992 natural perils cover was included 
automatically and therefore there is a tradition of 
coverage and secondly a policy is a condition of 
having a mortgage.   The bundling of flooding with 
other perils works to spread the risk across the 
different natural hazards and therefore works 
counter to anti-selection (Gaschen et al., 1998) 
.
 
 
A3.5 Japan 
Japan is one of the most exposed countries to 
natural hazards and with large urban populations 
and economic assets; the potential for damages is 
very high.  In Japan, flood cover is excluded from 
simple fire policies; however within comprehensive 
fire policies an additional multi-risk policy can be 
added which includes cover for water damages 
sustained from typhoons, intense rainfall and 
other overflows (CCS, 2008). There is a medium 
degree of market penetration for this flood 
insurance in Japan.  Paklina (2003) suggested than 
in 2003, 49% of households had fire policies for 
buildings insurance and 35% had fire policies for 
household contents; both of which include cover 
for flooding.  An additional premium is chargeable 
which is calculated as a percentage of the capital 
 
insured but although when earthquakes are 
covered there is some differentiation according to 
the building construction type and location, with 
flooding there is no differentiation owing to risk 
(Machetti, 2009)  
 
Additionally, not all losses are indemnified by the 
cover.  Flood cover is offered on a partly co-
insurance basis with the householder required to 
themselves recover from some of the losses.  
There are the usual deductibles associated with a 
policy; but in Japan these are quite high at 30% of 
the claim.  In addition to the deductible, there is a 
level of co-insurance present and a policyholder is 
only indemnified up to 70% of the losses if the 
claim is greater than 30% of the insured value 
(Gaschen et al., 1998). 
 
Key Characteristics: Israel 
Insurance scheme: A bundled natural perils policy purchased as an add-on to fire policies. 
Types of perils and flooding 
covered by insurance: 
Flood, storm and rainfall covered. 
Optional/compulsory cover: Optional – but required with a mortgage. 
Insurance premium 
mechanism: 
An additional premium required – but not flood-risk related. 
Risk transfer mechanism: Spread across different risks (cross-subsidised).  Also has reinsurance. 
Penetration/ 
coverage of flood insurance: 
Very high (c. 95%). 
Presence of state aid or 
compensation: 
No government involvement. 
Summary: Recovery from flooding is entirely based upon private flood insurance. 
Key principles of the recovery system 
Efficiency:  Unknown. 
Equity principle: Solidaristic, risk-insensitive insurance.   
Robustness of recovery 
system: 
Medium – Very high penetration and presence of reinsurance spreads the 
risks widely.  It is unlikely that the economic viability of the insurance 
industry would be threatened by flooding.  If losses rise premiums may 
also have to increase. 
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A3.6 Philippines 
There is no government involvement in flood 
insurance solutions in the Philippines; insurance is 
only available through the private market.  
Insurance cover for flood damages is available as 
an addition to typhoon policies (which are sold 
coupled to fire policies) for an additional premium. 
The premium is partly risk-related as properties are 
divided into six different hazard zones with an 
additional premium ranging from 0.1 to 0.6‰ of 
the insured value (Gaschen et al., 1998). But these 
ratings are linked to the typhoon risk and therefore 
are not risk based for all types of flooding.  
 
 
 
Furthermore, deductibles are also applied to 
claims amounting to approximately 2% of the value.  
There is a low market penetration of insurance 
with only 10 to 20% of fire policies having a flood 
and typhoon component (Gaschen et al., 1998).  
There is a high potential for adverse selection as 
there are few mechanisms for transferring the risk 
as full flood-risk related premiums are not charged 
and it is likely that only those at higher risk will 
purchase cover.  Insurers are therefore weary 
about offering cover due to their concern about 
their exposure.   Insurers are in the most part able 
to protect themselves by purchasing reinsurance 
on the global reinsurance market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Characteristics: Japan 
Insurance scheme: Sold by the private insurance market as part of a comprehensive fire 
policy. 
Types of perils and flooding 
covered by insurance: 
All flood risks are covered resulting from typhoon, storm surge, fluvial etc. 
Optional/compulsory cover: Optional.  
Insurance premium 
mechanism: 
An additional premium is required calculated as a percentage of the total 
sum insured – but is not tied to flood risk.   
Risk transfer mechanism: To some degree it will be spread across risks; however the optional nature 
means that it is likely only to be purchased by those at risk.  Some transfer 
of risk via co-insurance and reinsurance. 
Penetration/ 
coverage of flood insurance: 
Medium penetration of c. 40% for domestic properties. 
Presence of state aid or 
compensation: 
Unknown. 
Summary: Recovery is primarily through private market insurance with a co-
insurance element which means that those insured retain a higher than 
usual element of the risk. 
Key principles of the recovery system 
Efficiency:  The co-insurance element and the limiting on indemnification is an 
incentive to reduce losses and therefore to take some mitigation activities. 
Equity principle: There is partly a solidaristic element (via the spreading amongst different 
risks) but it also firmly has an individualistic element via co-insurance. 
Robustness of recovery 
system: 
Low to Medium -The medium penetration rate leaves the scheme open to 
anti-selection which threatens the economic viability of the scheme. 
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A3.7 South Africa 
Gaschen et al. (1998) report that private flood 
insurance is only available in South Africa and that 
there is no state compensation for flooding or 
other natural perils.  Property owners are able to 
purchase flood insurance as a supplement to their 
household fire policies.  These policies do not have 
risk-reflective premiums for flood insurance and 
deductibles or co-insurance are used rarely 
(Gaschen et al., 1998).  However, there should be a 
market tariff for storm losses – in which flood is 
included – but this is not always adhered to.  Cover 
is unavailable in some of the high risk areas which 
have been repeatedly flooded.   It is suggested that 
although penetration in terms of the number of 
households covered for fire (and therefore in the 
most part also flooding) is low at 30 to 50%; in 
terms of the value in 1998 over 75% of the value of 
real estate is covered.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Characteristics:  Philippines 
Insurance scheme: An additional policy purchased alongside typhoon insurance as an add-on 
to fire policies. 
Types of perils and flooding 
covered by insurance: 
Not clearly defined. 
Optional/compulsory cover: Optional. 
Insurance premium 
mechanism: 
Additional premium – partly risk-based but on typhoon risk and therefore 
not completely tied to flood risk. 
Risk transfer mechanism: No real clear mechanism – and likely only to be purchased by those at risk.  
Only spread by reinsurance. 
Penetration/ 
coverage of flood insurance: 
Low (c. 10 to 20%). 
Presence of state aid or 
compensation: 
No compensation. 
Summary: Entirely private system of insurance which partial risk-sensitive 
Key principles of the recovery system 
Efficiency:  Appears to be little incentives for mitigation – as premiums not tied to 
flood risk.  
Equity principle: Individualistic - Partly risk-sensitive insurance. 
Robustness of recovery 
system: 
Low – high potential for anti-selection as low penetration and the risks are 
not spread widely. 
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A3.8 Taiwan 
Since 2001 any flooding caused by earthquakes 
(such as tidal wave, surge or other floods) is 
covered as part of the National Residential 
Earthquake Insurance Program (CCS, 2008).  This 
makes insurance for earthquakes (and earthquake-
related perils) compulsory as part of fire policies 
backed by a central private reinsurance pool.  It 
was enacted by the Insurance Law Amendment Act 
which was in force since July 2001 and is based on 
the Taiwan Residential Earthquake Insurance Fund 
(TREIF) and applies a unified annual flat-rate 
premium of NT$ 1,459 per policy (c. NZ$ 62) as of 
2013 (TREIF website, 2013).  Damages are insured 
for their replacement value and the maximum 
level of insurance is NT$1,200,000 (c. NZ$ 50,800) 
and when added to those living expenses which 
are able to be claimed the total claim per 
household is NT$1.38 million (c. NZ$ 58,400) 
(TREIF website, 2013).   
 
There is a multi-level reinsurance structure 
whereby some of the losses are transferred to a 
co-insurance pool, some to the government and
 some risks to third parties such as the local and 
global reinsurance market as well as capital 
markets (Machetti, 2009).  Gurenko et al. (2006) 
describe this scheme as a government-sponsored 
catastrophe insurance program. 
 
However, this insurance only appears to cover 
losses from flooding related to earthquakes.  
Gaschen et al. (1998) reports that in Taiwan flood 
insurance related to typhoon-related storm events 
was also available through the private market.  
Cover was provided as an endorsement to 
household fire insurance policies although uptake 
was very low with a penetration rate in 1998 of 
less than 1% (Gaschen et al., 1998).  The state was 
considered to have high control of the product In 
terms of both premiums and the design of the 
scheme.  Gaschen et al. (1998) highlighted that 
penetration is low for two reasons; because 
premiums are high and fluctuate relative to flood 
risk and low flood and product awareness.  
Additionally, anti-selection is also considered to be 
a major issue. 
 
 
Key Characteristics:  South Africa 
Insurance scheme: Private insurance as an add-on to fire policies. 
Types of perils and flooding 
covered by insurance: 
Unknown – definitely flooding tied to storm events. 
Optional/compulsory cover: Optional. 
Insurance premium 
mechanism: 
There is a national market tariff for flooding related to storm but this is 
not always adhered to. 
Risk transfer mechanism: Not really clear if it is bundled with other perils – spread probably only by 
reinsurance. 
Penetration/ 
coverage of flood insurance: 
Medium to low penetration < 50%, but in 1998 three-quarters of assets 
were covered 
Presence of state aid or 
compensation: 
No state compensation. 
Summary: A completely private insurance system – not completely free-market 
based as there are market tariffs in place for this insurance. 
Key principles of the recovery system 
Efficiency:  Coverage is unavailable in high risk areas which limits exposure of the 
insurers and may encourage some mitigation – but this is unlikely. 
Equity principle: Individualistic, Risk-insensitive insurance. 
Robustness of recovery 
system: 
Low to Medium - The worst anti-selection may be avoided as high risk 
areas are excluded.  But little spreading of the risks and therefore the 
economic viability of the scheme may be exposed. 
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Key Characteristics:  Taiwan 
Insurance scheme: Private insurance for typhoon-
related flooding 
National Residential Earthquake 
Insurance Program includes some 
flood elements. 
Types of perils and flooding 
covered by insurance: 
Limited to typhoon-related 
flooding. 
Earthquake-related flood risks. 
Optional/compulsory cover: Optional endorsement to fire 
policies 
Compulsory on all fire policies. 
Insurance premium 
mechanism: 
Premiums for the additional 
component are risk-reflective. 
A flat-rate additional premium is 
added. 
Risk transfer mechanism: Premiums are risk-reflective – and 
also via reinsurance. 
Some across risks – but largely by 
transferring it to a co-insurance 
pool. 
Penetration/ 
coverage of flood insurance: 
Very low penetration. Unknown – although the 
compulsory element should make it 
relatively high. 
Presence of state aid or 
compensation: 
Unknown. 
Summary: Compulsory insurance on fire policies backed by a co-insurance pool which 
is spread further by a number of financial mechanisms for earthquake 
related risks.   
Key principles of the recovery system 
Efficiency:  Unclear – but it appears both 
systems are not to be tied to 
mitigation activities. 
The co-insurance part of the system 
should provide some incentives for 
mitigation. 
Equity principle: Individualistic risk-sensitive 
insurance system 
National solidaristic approach – 
affords a minimal protection to 
everyone. 
Robustness of recovery 
system: 
Low - High potential for anti-
selection as low penetration. 
Medium – Risks are spread quite 
widely which should provide some 
economic viability.  The compulsory 
nature broadens the pool. 
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Appendix B:  Exchange rates into New Zealand 
dollars 
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Local currency information was translated into NZ dollars as per the exchange rate on the 1st June 2013 – 
using the exchange rates in the table below. 
 
Currency NZ$1 equivalent 
Australian dollar (AUS$) 0.8367 
Brazilian real (BRL) 1.7053 
Canadian dollar (CA$  ) 0.8335 
Swiss Francs (CHF) 0.7716 
Danish krone (DKK) 4.6231 
Euro (€) 0.6203 
British Pound (GBP) 0.5313 
Norwegian krone (NOK) 4.7156 
New Taiwan dollar (NT$) 23.6278 
Turkish lira  (NTL) 1.5142 
Swedish krona (SEK) 5.3127 
United States dollar(US$) 0.8091 
 
Taken from the Yahoo finance currency convertor www.finance.yahoo.com/currency-converter/ 
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Appendix C:  Glossary of insurance terms 
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This glossary provides some basic definitions and focuses primarily on insurance terms.  Where terms have 
been defined in literature the courses are provided. 
 
‰ Per every thousand. 
Actuarial premium The price that would cover the expected claims cost determined using sound 
actuarial principles along with a margin for expenses and profit. 
 
An actuarially derived premium is one which is based on the expected cost of 
claims, taking into account the severity and likelihood of an event. 
Commonwealth of Australia (2011a; 142 and 144) 
All risks “A property insurance which covers any accidental loss or damage that is not 
specifically excluded under the policy” 
Lloyd’s website (2013) 
Anti-selection (or 
adverse-selection) 
Also referred to as adverse-selection or negative-selection 
 
A hazard to the robustness of an insurance system. “Insurance coverage is mostly 
requested by people in flood-prone areas who are frequently affected by floods, 
whereas people in low or residual risk areas are not interested in flood insurance 
coverage. Thus, the basic principle of pooling of risks is violated” 
Thieken et al., (2006; 384) 
Catastrophe 
reinsurance 
“A form of reinsurance that indemnifies the ceding company for the 
accumulation of losses in excess of a stipulated sum arising from a single 
catastrophic event or series of events.” 
IRMI website (2013) 
Claim - this is also 
referred to as a Loss. 
“Injury or loss to the insured arising so as to cause liability to the insurer under a 
policy it has issued.” 
British Insurance Brokers' Association website (2013) 
Co-insurance “In property insurance, requires the policyholder to carry insurance equal to a 
specified percentage of the value of property to receive full payment on a loss.”  
AM Best website (2013) 
Condition of average A potential condition on an insurance policy which takes account of the 
difference between the sum insured and the actual current value of a property 
(i.e. the degree of underinsurance).  In situations where this clause exists, when 
partial loss occurs the pay-out received through the insurance policy will be 
adjusted (pro-rata) to the same proportion as the value of the underinsurance. 
Contents insurance This refers to the coverage that is available for the personal belongings and 
fixtures and fittings of a property. 
Correlated Risk Correlated risk refers to the simultaneous occurrence of many losses from a 
single event… natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, and hurricanes 
produce highly correlated losses: many homes in the affected area are damaged 
and destroyed by a single event. 
Kunreuther (2007; 6) 
Cover “(1) A contract of insurance. (2) To effect insurance. (3) To include within the 
coverage of a contract of insurance.” 
IRMI website (2013) 
Coverage “The scope of protection provided under an insurance policy. In property 
insurance, coverage lists perils insured against, properties covered, locations 
covered, individuals insured, and the limits of indemnification.” 
AM Best website (2013) 
Deductible 
 
Or excess 
 
“the deductible is that portion of the loss that policyholders have to bear 
themselves” 
Hausmann et al. (2012; 7) 
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These are often used 
interchangeably and 
also some claim a 
technical difference 
they are practical 
terms similar. 
“The specified amount a loss must exceed before a claim is payable. Only the 
amount which is in excess of the deductible is recoverable.” 
British Insurance Brokers' Association website (2013) 
 
“The first portion of a loss or claim which is borne by the insured. An excess can 
be either voluntary to obtain premium benefit or imposed for underwriting 
reasons.” 
British Insurance Brokers' Association website (2013) 
 
“In the context of an insurance policy, an excess is the amount for which a 
policyholder is liable in the event of a claim.” 
Commonwealth of Australia (2011a; 142) 
Direct material 
damages 
This refers to the actual damages to a property, land or contents, rather than 
other losses such as business interruption or loss of income. 
Efficiency For the purposes of this report when efficiency is referred to in relation to 
whether an insurance or recovery system’s is designed to provide incentives for 
flood mitigation and its effectiveness in doing so. 
Based on IIASA (1999, p3). 
Endorsement “An insurance policy form that either changes or adds to the provisions included 
in one or more other forms used to construct the policy, such as the declarations 
page or the coverage form.” 
IRMI website (2013) 
 
A document that is attached to a slip, cover note or policy which evidences one 
or more changes in the terms of the insurance or reinsurance contract to 
which it refers. 
Lloyd’s website (2013) 
Excess See deductible 
Exposure “Measure of vulnerability to loss, usually expressed in dollars or units.” 
AM Best website (2013) 
First-loss policy “A type of property insurance policy that provides only partial insurance. In the 
event of a claim, the policyholder agrees to accept an amount less than the full 
value of damaged, destroyed or stolen items/property. In return, the insurer 
agrees to not penalize the policyholder for under-insuring their goods or 
property….In a first-loss policy claim event, the policyholder does not seek 
compensation for losses below the first-loss level. Premiums are calculated 
proportionately - meaning they are not based on the full value of total goods or 
property.” 
Investopedia website (2013)  
Flat-rate premium A premium which is offered at the same rate for all those insured, i.e. there is no 
differentiation according to risk. 
General insurance All non-life insurance policies including household policies and motor insurance 
policies 
Guarantee In this report refers to the assurance by a private or public organisation to 
assume responsibility for the loss (or part of a loss) if one or more of the insurers 
or other organisations default on their responsibilities.  A guarantee may be 
limited or unlimited in nature.  
Indemnity “A principle whereby the insurer seeks to place the insured in the same position 
after a loss as he occupied immediately before the loss (as far as possible).” 
British Insurance Brokers' Association website (2013) 
 
“Restoration to the victim of a loss by payment, repair or replacement.” 
AM Best website (2013) 
 A-58 
 
Indemnity value The value of the above. 
Insurability “Acceptability to the insurer of an applicant for insurance at a given rate.” 
IRMI website (2013) 
Insurable value “The value of the insurable interest which the insured has in the insured 
occurrence or event. It is the amount to be paid out by the insurer (assuming full 
insurance) in the event of total loss or destruction of the item insured.” 
British Insurance Brokers' Association website (2013) 
Insurant Someone who takes out an insurance policy (i.e. those who are insured) 
Limit “The insurer's maximum liability under an insurance, which may be expressed 
'per accident', 'per event', 'per occurrence', 'per annum', etc.” 
British Insurance Brokers' Association website (2013) 
Loss-ratio A measure of an insurer’s financial performance, calculated by dividing total 
claims cost over the period by total premiums over the period. 
Commonwealth of Australia (2011a; 143) 
Market solvency “Having sufficient assets--capital, surplus, reserves--and being able to satisfy 
financial requirements--investments, annual reports, examinations--to be eligible 
to transact insurance business and meet liabilities.” 
AM Best website (2013) 
Mitigation Mitigation refers to the elimination or reduction in the frequency, magnitude, or 
severity of exposure to risks, and associated losses. 
Commonwealth of Australia (2011a; 143) 
Moral hazard “Insured individuals may behave less carefully when they have insurance 
coverage, while this is unobservable by the insurer.” 
Botzen and van den Bergh (2008; 419-420) 
 
For instance, homeowners may not try to save property out of the way of flood 
waters as they realise that they will be able to claim for losses.  Deductibles and 
upper limits on insurance coverage are usual ways of tackling moral hazard. 
New for Old “Where insurers agree to pay the cost of property lost or destroyed without 
deduction for depreciation.” 
British Insurance Brokers' Association website (2013) 
Parametric insurance 
(reinsurance) 
Insurance or reinsurance that does not provide cover for the total loss.  Instead 
this cover will pay out based on a prior agreement of a value following the 
occurrence of a flood or other natural peril.  This is most viable for high intensity 
but low frequency events and avoids the necessity for post-event damage 
assessment. 
Peril “A contingency, of fortuitous happening, which may be covered or excluded by a 
policy of insurance.” 
British Insurance Brokers' Association website (2013) 
Personal lines “Insurance which is sold to individual consumers such as buildings, contents and 
travel insurance. This term is used in contrast to commercial lines.” 
Lloyd’s website (2013) 
Policy “A document detailing the terms and conditions applicable to an insurance 
contract and constituting legal evidence of the agreement to insure. It is issued 
by an insurer or his representative for the first period of risk. On renewal a new 
policy may well not be issued although the same conditions would apply, and the 
current wording would be evidence by the renewal receipt.” 
British Insurance Brokers' Association website (2013) 
Policyholder A person who holds an insurance policy and by it contracts with an insurer for 
coverage against specified events. 
QFCI (2012; 651) 
Premium A premium is the amount charged by an insurer to the policyholder enabling 
them to cover an agreed risk. It includes the expected cost of claims; 
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administration processes and insurer profit, and usually includes taxes and levies. 
Commonwealth of Australia (2011a; 144) 
Private insurer A private insurer refers to an insurance company, rather than a state or 
government- owned or controlled insurer. 
After QFCI (2012) 
Property insurance The cover that is available for losses or damage to the property or building. 
 
Also known as structural insurance. 
Reinstatement “Making good. Where insured property is damaged, it is usual for settlement to 
be effected through the payment of a sum of money, but a policy may give either 
the insured or insurer the option to restore or rebuild instead.” 
British Insurance Brokers' Association website (2013) 
Reinsurance Reinsurance is insurance purchased by insurers and is used as a way to transfer 
risk from the insurer to the reinsurer. 
Commonwealth of Australia (2011a; 145) 
Replacement value As new replacement. 
 
Replacement value cover provides for the full reinstatement of a damaged home 
to its original size and standard regardless of depreciation or age and in 
accordance with prevailing building standards. Replacement value cover usually 
includes the removal of debris and re-building fees in the event of a total loss 
claim. 
Commonwealth of Australia (2011a; 145) 
Reserve “An amount representing actual or potential liabilities kept by an insurer to cover 
debts to policyholders. A reserve is usually treated as a liability.” 
AM Best website (2013) 
 
A statutory reserve is one that is required by law whereas a voluntary reserve is 
one that an insurer may choose to allocate surplus to strengthen their financial 
structure. 
Risk-related premium Risk-related premiums have some degree of price modulation in accordance with 
the exposure (risk level) to some extent. 
Stop Loss “Any provision in a policy designed to cut off an insurer's losses at a given point.” 
IRMI website (2013) 
Sub-limit A sub-limit in an insurance policy refers to the maximum amount of cover applied 
to a particular section of the policy. 
Commonwealth of Australia (2011a; 145) 
Sum insured A sum insured refers to the amount of cover, expressed in dollars, that is 
provided by an insurance policy. It is the maximum amount payable on each 
claim under the policy. 
Commonwealth of Australia (2011a; 146) 
Supplement See endorsement 
Technically-priced 
premiums 
See full actuarial premiums. 
Total loss “Where the subject matter of an insurance is lost, destroyed or damaged beyond 
repair.” 
Lloyd’s website (2013) 
 
